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Introduction
In the 1970’s, what became known as the “‘rational expectations revolution” trans-
formed macroeconomic research. Up until then, macroeconomics had concentrated
on estimating systems of ad hoc aggregate relations (“Cowles macroeconometrics”)
with little reference to individual decision making or to the underlying microeco-
nomic heterogeneity. Following the contributions by, among others, Lucas, Sargent,
and Wallace macroeconomic outcomes were cast as dynamic stochastic equilibria
which were the result of rational optimal decision making by economic agents (Lu-
cas, 1972; Sargent and Wallace, 1976). However, initial research on this new type of
quantitative macroeconomic models which built on the influential work by Kydland
and Prescott also abstracted from macroeconomic heterogeneity and instead made
use of the assumption of a representative agent and firm (Kydland and Prescott,
1982). At that time, economists were lacking the conceptual and numerical tools for
solving dynamic models that explicitly accounted for microeconomic heterogeneity
and frictions. Also, it was not obvious that more detailed attention to these phe-
nomena was important when trying to understand the business cycle dynamics of
aggregate quantities and prices, or long-run growth.
In the last two decades, two simultaneous developments have changed this. First,
microeconometric research in labor economics and industrial organization has re-
vealed large and persistent cross-sectional dispersion and idiosyncratic volatility
among individual market participants. The risk that a single household or firm
faces is typically an order of magnitude larger than what is measured for aggregate
variables. To give an example, even within four-digit SIC industries in the U.S. man-
ufacturing sector, the average difference in logged total factor productivity (TFP)
1
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between an industry’s 90th and 10th percentile is 0.651. This means that a plant at
the 90th percentile produces almost twice as much output with the same measured
inputs as does the 10th percentile plant. The fact that these productivity differences
are quite persistent begs the question what feature of the microeconomic structure in
factor or product markets keeps factors from being reallocated to the more efficient
production units and what this implies for aggregate productivity (Syverson, 2004;
Foster et al., 2008).
The second important development was the dramatic reduction in the cost and
availability of computing power1 and the development of a conceptual framework for
modeling the interaction of microeconomic heterogeneity and frictions with macroe-
conomic outcomes. Early contributions dealt with the steady state properties of an
economy with entry, exit and within-industry productivity heterogeneity (Hopen-
hayn, 1992; Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993) and the effect of market incomplete-
ness on aggregate savings and the real interest rate (Huggett, 1993; Aiyagari, 1994).
An important milestone was the extension by Krusell and Smith which allowed to
compute dynamic aggregate equilibria in the presence of aggregate business cycle
risk and uninsurable risk while tracking the entire distribution of economic agents
(Krusell and Smith, 1997, 1998). In recent times, ever more efficient algorithms for
handling equilibrium dynamics under rational expectations and in the presence of
microeconomic heterogeneity have become available (Algan et al., 2010; Den Haan
and Rendahl, 2010; Kim et al., 2010; Malin et al., 2011; Reiter, 2010).
This dissertation contributes to the ongoing research agenda of trying to under-
stand macroeconomic outcomes in their interdependence with the underlying mi-
croeconomic heterogeneity and frictions. The first chapter investigates the effects of
modeling plant-level productivity heterogeneity and frictions to capital adjustment
on aggregate investment dynamics in the context of a two-country general equilib-
rium framework. The third chapter extends this notion of plant-heterogeneity by
introducing idiosyncratic differences in demand alongside productivity heterogene-
ity. The context there is a partial equilibrium framework where plants face sunk
entry and fixed costs to be able to serve export markets. The economic application
is a study of aggregate export elasticities to different kinds of aggregate shocks using
1This development includes the increase in the number of operations per second of individual
CPUs, the much improved scalability and accesibility of CPU clusters and, more recently, shared
memory parallelization in desktop computers using multi-core CPUs and specialized GPUs.
2
a version of the model that has been estimated on plant-level data. The second
chapter differs from the others in that its focus is on worker heterogeneity together
with a more general notion of job heterogeneity which may but does not have to
result from differences in plant heterogeneity. Individual workers face a search fric-
tion in the labor market and we study its implications for resulting wage inequality.
This application is set in a partial equilibrium setting as well. I give a more detailed
summary of each chapter in the remainder of this introduction.
Chapter 1.2 This chapter introduces fixed costs to capital adjustment at the
plant-level into an otherwise standard two country real business cycle model. The
presence of fixed adjustment costs implies increasing returns to scale in the invest-
ment technology. Plants therefore adjust in a “lumpy” fashion, i.e. in infrequent large
bursts. A large literature that tries to micro-found aggregate investment has estab-
lished this as an accurate description of plant investment behavior (Caballero et al.,
1995; Doms and Dunne, 1998; Cooper et al., 1999; Bachmann and Bayer, 2011a,b).
In contrast, international real business cycle models when fitting the volatility of
investment series from national accounts have typically relied on convex adjustment
costs to capital at the aggregate level (Baxter and Crucini, 1993; Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe, 2003). Previous studies in a closed economy general equilibrium setting
found no effects of microeconomic fixed costs to capital adjustment on aggregate
investment dynamics (Khan and Thomas, 2003, 2008).
The calibrated model yields two main results. First, unlike in the closed economy
setting, in a two country model non-convex capital adjustment costs matter for the
aggregate in that they dampen investment dynamics at the national level. The
effect is the stronger, the more open an economy is to trade and it vanishes when
letting the model converge towards two separate closed economies. Second, the
aggregate dynamics of the model can be accurately replicated by the assumption of a
homogeneous firm facing convex adjustment costs. This is a useful finding for applied
work since the homogeneous firm model is much simpler to solve. Finally, while for
any value of fixed adjustment costs there exists an accurate convex adjustment cost
approximation, our results caution against attaching a structural interpretation to
estimated convex adjustment costs from open economy models. While the mapping
2The chapter is based on the paper “Large Open Economies and Fixed Costs of Capital Adjust-
ment”, which I jointly wrote with Christian Bayer, (Bayer and Tjaden, 2013).
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from fixed to convex adjustment costs is stable with respect to variations in demand
side parameters (openness, investment tax credits), it is not invariant to variations
in those parameters that directly enter the firm’s trade-off between investment and
non-adjustment, i.e. mark-up and idiosyncratic risk.
Chapter 2.3 The second chapter leaves the realm of international economics and
moves to labor economics instead. We try to understand how much of observed wage
inequality is due the presence of a search friction in the labor market. Mincerian
wage regressions explain only about a third of observed wage variation which means
that much inequality is among observationally equivalent workers. If sampling job
offers in unemployment takes time and is subject to the opportunity cost of foregone
wages, identical workers rationally accept a range of heterogeneous job offers. Under-
standing how much of residual inequality results from search frictions as opposed to
unobserved heterogeneity is of first order importance when evaluating the efficiency
of labor markets and designing appropriate social insurance schemes. Previous re-
search found more than 40 percent of wage inequality to be frictional (Postel-Vinay
and Robin, 2002; Carrillo-Tudela, 2012).
A key mechanism for generating large frictional dispersion in search models is the
ability to continue sampling job offers on the job (Hornstein et al., 2012). The more
job offers workers receive on the job, the less of an option they are giving up when
moving out of unemployment. This makes them more willing to accept relatively
poor job offers and allows them to quickly move into very good matches which means
many high wage workers.
We provide empirical evidence from the Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation (SIPP) that an important share of job to job transitions is however not value
improving. We build a structural search model that explicitly accounts for those
losses. It includes a number of important channels that enlarge the set of acceptable
job offers to the worker: skill accumulation on the job, skill loss in unemployment
and search on the job. Nonetheless, and in contrast to previous findings, the model
attributes only 14 percent of total wage inequality to the search friction. The crucial
novelty that explains our different estimates is the introduction of reallocation shocks
3The chapter, “Quantifying the Contribution of Search to Wage Inequality” is based on a joint
project with Felix Wellschmied, (Tjaden and Wellschmied, 2013). That paper previously cir-
culated as “Exploring the Causes of Frictional Wage Inequality”, (Tjaden and Wellschmied,
2012).
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for employed workers. They leave the worker only the outside option of accepting
a new job or moving into unemployment. When excluding that assumption, our
estimated contribution of the search friction to wage inequality jumps to 38 percent,
much closer to previous estimates.
Chapter 3.4 The third chapter returns to the field of international economics.
When manufacturing plants enter into the export market, they on average exhibit
higher export revenue growth rates than incumbent exporters for a number of years
and an exit hazard from exporting that is declining in tenure. These facts are at
odds with standard fixed cost models typically used in empirical studies of export
participation (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Das et al., 2007; Willis and Ruhl, 2009).
They hint at the presence of a market specific demand factor that entrants have to
slowly accumulate. I explore the the macroeconomic implications of introducing this
notion of customer capital into a dynamic model of plant exporting behavior. Other
sources of heterogeneity are differences in revenue productivity and stochastic entry
and fixed costs of exporting.
I structurally estimate the model on a large panel data set of German manufactur-
ing plants between 1995 and 2008. The estimation method is a Simulated Method
of Moments (SMM) procedure. The high dimensionality of the problem induces me
to use a global particle swarm optimization algorithm to find the minimum of the
objective function. The results provide a first estimate from plant level data of the
costs of maintaining and expanding a costumer base in export markets. Implied
costs are sizable and constitute by far the most important export associated costs.
During the time of the sample, the average firm spends between 3 and 4 millions
of 1995 euros on marketing activities. Average entry costs into exporting of around
33,467 euros are comparatively small.
In terms of predictive power, the model outperforms a standard fixed cost model
of exporting by correctly predicting the sizable export expansion in the data after
the year 2003. The model can also reconcile large predicted trade gains after a tar-
iff reduction with a relatively low elasticity of substitution between exported and
domestic goods in the export market. The discrepancy between high estimated sub-
stitution elasticities from trade reactions to tariff liberalizations and low elasticities
4The chapter is based on the paper “Foreign Customer Accumulation and Export Dynamics”,
(Tjaden, 2013).
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Introduction
needed to reproduce export dynamics at business cycle frequency had previously
been called the elasticity puzzle of international economics.
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Chapter1
Large Open Economies and Fixed Costs of
Capital Adjustment
1.1 Introduction
Since Backus et al. (1992) adapted the real business cycle model to the context of
international economics, it has been well known that the model suffers in this context
from excess volatility in capital reallocation across countries. The introduction of
trade in intermediate goods as in Backus et al. (1994) tends to mitigate the effect, but
this depends crucially on parameter values and model assumptions. An ample range
of applications remains in which the assumption of unobstructed, frictionless capital
flows across borders implies an investment volatility relative to output far in excess
to what is consistent with national data.1 As was first demonstrated by Baxter and
Crucini (1993), the model’s fit can be significantly improved by the introduction of
convex adjustment costs to capital at the national level. Over time, this has become
a standard practice.
However, this can only remain a kludge for removing excess investment volatil-
ity as macroeconomic research micro-founding aggregate investment behavior has
found fixed and not convex adjustment costs to be the dominant friction to capital
adjustment at the plant or firm level.2 A priori, it is not clear whether a stand-in
representative firm with quadratic adjustment costs is a good representation of many
1Common examples are the cases of perfect substitutability between consumption goods in multi-
country models (e.g. Den Haan et al. (2011)), a small open economy setting (e.g. Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2003)) or the presence of nominal frictions (e.g. Chari et al. (2002)).
2Early studies using US data are Caballero et al. (1995), Doms and Dunne (1998), Caballero and
Engel (1999) and Cooper et al. (1999). More recent examples are Gourio and Kashyap (2007)
using US data and Bachmann and Bayer (2011a,b) using German firm-level data.
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firms that exhibit lumpy investment. This leaves open what effect on the micro-level
these representative firm open economy models actually capture; renders their esti-
mated versions potentially subject to the Lucas critique; and finally challenges their
policy predictions. We therefore introduce fixed capital adjustment costs into an
otherwise standard two goods, two country real business cycle model in the spirit of
Backus et al. (1994) and ask what the aggregate consequences are.
Specifically, we want to answer in a model of two large open economies the following
three questions: First, do fixed adjustment costs at the firm level have aggregate
consequences at all? Second – if so – can these effects be captured by a stand in
aggregate model with convex adjustment costs and a representative firm? Third – if
they can – how stable are the identified convex adjustment cost parameters of this
stand-in model with respect to changes in the non-adjustment-cost parameters of
the underlying lumpy-investment model?
We find that fixed adjustment costs do matter for the aggregate, that their effects
can be captured by quadratic adjustment costs, but that the so identified quadratic
costs change when non-adjustment cost parameters change, i.e. quadratic costs lack
”fundamentalness”.
Given that fixed costs and quadratic costs are often cast as rival specifications our
research strategy, which is closely related to Chang et al. (2010),3 may come as a
surprise. Our reason for exploring the possibility of representing fixed adjustment
costs by quadratic ones is the following: All papers studying the role of fixed adjust-
ment costs in general equilibrium have found approximate aggregation in the sense of
Krusell and Smith (1998). In particular, they found that a log-linear law of motion
describes the dynamics of the aggregate stock of capital, the only endogenous aggre-
gate state variable in these models, just as it does in a quadratic adjustment-cost
model. This suggests that such a model can capture the aggregate dynamics of the
heterogenous firm, lumpy investment model.
In a one-sector closed economy model, Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) show this
to be true in a very specific sense. They find fixed adjustment costs to be entirely ir-
relevant for aggregate dynamics. Hence, firms can be represented by a single firm not
facing any adjustment costs. In their closed economy general equilibrium model, this
3They have recently argued for more caution when aggregating over ex post heterogeneous micro
units in the presence of frictions. They look at an incomplete-markets, heterogeneous household
setup, and show that the estimated parameters of homogeneous agents models in these settings
can often lack “fundamentalness” in the sense of the Lucas critique.
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irrelevance result arises because the household’s desire to smooth consumption does
not allow for much variation in savings behavior. This yields that small additional
changes in the interest rate undo all potential aggregate effects of microeconomic
lumpiness in a closed economy because indivdiual investment timing is very sen-
sitive to interest rate movements notwithstanding the fixed adjustment costs, see
House (2008), while savings are not. In an open economy setting, domestic savings
are not the only means to finance investment and consumption smoothing can also
be achieved via movements in the current account. This should, in theory, dampen
interest rate responses which leaves room for fixed adjustment costs to matter.
This intuition turns out to be right. In a two country model, non-convex capital
adjustment costs matter for the aggregate in that they dampen investment dynamics
at the national level. The effect is the stronger, the more open an economy is to trade
(i.e., the smaller its home bias in consumption), such that the Khan and Thomas
(2003, 2008) result obtains when letting the model converge towards a model of two
separate closed economies.
Finding a dampening effect of fixed costs and approximate aggregation lets us
investigate then our conjecture of approximate representation. Indeed, a homoge-
neous firm facing convex adjustment costs can act as a handy stand-in to replicate
the aggregate dynamics. Finally, we asses the ”fundamentalness” of these convex
adjustment cost approximations. To do so, we construct matches between convex
and non-convex adjustment cost parameters while varying other model parameters,
in particular openness to trade, the introduction of an investment tax credit, vari-
ations in the idiosyncratic profitability risk, and the curvature of the production
function (characterizing the mark-up firms can charge). It turns out that the link
between the two cost specifications is stable with respect to variations in those model
parameters that only characterize the aggregate trade-off between investment and
consumption, i.e. openness and the tax credit. Yet, it is not stable to variations in
those parameters that directly enter the (firm’s) trade-off between investment and
non-adjustment, i.e. the mark-up and the idiosyncratic risk.
The intuition for these seemingly contradictory findings is rather straightforward
if one thinks of the equilibrium as the solution to a social planner’s problem. A
social planner chooses sequences of distributions of capital across production units
in order to maximize utility of the representative household from consumption and
leisure. In choosing these distributions, the planner needs to take into account both
the direct costs from capital adjustment as well as the indirect, efficiency costs from
9
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having otherwise equal plants employing different levels of capital. Between the two
costs there is a trade-off. The more frequent firms adjust, the more adjustment costs
are paid but the more efficiently is the aggregate stock of capital distributed. This
means non-adjustment at the firm level has an efficiency cost, which is a function
of the curvature of the production function and the dispersion of bliss-points in
capital stocks. More specifically, non-adjustment is the more costly, the higher the
production function’s curvature and the faster the distribution of bliss points flattens
out due to idiosyncratic shocks, i.e. the more these shocks are dispersed; and if non-
adjustment at the firm level is more costly, the more often will a social planner change
idiosyncratic capital stocks, which – as a byproduct – allows to be more reactive to
aggregate shocks, too.4 Similarly, if the curvature is low, the planner can use the
intensive margin of those firms adjusting to react to aggregate shocks.
This in mind, our first result of approximate representation (beyond approximate
aggregation) implies that the cost of adjustment in the aggregate are approximately
quadratic. Second, since changes in parameters outside the firm’s problem (openness,
investment tax-credit) do not affect the trade-off between efficiency and adjustment
frequency, they do not change the approximate representative firms’ problem. Third,
since changes in curvature or risk effectively change this trade-off, changes in the
production function (or in productivity heterogeneity) change the adjustment costs
of the approximately representative firm.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews a num-
ber related recent contributions to the literature. Section 3 presents the model.
Section 4 briefly introduces the numerical solution method. Section 5 explains pa-
rameter choices. Section 6 presents our main results – fixed adjustment costs mat-
ter but aggregate dynamics are indistinguishable from a representative firm model
with quadratic adjustment costs. Section 7 discusses how stand-in quadratic ad-
justment costs co-depend on other model parameters. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
An appendix provides more detailed information concerning the calibration of fixed
adjustment costs and the numerical solution procedure.
1.2 Related Literature
4Berger and Vavra (2010) show a similar result for variations in risk in a sticky price model. When
idiosyncratic risk increases, then price setting becomes more flexible in their model.
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A number of other recent papers have shown applications in which the non-convexity
of plant-level decisions does matter in shaping aggregate dynamics. Bachmann et al.
(2010) show that lumpiness in the capital adjustment decision helps explain the pro-
cyclicality of the aggregate investment response to TFP shocks in U.S. data. Fiori
(2012) introduces a two-sector RBC model in which non-convex capital adjustment
costs in the investment goods producing sector allow the model to replicate a hump-
shaped response of aggregate investment to productivity shocks. Given that a two-
country model can also be interpreted as a model with two large sectors, our result
reinforces the importance of fixed capital adjustment costs in inter-sectoral realloca-
tion. Bachmann and Ma (2012) solve a closed economy model in which aggregate
savings can also take the form of inventory accumulation. They show that a fixed cost
to restocking inventories and fixed capital adjustment costs have mutually reinforc-
ing effects on aggregate dynamics. In Sustek (2011) plants face non-convex costs to
using different forms of shift work. In consequence, output volatility is reduced and
becomes countercyclical. Most similar in spirit to our work is a paper by Miao and
Wang (2011) developed parallel which derives conditions under which the aggregate
dynamics in a model where firms face both fix and convex capital adjustment costs
can be represented by a model where only convex costs are present and Tobin’s Q is
a sufficient statistic for describing investment dynamics. Their paper demonstrates
that the form of the convex cost function in the isomorphic representation depends
on the size of non-convex adjustment costs. In contrast to our approach, Miao and
Wang (2011) assume constant returns to scale in production at the micro level and
then use convex capital adjustment costs alongside fixed ones to avoid a degenerated
firm problem. By dropping the constant returns to scale assumption, we can show
that the curvature of the production function and the distribution of idiosyncratic
profitabilities enters in the convex adjustment cost representation.
1.3 The Model
We model a world economy composed of two countries Home and Foreign (where
necessary, country specific variables will be distinguished by the superscripts H and
F respectively). Each country is populated by a representative household and a
continuum of firms producing an intermediate good which differs between the two
11
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countries. Competitive final goods producers use these inputs to produce a local
composite good used for investment and consumption. There exists a complete
set of contingent claims which ensures international consumption risk sharing. The
challenge in solving the model lies in the solution of the intermediate goods producers’
problem in both countries. Here, we closely follow Khan and Thomas (2008) and
can therefore be brief in referring the reader to these papers for further explanations.
Our focus will instead lie on the necessary adaptations to the solution method for it
to be applicable to our model.
1.3.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households in both economies who work and con-
sume and who have access to complete international asset markets. Their felicity
function is defined on the consumption of their local consumption good and in (in-
divisible) labor, which they supply on the local labor market:
U(Cj, Nj) = log(Cj)− ANj, (1.1)
where Cj denotes consumption in country j and Nj the households labor supply in
country j.
Households hold wealth as one-period shares in plants denoted by the measure
λj. Given the prices they receive for their current shares ρ
j
0 (, l; zˆ, m) and the real
wage rate Wj/P
C
j , households choose current consumption Cj, labor effort Nj and
the number of new shares λ′j (, k) to buy at prices ρ
j
1 (
′, k′; zˆ, m). (zˆ, m) summarizes
the aggregate state and is defined further below. Households maximize the expected
discounted present value of intertemporal utility:
W (λj; zˆ, m) = max
Cj ,Nj ,λ′
[U (Cj, Nj) + βE [W (λ′; zˆ′,m′)]]
subject to
Cj +
ˆ
ρj1 (
′, k′; zˆ, m) d (′ × k′) ≤ Wj/PCj +
ˆ
ρj0 (, k; zˆ, m) d (× k)
Let λ be the Lagrangian multiplier on the household’s intertemporal budget con-
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straint. We obtain the first-order conditions with respect to consumption
λPCj = UC(Cj, Nj) =
1
Cj
, (1.2)
where PCj is the current price of the final consumption good in country j. With
respect to labor we obtain
λWj = −UN(Cj, Nj) (1.3)
where Wj is the nominal wage in country j. Combining this with the first order
condition on consumption and plugging in the assumed functional forms we obtain
Wj/P
C
j = ACj.
Note that with complete international financial markets the resulting allocation
must be efficient. This, together with the assumption of symmetric initial endow-
ments, implies equal Pareto weights and hence the risk sharing condition UC(CF ,NF )
PCF
=
UC(CH ,NH)
PCH
.
1.3.2 Final Goods Producers
In both countries, consumption and investment use a composite good produced by
a competitive final goods producer. The final goods producer in country j combines
intermediate goods XH,Fj , where X
H
j (X
F
j ) are intermediate goods produced in the
Home (Foreign) country and used in country j. Final consumption goods in country
j are produced using the constant returns to scale production function:
Gj(X
H
j , X
F
j ) =
[
ω
1
σXjj
σ−1
σ + (1− ω) 1σX¬jj
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, j = H,F,
where ω measures the home-bias or importance of local intermediate goods for the
final goods production, ¬j denotes the respective other country.
Final goods markets are competitive. Let PXj be the price of the intermediate
good produced in country j. Then final goods producers solve the cost minimization
problem:
min
XHj ,X
F
j
PXHX
H
j + P
X
F X
F
j (1.4)
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s.t.
Gj(X
H
j , X
F
j ) = 1
This cost minimization and perfect competition imply that the price of the consump-
tion good PCj in country j is given by
PCj =
[
ω
(
PXj
)1−σ
+ (1− ω) (PX¬j)1−σ] 11−σ .
Using the Home country intermediate good as a numeraire and normalizing PXH to
one we obtain as prices for the final consumption good:
PCH (τ) = [ω + (1− ω)τ 1−σ]
1
1−σ
PCF (τ) = [ωτ
1−σ + (1− ω)] 11−σ = τPCH
(
τ−1
)
where τ =
PXF
PXH
denotes the terms of trade.
1.3.3 Intermediate Goods Producers
The more complicated planning problem is the one of the intermediate goods pro-
ducer. In both countries, intermediate goods producers employ predetermined capi-
tal and labor and produce according to a Cobb-Douglas decreasing-returns-to-scale
production function
y = z(kχn1−χ)
1
η
where z is stochastic total factor productivity common to all firms in the country
and  is firm-specific productivity. A way of reading the decreasing returns-to-scale
assumption is as constant returns-to-scale in production with capital share χ cum
monopolistic competition in intermediate goods, where firms earn a mark-up of η on
their sales. This implies revenue elasticities of capital θ = 1
η
χ and ν = 1
η
(1 − χ) of
labor.
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We assume that Home and Foreign technology follow the joint process[
log (zH,t)
log (zF,t)
]
=
[
ρ1 ρ2
ρ2 ρ2
][
log (zH,t)
log (zF,t)
]
+
[
νˆ1
νˆ2
]
,with
[
ν1
ν2
]
∼N
([
0
0
]
,
[
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2
])
As in Backus et al. (1994) and Heathcote and Perri (2002), technology spillovers
are assumed symmetric with ρ1, ρ2 > 0. This allows for an important simplifica-
tion which results in the elimination of one state variable in our numerical solution
algorithm. The focus of our study is on the excess volatility of the investment se-
ries in national economies caused by international capital reallocation in response
to productivity differentials between the two countries. From now on, we therefore
focus on relative technology log (zˆt) = log (zH,t)− log (zF,t) only. zˆt follows an AR(1)
process
log zˆt = ρ log zˆt−1 + υˆ
with
υˆ ∼ N(0, σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡σ2
).
and ρ = ρ1 − ρ2. We set zHt = zˆt and zFt = zˆ−1t and discretize zˆt into a 13-
state Markov process using Tauchen’s (1986) method. The idiosyncratic profitability
process follows a 15-state Markov process which is an approximation to a continuous
AR(1) process for log profitability with Gaussian innovations.
Each firm produces an intermediate good but needs to raise capital in terms of the
national composite good. At the beginning of a period a firm receives an idiosyncratic
i.i.d. fixed adjustment cost draw ξ ≥ 0, which is denominated in units of labor. It
is drawn from a distribution G : [0, ξ¯] → [0, 1]. This distribution is common to all
firms:
G ∼ U(0, ξ¯).
We initially denote the firm’s planning problem in units of the local capital-
consumption good. The intra-period timing is a follows: After having observed in-
novations to aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity and its adjustment cost draws,
the firm optimally adjusts labor, produces output and harvests flow profits. After-
wards, the firm decides whether to pay the adjustment cost and adjust its capital
stock to the current target level or whether to exercise its option to wait and see and
15
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let its capital depreciate. Upon investment, the firm incurs a fixed cost of wξ, where
w is the current real wage rate defined in local intermediate goods wj := Wj/P
X
j .
Capital depreciates at rate δ. Table 1.1 summarizes the evolution of the firm’s capital
stock (in efficiency units) between two consecutive periods, from k to k′.
Table 1.1: Evolution of the Firm’s Capital Stock
Fixed cost paid γk′
i 6= 0: wξ (1− δ)k + i
i = 0 0 (1− δ)k
Notes: This table summarizes the evolution of the
firm’s capital stock conditional on the binary choice be-
tween investing and not investing.
The distributions of firms over capital and idiosyncratic productivity states (, k)
in the two countries are summarized using the probability measures µH and µF . They
are sufficient to describe differences between firms and their evolution over time given
the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs. Define m ≡ [µH(k, ), µF (k, )] so that the
aggregate state of the economy is described by (zˆ, m). The distributions evolve over
time according to a mapping Γ from the current aggregate state m′ = Γ(zˆ, m) which
will be defined below.
Let vj(, k, ξ; zˆj,m) denote the expected discounted value - measured in local con-
sumption goods - of a firm in country j that is in idiosyncratic state (, k, ξ), given
the aggregate state (zˆ, m). Its expected value prior to drawing its adjustment cost
draw is then given by:
v¯j(, k; zˆ
j,m) =
ˆ ξ
0
vj(, k, ξ; zˆ
j,m)G(dξ) (1.5)
The dynamic programming problem of a firm in country j is described by:
v(, k, ξ; zˆj,m)j = cfj + max
{
vdepj ,max
k′
(
−acj + vadjj
)}
, (1.6)
where cf are flow profits, vdepj is the firm’s continuation value if it chooses inaction
and lets its capital depreciate, and vadjj the continuation value, net of adjustment
costs, if the firm chooses to invest and adjust its capital stock to the current target
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level. These functions are given by:
cfj = max
n
[
zˆj(kχn1−χ)
1
η − wj(zˆ, m)n
]PXj
PCj
(1.7a)
vdepj = E
[
dj (zˆ
′,m′) v¯(′,
(1− δ)
γ
k; zˆ
′
,m′)
]
(1.7b)
acj = ξwj(zˆ, m)
PXj
PCj
(1.7c)
vadjj = −i+ E
[
dj
(
zˆ
′
,m′
)
v¯(′, k′; zˆ′,m′)
]
(1.7d)
where both expectation operators average over next period’s realization of the aver-
age and idiosyncratic productivity states, conditional on this period’s values, and we
recall that i = γk′−(1−δ)k. The stochastic discount factor of the local representative
household is dj
(
zˆ
′
,m′
)
= β
UC(Cj(zˆ
′,m′),Nj(zˆ′,m′))
UC(Cj(zˆ,m),Nj(zˆ,m))
.
We can eliminate the stochastic discount factor by rephrasing the firm’s value func-
tion in terms of utils (more details can be found in Khan and Thomas, 2008). This
allows us compute equilibrium by solving a single Bellman equation that combines
the plant-level optimization problem in equations (1.5)-(1.7) with the household first
order conditions (1.2)-(1.3). Given that investment uses the composite consumption
good, we define its price relative to the firm’s output as (PXH has been normalized to
one):
qj(τ) =

PCH
PXH
= PCH (τ) for j = H
PCF
PXF
=
PCF
τ
= PCH (τ
−1) for j = F
. (1.8)
Denoting the marginal utility of consumption by %j ≡ U jC(Cj, Ni), we obtain due to
efficient risk sharing between the economies:
%j (τ, CH) =
UHC for j = HUFC PXFPCF qF (τ) = %H(τ, CH)PXFPCH qF (τ) = %H(τ, CH)τ qF (τ)qH(τ) for j = F
(1.9)
UHC is the marginal utility of consumption in the Home-economy. Importantly,
we can express the marginal utility of the foreign household as a function of home
marginal utility and terms of trade.
Let Vj(, k, ξ; zˆi,m) = vjU
j
C(Ci, Ni) now denote the expected discounted value in
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utils of the respective representative household of a firm. This is:
Vj(, k, ξ; zˆ
j,m) = CFj + max
{
V depj ,max
k′
(
−ACj + V adjj
)}
, j = H,F (1.10)
with the components defined analogously to before. These are given by:
CFj = max
n
[
zj (zˆ) (k
χn1−χ)
1
η − wj(zˆ, m)n
]%j(τ, CH)
qj(τ)
(1.11a)
V depj = βE
[
V¯j(
′,
1− δ
γ
k; zˆ
′
,m′)
]
(1.11b)
ACj = ξwj(zˆ, m)
%j(τ, CH)
qj(τ)
(1.11c)
V adjj = −i%j(τ, CH) + βE
[
V¯j(
′, k′; zˆ′,m′)
]
(1.11d)
V¯j(, k; zˆj,m) =
ˆ ξ
0
Vj(, k, ξ; zˆj,m)G(dξ). (1.11e)
Given (, k, ξ) and equilibrium prices wj(zˆ, m), %j [τ(zˆ, m), CH(zˆ, m)] and q [τ(zˆ, m)]
the plant chooses employment and whether to invest or let its capital depreciate.5
Denote as Nj = N(, k; zˆ, m), Kj = K(, k, ξ; zˆ, m) the intermediate firm policy
functions. Since capital is predetermined, the optimal employment decision is in-
dependent of the current adjustment cost draws. We denote the total intermediate
goods output in country j by Yj.
1.3.4 Recursive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy is completely described by the
set:
{wj, %H , τ, Vj, NDj , NSj , Kj, Cj, XHj , XFj ,Γ}j=H,F
that satisfy
1. Firm optimality : Taking w, τ , λ and Γ as given, Vj satisfy (1.10)-(1.11e) and
NDj , Kj are the associated policy functions.
5Note that the problem is symmetric for both countries, which can be exploited to save computa-
tion time.
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2. Household optimality : Taking w, τ and λ as given, the households’ consump-
tions Cj and labor supplies N
S
j satisfy (1.2) and (1.3).
3. XHj , X
F
j solve (1.4).
4. Labor markets clearing :
NSj (zˆ, m) =
ˆ {
NDj (, k; zˆ, m) +
ˆ
ξI
[
1− δ
γ
k −Kj(, k, ξ; zˆ, m)
]
dG
}
dµj
where I(x) = 0 if x = 0; I(x) = 1 otherwise.
5. Final goods markets clearing :
Cj +
ˆ ˆ ξ
0
[γKj(, k, ξ; zˆ, m)− (1− δ)k] dGdµH = Gj(XHj , XFj )
6. Intermediate goods markets clearing :∑
l=H,F
Xjl = Y
j
7. Model consistent dynamics : The evolution of the cross-sectional distributions
that characterize the economy in both countries, m′ = Γ(zˆ, m), is induced by
{Kj(, k, ξ; zˆ, m)}j=H,F and the exogenous processes for zˆ and .
1.4 Numerical Solution
The aggregate state contains two infinite dimensional objects: The distributions of
intermediate producers in both countries over capital and idiosyncratic productivity
states. Following Krusell and Smith (1998, 1997) we approximate those distributions
by a finite number of distributional moments. Let mˆ = [kH , kF ] denote our approxi-
mate aggregate state and Γˆ(mˆ, zˆ)) denote its law of motion, such that mˆ′ = Γˆ(mˆ, zˆ).
In our applications, first moments over capital, kH and kF turn out to contain suffi-
cient information to accurately forecast prices. A number of accuracy tests including
R2s are reported in the numerical appendix. We specify simple log-linear rules to
describe price forecasts for % and τ and the evolution of capital stocks Γˆ. Instead of
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laws of motion for log(kH) and log(kF ), we work with a rotated version of the system
in the sum of of log-world capital and its difference6.
We impose some economic structure to minimize the effect of simulation and esti-
mation uncertainty inherent in a Monte-Carlo method such as Krusell and Smith’s
(1998) algorithm (see DenHaan, 1997). For this reason, exploiting symmetry, we
assume that world capital depends only on previous world capital (and not on its
distribution over countries) and the difference in capital stocks between countries
depends only on previous differences and not on world capital stocks. Moreover, we
impose log linear effects of aggregate productivity on the dynamics of capital stocks
as well as prices:7
[
log(kH) + log(kF )
]′
= αworld0 + α
world
1
[
log(kH) + log(kF )
]
(1.12a)[
log(kH)− log(kF )
]′
= α∆1
[
log(kH)− log(kF )
]
+ α∆2 log(zˆ) (1.12b)
log(%H) = α
%
0 + α
%
1 log(kH) + α
%
2 log(kF ) + α
%
3 log(zˆ) (1.12c)
log(τ) = ατ1
[
log(kH)− log(kF )
]
+ ατ3 log(zˆ). (1.12d)
The solution algorithm consists of two steps which are repeated successively until
6One may obtain the specification below by pre-multiplying the system[
log
(
kH
)′
log
(
kF
)′ ] = [ αH0αF0
]
+
[
αH1 α
H
2
αF1 α
F
2
] [
log
(
kH
)
log
(
kF
) ]+ [ αH1
αF2
]
log (zˆ)
with the matrix [
1 1
1 −1
]
.
Symmetry of Home and Foreign country implies that αH0 = α
F
0 ;α
H
1 = α
F
2 ; α
F
1 = α
H
2 and
αH3 = −αF3 . It follows that
αworld0 = 2α
H
0
α∆0 = 0
αworld1 = α
H
1 + α
F
1 = α
H
2 + α
F
2
α∆1 = α
H
1 − αF1 = αH2 − αF2
αworld2 = 0
α∆2 = 2α
H
2
7We checked whether these restriction we imposed actually restrict the dynamics, by estimating
versions without the imposed restrictions and check whether the restrictions would be rejected
by a Wald test. We found that the imposed restrictions would not be rejected in equilibrium.
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parameters of the aggregate laws of motion converge. Using an initial guess for the
parameters of the aggregate laws, we solve the dynamic programming problem posed
by equations (1.10) - (1.11e) which becomes computationally feasible once the ap-
proximate aggregate state is used. A number of the problem’s features facilitate the
solution considerably. First, the firms’ employment decision is static and indepen-
dent of its investment adjustment cost draw so that it can be maximized out using
the respective first order condition:
N(, k; zˆ, mˆ) =
( w
zˆνkθ
) 1
ν−1
Second, the optimal capital stock chosen conditional on adjustment is independent
of the firm’s current individual capital stock. This optimization problem therefore
needs to be solved only once for each point on the aggregate state grid. Given that
adjustment is costly and that it always holds that V adjj (; zˆ, mˆ) ≥ V depj (k, ; zˆ, mˆ), the
value of the adjustment cost draw, ξˆ(, k; zˆ, mˆ), at which the firm is just indifferent
between adjusting and exercising its option to wait and see (i.e. letting its capital
depreciate) is given by:
ξˆj(, k; zˆ, mˆ) =
qj [τ(zˆ, mˆ)]
[
V adjj (; zˆ, mˆ)− V depj (k, ; zˆ, mˆ)
]
%j(zˆ, mˆ)w [τ(zˆ, mˆ)]
(1.13)
Denoting the target capital stock to which a firm with idiosyncratic productivity 
in country j adjusts in the absence of frictions by k∗j (; zˆ, mˆ) allows us to compute
the firms’ second policy function determining investment:
k′ = Kj(, k, ξ; zˆ, mˆ) =
k∗j (; zˆ, mˆ) if ξ ≤ ξˆj(, k; zˆ, mˆ),(1− δ)k/γ otherwise. (1.14)
Given firm policy functions, we simulate the economy in the second step. In order
to more efficiently exploit parallel computing resources, instead of using one long
draw of relative productivities, we generate observations for aggregate variables us-
ing several shorter draws of zˆt. During the simulation, market clearing values of %
and τ are computed exactly. This procedure generates a total of T=4800 observa-
tions of {mˆt, %t, τt} which we use then to update the α-coefficients in the aggregate
laws of motion by simple OLS regression. We iterate these steps until an F-Test
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finds all parameter estimates from two successive steps statistically indistinguish-
able. Upon convergence, we have obtained the Krusell-Smith recursive equilibrium
of our economy for a given set of parameters.8
1.5 Parameter Choices
The model parameters to calibrate are relatively standard. They involve the discount
factor, β, the disutility of labor, A, the parameters of the production function, χ
and η, the law of motion for aggregate productivity, the substitution elasticity in
final goods production, σ, as well as the home bias parameter, ω. The parameters
somewhat less standard are of the idiosyncratic productivity process, ρ and σ and
the adjustment cost parameter ξ¯.
1.5.1 Open Economy Parameters
The substitution elasticity, σ, between intermediate input goods in the production
function for the final consumption goods is set to 1.5. A common range in the open
economy literature is [1, 2]. A recent estimate for the bilateral productivity process
come from Heathcote and Perri (2002) who use data for the US and the rest of the
world as other economy. Their estimates imply values for our process of log-relative
TFP of ρ = .945 and σ2ν = 0.0087. For our baseline, we set ω = 0.7 which is about
average for OECD countries.
1.5.2 Parameters for the National Economies
The model period is a quarter. Our choice for β = 0.99 implies an annual interest
rate of 4 percent. We set A = 1.852 to match a steady state labor supply of 1/3.
8Our abstraction from variations in world-TFP implies a near constant world capital stock. In
the stochastic steady state of the system, kH and kF are therefore almost perfectly negatively
correlated. This poses a serious problem for the estimation of our Krusell-Smith rules if using
only observations from the stochastic steady state.
We solve this by first letting the system settle into its stochastic steady state during fifty
initial periods, then we lower the capital stock of every firm by 20% and observe the adjustment
path of the economies back to the steady state. This gives enough additional information to
identify also the law of motion for world capital. More details on the solution procedure can be
found in the appendix.
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We set the coefficients of the revenue function χ = 1/3 and η = 4/3 which implies
a mark-up of 33 % and the implied output elasticities of labor and capital are ν = 1/2
and θ = 1/4 respectively, as in Bloom (2009). This is also close to the empirical
estimate in Bachmann and Bayer (2011a) for manufacturing. We calibrate γ to imply
a technological growth rate of 1.4% p.a. and depreciation to 9.4 % p.a and assume
for idiosyncratic productivity
log ′ = ρ log + σu (1.15)
where u ∼ N(0, 1) and set ρ = 0.98 and σ = 0.0459 in line with Bachmann and
Bayer (2011a), who report annual cross-sectional firm level data.
Our baseline specification of ξ = 1.7 matches a cross-sectional skewness in annual
plant investment rates of 2.2 reported in Bachmann and Bayer (2011a) and also
matches roughly the fraction of spike-adjusters (13%) they report for manufacturing.9
This estimate is well in line with estimates by Bachmann et al. (2010), Caballero and
Engel (1999), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), or Bloom (2009). In comparing the
point estimates, one should keep in mind, however, that we calibrate to the quarterly
frequency. As adjustment costs are i.i.d. random variables, this implies that actual
adjustment costs paid are on average much lower. The estimate of ξ¯ itself therefore
cannot be directly compared to papers calibrated to an annual frequency, but the
implied average resources spent on adjustment can be. Our adjustment cost estimate
implies that conditional on adjustment roughly 29% of the adjusting firm’s annual
labor force is used for installing capital (worth 14% of its annual output) which is in
line with the estimates cited above, see Table 3 in Bachmann et al. (2010). Table 1
below summarizes our parameter choices10 .
9If we had matched the fraction of spike adjusters in LRD (19%), a somewhat smaller estimate
of ξ¯ ≈ 0.4 would have been obtained. Note, however, that even at this smaller level, fixed
adjustment costs significantly dampen aggregate fluctuations in investment. On the other hand,
taking additionally unit aggregation into account would increase the estimate of ξ¯ instead.
Moreover, note in comparing our ξ = 1.7 to other calibrations the quarterly frequency to which
we calibrate, which means that firms have four draws of ξ in a year and can choose the smallest
one.
10At first sight, our calibrated maximum adjustment costs of 1.7 look much larger than the 0.0083
in Khan and Thomas (2008). Indeed, one might wonder whether the effects we report below are
simply the effect of higher adjustment costs and not of introducing the open economy dimension.
There are two main arguments why this is not likely to be the case. For one, as we report in
Table 1.4, the dampening effect of fixed adjustment costs on aggregate investment is a decreasing
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Table 1.2: Parameters of the Baseline Calibration
Preferences
HH discount rate β = 0.99
Disutility of labor A = 1.852
Firm production
Output elasticity of capital χ = 1/3
Mark-up in intermediate goods markets η = 4/3
Implied labor revenue elasticity ν = 1/2
Implied capital revenue elasticity θ = 1/4
Rate of technological progress γ = 1.0035
Depreciation rate δ = 0.0235
Persistence in id. prod. ρ = 0.98
Std. of innovations to id. prod. σ = 0.0459
Open Economy
EOS in composite good σ = 1.5
Persistence in relative TFP ρ = 0.945
Variance of innovations to TFP σ2υ = 0.0087
Import share in consumption 1− ω = 0.3
1.6 Results
We obtain three sets of results from the simulation of our model. First, under our
baseline specification, fixed adjustment costs dampen capital reallocation between
economies. This effect is the stronger, the more open the economies are to trade and
vanishes as ω → 1, i.e. the economies become more similar to a closed economy, so
that the main Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) result obtains. Second, the aggregate
behavior of the economy with fixed adjustment costs can be represented by an econ-
omy with quadratic adjustment costs. Third, the size of the quadratic costs that
yield almost identical aggregate behavior co-depends on the curvature of the revenue
function w.r.t. capital and on the size of idiosyncratic risk σ, but does not depend
function of the openness to trade of the two economies. When approaching the limiting case of
two closed economies the effect disappears. Second, as a robustness exercise, Khan and Thomas
also solve a version of their model with much larger fixed costs of about .21 and still find only
very small effects on aggregate investment. At an annual frequency, this model specification is
actually relatively close to ours. For example, the probability of receiving a fixed cost draw of
at most .05 in any year in their specification is 24.1 percent. In our case, given the quarterly
frequency of the model, the likelihood of that event is 11.26 percent so only about half as big.
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Table 1.3: Cyclical Properties
Frictionless Non-convex cost Quadratic cost
Model Model Model
Standard deviations in %
Output 1.826 1.775 1.777
Standard Deviation Relative to Output
Investment 6.327 4.426 4.417
Consumption 0.188 0.208 0.207
Employment 0.581 0.495 0.498
Exports 0.869 0.506 0.505
Imports 0.870 0.507 0.505
NX 0.693 0.360 0.378
ToTs 0.939 1.043 1.037
Correlation with Output
Investment 0.860 0.915 0.915
Consumption 0.940 0.985 0.985
Employment 0.961 0.983 0.984
Exports -0.226 0.354 0.343
Imports 0.225 -0.354 -0.343
NX -0.679 -0.656 -0.658
ToTs 0.940 0.985 0.985
Persistence
Output 0.694 0.696 0.696
Investment 0.581 0.627 0.627
Consumption 0.816 0.746 0.746
Employment 0.617 0.655 0.655
Exports 0.747 0.944 0.943
Imports 0.747 0.944 0.943
NX 0.601 0.668 0.667
ToTs 0.816 0.746 0.746
Notes: All statistics are averages from 100 simulations of the economy over 200 quar-
ters. All data are in logs except for net-exports (NX) and HP(1600)-filtered. Net-
exports are relative to Output.
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on openness or the presence of an investment tax-credit. This third set of results are
discussed in detail in Section 1.7.
1.6.1 Fixed Adjustment Costs Matter in the Open Economy
We first asses whether non-convex adjustment costs at the firm level matter at all
in our setting in shaping aggregate investment dynamics. In other words, we check
whether our initial intuition that the potential to achieve consumption smoothing
via movements in the current account brings back a role for fixed adjustment costs
to capital in shaping the business cycle.
We compare the aggregate behavior of our economy to a frictionless reference and
a version with partial adjustment that introduces quadratic adjustment costs of the
form φ
2
wt
(
kt+1−kt
kt
)2
. We set φ = 3.08, details for this parameter are deferred to the
next section11. Table 1.3 summarizes volatilities, correlation and persistence of the
key variables for the three specifications. Two important results can be read from this
table. First, unlike in the closed economy, see Khan and Thomas (2008), non-convex
adjustment costs to capital at the plant level have an effect on the dynamic behavior
of macro aggregates in our open economy setup. Their main effect is to dampen the
volatility of aggregate investment relative to output by reducing impact responses
of investment to productivity innovations and to mildly increase its persistence.
Moreover, they change the cyclicality of exports and imports. When comparing
the reported moments to empirical moments of international business cycles, one
should keep in mind that we have basically abstracted from world tfp movements
by focusing on movements in relative productivity. That, for example, explains
the relative consumption volatility of only .208 in our baseline specification. When
evaluating the reported results, the focus should therefore lie on the quantitative
differences between the columns.
Given the strong difference in results for the open and closed economy, we explore
whether our specification nests the closed economy result as a limiting case of an
economy with perfect home bias in consumption. We therefore solve our model for
various values of the openness parameter, ω, ranging from 0.55 to 0.9. Table 1.4
11 We chose capital adjustment costs to be labor denominated to keep as close a possible to the
baseline fixed cost specification. We also experimented with output denominated costs. This
did not qualitatively alter results. Quantitatively, calibrated quadratic adjustment costs did not
change much either.
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Table 1.4: Investment Volatility relative to output for different openness parameter
values
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6 ω = 0.7 ω = 0.85 ω = 0.9
Frictionless 8.121 7.395 6.327 5.103 4.799
ξ = 1.7 2.981 3.721 4.426 4.413 4.302
Percentage difference 63.3% 49.7% 30.0% 13.5% 10.4%
Notes: All other parameters are kept at their baseline value.
displays volatility of investment relative to output for different parameter values for
a frictionless economy and compares it to one featuring non-convex adjustment costs
of ξ = 1.7. Clearly, the effect of fixed adjustment costs on investment volatility is
stronger, the more open an economy is to trade. Vice versa, at ω = 0.9 the effect has
weakened substantially. The closed economy setting of Khan and Thomas (2008)
then obtains as a limiting case. When our economies are completely closed to trade,
fixed adjustment costs once again wash out when looking at aggregate statistics.
Coming back to Table 1.3, there is a second observation. The effects of microe-
conomic fixed adjustment costs, when looking at aggregate dynamics, are almost
indistinguishable from our quadratic adjustment cost specification. Figure 1.1 puts
this in a graphical version and displays the demeaned time series of investment for
the same draw of aggregate productivity shocks for both the quadratic cost model
and the fixed adjustment cost model calibrated to investment at the micro level.12 In
fact, the investment series of the quadratic cost model (partial adjustment) and the
fixed cost model perfectly align. More technically one could say that we find “ap-
proximate representation” beyond “approximate aggregation” in the sense of Krusell
and Smith (1998). In the following section we investigate this similarity of fixed ad-
justment costs and quadratic ones in more detail.
12Both series slightly differ in their respective means, because the stochastic costs of capital real-
location introduce a precautionary motive into the aggregate investment decision in the fixed
cost model. Meanwhile, we account for firm heterogeneity only implicitly in the quadratic cost
model by simulating one firm whose TFP is adjusted upwards to account for higher overall
productivity due to log-normally distributed idiosyncratic productivities.
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Figure 1.1: Time-Series of Investment in Fixed Cost and Partial Adjustment Model
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Notes: The figure shows series of aggregate investment generated by the fixed adjustment cost model and a matched
quadratic adjustment cost specification simulated over the same draw of aggregate productivities. Both series have
been demeaned.
1.7 “Fundamentalness” of Quadratic Capital Adjustment
Costs
As discussed in the introduction, the problem of excess volatility in investment is
widespread in the literature on open economy business cycle models. The problem
is most severe when countries trade perfectly substitutable goods as in Backus et al.
(1992), but it occurs in varying degrees of severity also in settings more comparable
to ours. The introduction of convex or more specifically quadratic adjustment costs
at the aggregate level has become a standard kludge to bring the model closer to the
data.
We noted in our first take on the results that the aggregate dynamics in a setting
with microeconomic lumpiness in investment look almost indistinguishable from one
where a representative stand-in firm faces quadratic costs to capital adjustment. In
the aggregate, quadratic costs therefore provide a reasonable approximation to the
dynamics of the more complicated underlying heterogeneous firm fixed adjustment
cost model (“approximate representation”). Versions of the representative agent
model estimated on aggregate data only will thus never be rejected even if our
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lumpy investment model was the data generating process. More importantly, to the
researcher who is interested in matching aggregate dynamics only, quadratic costs
provide an easily manageable tool and an additional degree of freedom. He may
scale investment responses to productivity innovations without missing aggregate
dynamics implied by more detailed microeconomic foundations.
1.7.1 Do Estimates of Quadratic Costs have Structural Meaning?
We have shown so far that in an open economy setting, quadratic costs to capital
adjustment provide a good aggregate representation of a model which realistically
models the firm’s investment problem. This does not yet prove, however, that the
estimated quadratic adjustment costs have a structural interpretation. We know how
model predictions may be invalidated when a macro outcome is ad hoc described as
the result of a microeconomic decision problem one knows to differ from the actual
one. There is widespread evidence for the main adjustment costs at the plant or
firm level being non-convex and not quadratic (see Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)).
Consequently, estimated versions of quadratic cost models can be subject to the
Lucas critique in the sense that their cost parameter lacks fundamentalness with
respect to changes in policy and other deep parameters. Meanwhile, we also know
from the example of Hansen (1985) that it is sometimes innocuous to represent the
behavior of many agents by a decision problem that no agent actually faces if this is
justified by aggregation itself.
The crucial question is, whether the quantitative link between estimates of con-
vex aggregate and non-convex idiosyncratic adjustment costs is invariant to policy
interventions. Calibrating the fixed costs from micro data – as we did – or al-
ternatively estimating quadratic adjustment costs from aggregate time-series would
thus be equivalent as it always yielded the same aggregate behavior. If, however,
the macro-equivalent quadratic adjustment costs are not invariant to changes in
non-adjustment-cost parameters, then using an estimated quadratic adjustment cost
model is subject to the Lucas critique.13
To investigate this issue, we ask whether the matched quadratic adjustment costs
13Obviously, a prerequisite for this issue is whether approximate representation holds for a wide
range of model parameters or is particular to our calibration. Throughout this section we find
approximate representation to hold.
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change if we vary key non-adjustment cost parameters of the model (that have a
strong influence on the dynamics of aggregate investment in the model). We do so in
four experiments. Each of these experiments has a policy interpretation, some maybe
not perfect, but this imperfect interpretation comes at the advantage of a minimal
intervention: not changing the model structure but only the model parameters.
First we look at variations in openness, ω. These variations can be thought of
as introduction (removal) of tariffs or other trade barriers. As we have seen be-
fore, variations in openness have a strong impact on both the aggregate investment
volatility and the ability of fixed adjustment costs to dampen this volatility. Second,
we look at the introduction of a stochastic investment tax credit, modeled as a sub-
sidy that changes the relative price of investment goods (which was so far fixed to
one). Third, we investigate changes in the mark-up, η, which can be thought of as
the result of competition policy. Fourth, we vary idiosyncratic risk, σ. While this
last experiment does not have a very clear policy analogue, it relates closely to the
recent literature on time-varying uncertainty (see e.g. Bloom (2009) or Bachmann
and Bayer (2011b)). It also helps to better understand the mixed results that we
obtain with respect to the “fundamentalness” of quadratic adjustment costs.
1.7.2 Methodology: Matching Quadratic to Fixed Costs of Capital
Adjustment
For the various parameter combinations we experiment with, we search for a size
φ of quadratic adjustment costs such that the law of motion for aggregate capital
coincides between fixed and quadratic adjustment cost specification. To be precise,
we minimize the distance between the resulting parameters of the log-linear law of
motion for relative capital stocks
(
α∆1 α
∆
2
)
in the two model specifications:
min
φ
Ψ
(
φ, ξ¯
)
= min
φ
∑
i=1,2
[
α∆,fixedi
(
ξ¯
)− α∆,quad.i (φ)]2 .
The justification for this matching strategy is that once accurate rules for predict-
ing the two capital stocks have been found, at least in the quadratic adjustment cost
case, the sequence of allocations can be pinned down from these rules and labor mar-
ket clearing.14 The obtained matches are very close in terms of Ψ, with square-root
14In order to obtain a solution to the firm problem in the quadratic cost setting, we again employ
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differences ranging around 2%-6% of
(
α∆1 + α
∆
2
)
. We report estimates of matched
quadratic costs and minimized distances for all experiments in Section 1.B of the
appendix.
1.7.3 Variations in Openness
Figure 1.2: Quadratic adjustment cost estimates for different values of ω
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Notes: The figure displays estimates of quadratic capital adjustment costs for different values of the home bias
parameter ω and for a broad range of fixed adjustment cost specifications ξ. We obtained estimates of the quadratic
adjustment cost parameter φ by minimizing the distance between the laws of motion of the relative capital stocks(
α∆1 α
∆
2
)
for the fixed and quadratic cost model.
We start by varying the home-bias parameter from a value of 0.55, an economy very
open to trade (say the Netherlands) to a value of 0.9, an economy almost closed to
the world (say, the United States up to the mid 1990’s). For each value for openness,
we estimate matching quadratic adjustment costs across a broad range of fixed costs
values. Figure 1.2 summarizes the results of this experiment. The figure displays
the matched
(
φ, ξ¯
)
pairs for five levels of openness, ω. In order to for the quadratic
a global solution technique using a variant of the solution method for the fixed cost case. In
matching the two models, we take into account that firm productivities in the heterogeneous firm
model are log-linearly distributed which implies an upwards adjustment of mean productivity by
σ2
2
√
1−ρ2
and thus raises steady state capital stocks in both countries compared to a homogenous
firm version of the model.
31
CHAPTER 1. OPEN ECONOMIES AND LUMPY INVESTMENT
adjustment cost estimate to be ascribed structural or ”fundamental” meaning, its
value should be invariant across the different home bias specifications.
We find first that “approximate representation” holds for all values of adjustment
costs and openness considered. Secondly, importantly, and perhaps more surpris-
ingly, the lines in Figure 1.2, which represent the implied mapping φ(ξ¯) for various
levels of openness, basically fall on top of each other.15 Moreover, the obtained
quadratic adjustment costs estimate is also broadly in line with the numbers typi-
cally considered when calibrating the quadratic adjustment cost model to aggregate
data (With 3.08 being the estimate for our baseline specification). Accordingly, the
link between fixed and quadratic adjustment costs passes this first test.
1.7.4 An Investment Tax Credit
Another more subtle trade policy is an investment tax credit (ITC). We assume that
in country H there is an ad valorem subsidy τinv on buying investment goods, so
that the effective price for the investment good decreases and (1.11d) in the firm’s
problem becomes:
V adjH = −(1− τinv)i%H(τ, CH) + βE
[
V¯H(
′, k′; zˆ′,m′)
]
However, to render the problem more interesting, we assume that the policy is
stochastic. We model the tax policy state as a Markov chain with state vector[
0 τinv
]
and transition matrix Πtax:
Πtax =
[
0.97 0.03
0.25 0.75
]
The country applies the subsidy 10 percent of the time and once the policy is in
place its expected duration is 4 quarters.
Under the policy, firms in country H pay less for investment goods. The subsidy
is financed by a lump-sum tax levied on all households (through risk-sharing also
effectively on the country F households). Technically this means that we can simply
distort the firm’s decision problem and leave all other equilibrium constraints, in par-
15The variation lies in the order of magnitude of the precision of our numerical procedure.
32
1.7. ARE QUADRATIC COSTS “FUNDAMENTAL” ?
ticular the goods market clearing condition, unchanged. Of course this introduces an
additional aggregate state to the problem and makes the firm problems asymmetric
across countries. Consequently, the KS-rules need to be adjusted and as the policy
only applies to one country need to accommodate the asymmetric setting now where
we can no longer expect small variations in the world stock of capital.
Figure 1.3: Levels of φ corresponding ξ¯ = 1.7 for various sizes of ITC, τinv
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Notes: The figure displays estimates of matched quadratic adjustment costs after introducing a stochastic investment
tax credit (ITC) in country H into the model environment. One bar corresponds to one value of the investment
tax credit τinv . Estimates of the quadratic adjustment cost parameter φ were obtained by minimizing the distance
between the laws of motion of the relative capital stocks
(
α∆1 α
∆
2
)
for the fixed and quadratic cost model.
Figure 1.3 displays the results for the quadratic-cost match for this experiment.
The unconditional business cycle statistics are available in the appendix. While the
introduction of an investment tax credit has substantial impact on the business cycle
statistics (output and more so investment volatility goes up, consumption becomes
less pro-cyclical), the impact on the size of the matched quadratic adjustment costs
is minor. By and large also for this experiment we can view the representative-
firm, quadratic-adjustment-cost model as a quasi “fundamental” stand in for the
heterogenous-firm, fixed-adjustment-cost model.
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Figure 1.4: Levels of φ corresponding ξ¯ = 1.7 for various η and σε
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Notes: The figure displays estimates of matched quadratic adjustment costs for variations in the curvature of the
production function (η) and the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity (σ). For all experiments, we
keep ξ fixed at its baseline value of 1.7. Estimates of the quadratic adjustment cost parameter φ were obtained
by minimizing the distance between the laws of motion of the relative capital stocks
(
α∆1 α
∆
2
)
. for the fixed and
quadratic cost model.
1.7.5 Variations in Mark-up and Idiosyncratic Uncertainty
We so far found a stable quantitative link between estimates of quadratic and fixed
capital adjustment costs across variations of what could broadly be described as
”demand side” parameters.
Next we show that the quadratic adjustment costs are not fundamental with re-
spect to all parameter variations. The quantitative link breaks down, once we start
to consider variations on the ”production side”. Besides the size of adjustment costs
ξ¯ also the curvature of the production function (which in our case is pinned down
by η) determines the aggregate importance of fixed adjustment costs. This is the
key insight from Gourio and Kashyap (2007) who show that the capital-elasticity
of revenues, i.e. the curvature of the reduced form revenue function, is central in
determining the effect of non-convex adjustment costs.
The intuition for their finding can be grasped from thinking about the problem
from a social planner’s perspective. The planner chooses sequences of capital distri-
butions (and labor) in order to maximize utility from consumption and leisure. Fixed
adjustment costs imply a trade-off for the social planner between paying high adjust-
ment costs to have firms adjusting frequently or accepting inefficiency from having
equally productive firms employing different levels of capital. The social costs of
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capital adjustments now result as the minimum loss the social planner can achieve
by trading off higher adjustment frequencies with inefficient distributions of capital
over production units.
This trade-off is absent in the quadratic cost model. Hence, anything that affects
its severity has to be captured by the size of φ. The efficiency costs of unequal capital
stocks depend on the capital-elasticity of revenues and are largest around an elasticity
of 1/2. Consequently, the social planner accepts larger capital dispersions for lower
η and lets firms adjust less frequently. For the same reason, the social planner uses
more the intensive margin of adjusters to accommodate aggregate shocks. By a
similar line of argument, the same should hold true for variations in productivity
uncertainty σε. Higher σε mean more diverse capital stocks for equally productive
firms if the frequency of adjustment is kept constant.
In fact, our ”quadratic-fixed costs equivalence scale” breaks down once we vary
the mark-up η or uncertainty σε, see Figure 1.4. We consider η ∈ {4/3, 5/4, 6/5}
and σε ∈ {0.23, 0.345, 0.46}. The figure displays the various equivalent levels of φ
corresponding to fixed adjustment costs ξ¯ = 1.7. As one can see, the equivalent φ
depends on the mark-up and is – as expected – decreasing in the revenue elasticity
of capital (i.e. increasing in η) and decreasing in idiosyncratic uncertainty σε. Hence
the equivalent φ increases when uncertainty decreases. A similar result is found by
Berger and Vavra (2010) for price adjustment.16
These results show that it is problematic to interpret the parameters of the repre-
sentative firm model in a deep sense. Suppose for example a researcher estimates the
aggregate representative firm model before and after a liberalization of intermediate
goods markets, such that market power of single firms decreases and effectively η
decreases. Then this researcher would conclude that the liberalization was accompa-
nied by a decrease in capital adjustment costs. Similarly, a researcher that estimates
the representative firm model from aggregate data once in turbulent and another
time in more tranquil times, when σε is small, would be led to the (false) conclusion
that capital adjustment costs have increased.
16We also experimented with recalibrating ξ¯ as the distribution of micro-investment rates changes
with η and σε. Qualitatively we obtained the same results.
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1.7.6 Quantitative importance of deviations from fundamentalness
Yet, beyond the changes in estimated parameters, how severe is the non-fundamentalness
of quadratic adjustment costs in terms of the ability of the model to produce fore-
casts of aggregate business cycle statistics? As discussed, one can also consider the
mark-up experiment as an example of a policy, as changes in η can result from com-
petition policy. Suppose, now, a researcher would study the effect of such policy on
the business cycle behavior of the economy, but takes the stand-in representative firm
model calibrated to aggregate data for the status quo ante of the reform. Assume
the data is generated from our model with fixed adjustment costs and η = 4/3. Then
assume the researcher uses the quadratic cost model to predict the macroeconomic
implications of the policy change. According to our previous findings, he should
have decreased the stand in quadratic adjustment costs, φ, as a result of the change
in η. If the researcher fails to do so, this representative firm model under-predicts
investment fluctuations.
Figure 1.5 shows that the size of the error can be sizable and close to 18% for
the examples studied. The figure displays the relative difference of the investment
volatility of the fixed adjustment cost model to the quadratic adjustment cost model,
keeping φ at its value obtained as the stand-in quadratic adjustment costs for our
baseline specification, φ = 3.08. Changes in uncertainty have a very similar effect,
again see Figure 1.5.
1.8 Conclusions
Chang et al. (2010) have pointed out that in many macroeconomic models where
aggregate dynamics are represented as the decisions of a representative agent, insuf-
ficient care is applied when explicitly aggregating across potentially heterogeneous
microeconomic units. We take this criticism seriously and apply it to the context of
two country open economy models. In that literature, the problem of excess volatility
in national investment dynamics is widespread and has usually been addressed by the
introduction of quadratic costs to capital adjustment at the level of a representative
firm.
However, this specification lacks empirical microeconomic foundation. Instead,
much of the literature on plant level investment dynamics in the last two decades has
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Figure 1.5: Relative deviations in investment volatility when keeping φ constant
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Notes: The figure shows prediction errors in investment volatility from the quadratic adjustment cost model relative
to the underlying fixed adjustment cost model when varying ”supply side” parameters. In panel (a) the mark-up
parameter η changes and panel (b) varies idiosyncratic uncertainty. Quadratic adjustment costs are always kept at
their baseline estimate of 3.08.
focused on so called lumpy investment models where micro units are faced with fixed
costs to capital adjustment. These models have proven able to reproduce salient
features of plant level investment behavior: long time-spans of virtual inactivity
interspersed by occasional outbreaks of large and concentrated adjustments of the
capital stock. How this behavior affects aggregation is a priori not clear.
In this chapter we have solved a relatively standard two-country real business
cycle model of differentiated goods where firms face idiosyncratic productivity risk
and stochastic fixed costs to capital adjustment. We demonstrate that this cost
specification matters for shaping aggregate dynamics. The smoothing effect of fixed
adjustment costs is the stronger, the more open an economy is to trade and the irrel-
evance result of Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) obtains only as a limiting case of no
openness to trade. Secondly, our model serves to rationalize the assumption of convex
costs to capital adjustment in a representative firm setting as the aggregate effects
of non-convex adjustment costs turn out to be indistinguishable from a quadratic
cost setting. We argue that for aggregate purposes one may view the representative
agent quadratic adjustment costs model as a suitable approximation. This approxi-
mation is not only a statistically sensible representation of the fixed adjustment cost
model but can even be viewed as an economically sensible approximation in as far
as the ”deep” adjustment cost parameter of the quadratic adjustment cost model
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does only co-depend on the parameters of the deeper fixed-costs model that regard
the production side (revenue elasticity of capital and productivity heterogeneity).
With this caveat in mind, we view estimates of the quadratic cost specification as a
reasonable macro representation of the underlying investment technology in a wide
range of applications.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
1.A Calibrating Convex Adjustment Costs
The investment adjustment cost parameter ξ of our baseline specification was chosen
to match a cross-sectional investment rate skewness of 2.2 which Bachmann and
Bayer (2011a,b) find in firm level data. Table 1.5 displays a number of statistics
for our baseline calibration which summarize annual plant level investment behavior
as a function of investment adjustment costs. We always calculate gross annual
investment for a plant, simulating a cross-section of 6000 plants. As spike adjuster, we
qualify a plant whose annual gross investment rate exceeds 20 percent ( it
.5(kt+1−kt) >
.2). Mean average spike adjustment refers to mean capital stock growth conditional
on the adjustment being counted as spike. Finally, we calculate the average cost that
firms have to bear from realized adjustments as a fraction of their annual output and
wage bill.
Table 1.5: Annual Plant Level Statistics
η 1.33 1.25 1.2
ξ 8E-3 2E-2 0.05 0.2 0.25 0.4 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.7
Mean fraction of adjusters 0.95 0.87 0.74 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.57
Std. fraction of adjusters 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Investment rate skewness 0.05 0.16 0.48 0.94 1.04 1.27 1.84 2.20 1.91 1.68
Mean fraction of spike adjusters 0.38 0.36 0.29 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.19
Std. fraction of spike adjusters 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Mean average spike adjustments 0.49 0.50 0.56 0.64 0.65 0.69 0.77 0.82 0.93 1.03
Std. of average spike adjustments 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.36 0.39
Adj. cost paid / % annual output 0.11 0.27 0.85 1.98 2.27 3.03 5.34 7.46 9.70 12.58
Adj. cost paid / % annual wages 0.23 0.55 1.70 3.97 4.55 6.06 10.67 14.92 18.18 22.64
Notes: Results are means from 100 simulations of 6000 plants over 200 periods (quarters). All statistics refer to an-
nualized plant level investment rates. An adjusting plant is a plant that at least once within a given year chooses to
not to let its capital stock depreciate but to invest. A plant is counted as spike adjuster if its annual investment rate
it
.5(kt+1−kt) exceeds .2.
1.B Matching Convex to Non-convex Adjustment Costs
We minimize the Euclidian distance between the log-linear law of motion of relative
capital stocks in a non-convex and a convex adjustment cost setting as described
in the main chapter. Table 1.6 provides the resulting parameter matches and the
minimized distance measure.
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Table 1.6: Parameter Matches and Minimal Distances Ψ
Variations in Openness
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6 ω = 0.7 ω = 0.85 ω = 0.9
φ Ψ φ Ψ φ Ψ φ Ψ φ Ψ
ξ = 0.002 0.0300 0.0053 0.0200 0.0051 0.0100 0.0027 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0015
ξ = 0.008 0.0700 0.0071 0.0500 0.0032 0.0300 0.0007 0.0050 0.0015 0.0300 0.0012
ξ = 0.05 0.2600 0.0025 0.2600 0.0010 0.2600 0.0003 0.2800 0.0012 0.2700 0.0010
ξ = 0.2 0.6600 0.0022 0.6700 0.0021 0.6800 0.0014 0.6500 0.0008 0.6400 0.0006
ξ = 0.25 0.7800 0.0014 0.7800 0.0018 0.7900 0.0012 0.7600 0.0006 0.7400 0.0005
ξ = 0.4 1.1000 0.0003 1.1000 0.0008 1.1000 0.0007 1.0600 0.0004 1.0400 0.0003
ξ = 1.0 2.1500 0.0005 2.1500 0.0002 2.1300 0.0001 2.0700 0.0002 2.0300 0.0002
ξ = 1.7 3.1000 0.0008 3.1100 0.0006 3.0800 0.0003 2.9900 0.0001 2.9600 0.0001
Investment Tax Credit
φ Ψ
τinv = 0.02 3.11 0.0035
τinv = 0.03 3.12 0.0051
τinv = 0.04 3.13 0.0067
τinv = 0.05 3.14 0.0083
τinv = 0.06 3.16 0.0098
τinv = 0.075 3.17 0.0121
Markup-variations
φ Ψ
η = 1.25 1.97 0.0005
η = 1.2 1.27 0.0013
Variations in plant-uncertainty
φ Ψ
σ = 0.0345 4.33 0.0013
σ = 0.023 4.96 0.0031
The table reports quadratic adjustment cost estimates φ and corresponding minimized distances ψ for all model specifications
presented in the main chapter. In the experiments varying the investment tax credit, mark-ups and plant-level idiosyncratic
uncertainty, openness (ω) is fixed at its baseline value of 0.7
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1.C Numerical Solution Method
In order to numerically solve our model, we need to accurately approximate the
laws of motion of the two cross-sectional distributions over capital and idiosyncratic
productivity states in both countries. Given that our value function is of dimension
3 + 2n where n ∈ Rn is our number of moments by which to approximate µH and
µF , we are limited in the number of moments for approximation. Another challenge
is the simultaneous solution for the two prices τ and λ during the simulation step.
1.C.1 Accuracy of the Approximating Laws of Motion
Furtunately, we find that, as in related papers, it is sufficient to approximate the
cross-sectional distributions by their first moments over capital in order to forecast
prices judging by all standard measures for accuracy. We use the following general
log-linear forms for the aggregate laws of motion:
[
log(kH) + log(kF )
]′
= αworld0 + α
world
1
[
log(kH) + log(kF )
]
+ αworld2 log(zˆ) + α
world
3 τinv
(1.16a)[
log(kH)− log(kF )
]′
= α∆0 + α
∆
1
[
log(kH)− log(kF )
]
+ α∆2 log(zˆ) + α
∆
3 τinv (1.16b)
log(%H) = α
%
0 + α
%
1 log(kH) + α
%
2 log(kF ) + α
%
3 log(zˆ) + +α
%
4τinv (1.16c)
log(τ) = ατ0 + α
τ
1
[
log(kH)− log(kF )
]
+ ατ2 log(zˆ) + +α
τ
3τinv (1.16d)
For all model versions (including our baseline) where there is no investment tax
credit αworld3 , α
∆
3 , α
%
3 and α
τ
3 are obviously restricted to zero. One can view the
laws of motion for world capital and capital differences as rotated versions of laws
of motion for capital in each national economy. Also, for those variants theory
predicts that such forecasting rules for each national economy should be symmetric,
as the economies we model are symmetric. For our rotated rules, this symmetry with
respect to the individual stocks of capital implies the following additional restrictions:
1. αworld2 = 0
2. α∆0 = 0
3. ατ0 = 0
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Tables 1.7 to 1.11 report the parameter estimates which solve the Krusell-Smith
algorithm for the model parameterizations that we consider in our main chapter.
As first measure of accuracy we report the R2 (Table 1.12- 1.13) along with the
regression results. Note that forecast error variance is generally very low and that
in our baseline calibration the minimum R2 for all regression results is 99,99%.
As argued by Den Haan (2010) very low one-step-ahead prediction errors by them-
selves are no guarantee for having found an accurate description of the aggregate
behavior of the economy. We therefore compute an additional measure which al-
lows us to asses accuracy over longer forecast horizons. Specifically, we simulate the
economy over a fresh, long productivity draw of 5000 periods, calculating market
clearing prices and the behavior of the aggregate capital stock stocks exactly. We
record these capital stocks as reference and then simulate the time path of the same
variables using our estimated laws of motion as the data generating process. Our
measure of accuracy is 99th percentile of percentage deviations between the two se-
ries.17 Results are reported in Table 1.14. The fact that deviations between the two
series are almost always below 1 % and for our baseline calibration below 0.5% gives
us confidence in having found accurate solutions. Also note that there is no system-
atic relation between either forecast length and percentage error or cyclical position
and percentage error, i.e. market clearing and forecasting rules do not diverge.
1.C.2 Simulating the economy
For simulating the economy and obtaining updates for the estimates of our aggregate
rules we use the method proposed in Young (2010). This means approximating the
distribution of firms over capital and productivity by a histogram over a fine but
fixed grid and assigning all probability mass in transitions to the grid-points by
linearly splitting it up between adjacent ones. Every period, the two equilibrium
prices are computed exactly using the trust-region-dogleg algorithm of MATLAB’s
fsolve as described in Coleman and Li (1996) with a termination tolerance on prices
17This is a variant of the accuracy measure proposed in Den Haan (2010) who takes the maximum
percentage deviation as accuracy measure. We therefore require the two series to be very close
99 % of the time. Our numerical solution for market clearing extremely rarely creates very
short-lived spike-deviations. We view these blips rather as numerical outliers of the root finding
algorithm. In fact the maximum deviations change depending on solving on a 64-bit or 32-bit
machine. Therefore, taking the maximum error is likely to understate the quality of our results.
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of 1E-7. During simulations, we use on-grid maximization methods to solve the firm
problems when finding the root of our market clearing conditions. In order to do
that, we interpolate value functions to our histogram capital of grid points using the
current forecasts from the aggregate laws of motion.
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Table 1.7: Krusell-Smith-Rules for
[
log(kH) + log(kF )
]′
Variations in Opennes
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6 ω = 0.7 ω = 0.85 ω = 0.9
αworld1 α
world
2 α
world
1 α
world
2 α
world
1 α
world
2 α
world
1 α
world
2 α
world
1 α
world
2
Frictionless 0.3002 0.9229 0.3013 0.9226 0.2998 0.9230 0.2999 0.9229 0.2999 0.9230
ξ = 0.002 0.3010 0.9219 0.3008 0.9220 0.2999 0.9222 0.2997 0.9223 0.2998 0.9223
ξ = 0.008 0.2998 0.9223 0.2993 0.9224 0.2990 0.9225 0.3000 0.9223 0.2998 0.9223
ξ = 0.05 0.2957 0.9234 0.2955 0.9234 0.2958 0.9233 0.2964 0.9232 0.2965 0.9232
ξ = 0.2 0.2916 0.9243 0.2916 0.9243 0.2916 0.9243 0.2918 0.9242 0.2918 0.9242
ξ = 0.25 0.2905 0.9245 0.2905 0.9245 0.2905 0.9245 0.2906 0.9245 0.2908 0.9245
ξ = 0.4 0.2876 0.9252 0.2876 0.9252 0.2876 0.9252 0.2878 0.9251 0.2879 0.9251
ξ = 1.0 0.2798 0.9270 0.2797 0.9270 0.2797 0.9270 0.2798 0.9270 0.2798 0.9270
ξ = 1.7 0.2732 0.9285 0.2732 0.9285 0.2732 0.9285 0.2733 0.9285 0.2734 0.9285
Investment Tax Credit αworld0 α
world
1 α
world
2 α
world
3
τinv = 0.02 0.2768 0.9275 0.0005 0.0040
τinv = 0.02 0.2763 0.9276 0.0008 0.0060
τinv = 0.02 0.2756 0.9277 0.0011 0.0080
τinv = 0.02 0.2748 0.9280 0.0014 0.0101
τinv = 0.02 0.2737 0.9282 0.0016 0.0122
τinv = 0.02 0.2719 0.9287 0.0017 0.0154
Markup-variations αworld1 α
world
2
η = 1.25 0.2894 0.9284
η = 1.2 0.3024 0.9280
Variations in plant-uncertainty αworld1 α
world
2
σ = 0.0345 0.2611 0.9297
σ = 0.023 0.2549 0.9298
Notes: This table reports the Krusell-Smith equilibrium laws of motion for the sum of world log-capital stocks for all model specifications presented in
the main chapter. In the experiments varying the investment tax credit, mark-ups and plant-level idiosyncratic uncertainty, openness (ω) is fixed at its
baseline value of 0.7.
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Table 1.8: Krusell-Smith-Rules for
[
log(kH)− log(kF )
]′
Variations in Opennes
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6 ω = 0.7 ω = 0.85 ω = 0.9
α∆1 α
∆
2 α
∆
1 α
∆
2 α
∆
1 α
∆
2 α
∆
1 α
∆
2 α
∆
1 α
∆
2
Frictionless 0.4542 0.7118 0.6376 0.6306 0.7907 0.5265 0.8821 0.4236 0.8995 0.3984
ξ = 0.002 0.4657 0.6840 0.6372 0.6197 0.7884 0.5238 0.8816 0.4244 0.8989 0.3997
ξ = 0.008 0.4950 0.6604 0.6474 0.6154 0.7924 0.5229 0.8808 0.4222 0.8985 0.3967
ξ = 0.05 0.5683 0.5455 0.6758 0.5514 0.7999 0.4982 0.8833 0.4134 0.9003 0.3903
ξ = 0.2 0.6518 0.4189 0.7151 0.4656 0.8103 0.4607 0.8863 0.4018 0.9023 0.3819
ξ = 0.25 0.6689 0.3958 0.7247 0.4477 0.8134 0.4520 0.8871 0.3986 0.9029 0.3795
ξ = 0.4 0.7053 0.3464 0.7468 0.4062 0.8211 0.4298 0.8892 0.3899 0.9043 0.3731
ξ = 1.0 0.7716 0.2559 0.7931 0.3181 0.8407 0.3720 0.8949 0.3646 0.9082 0.3538
ξ = 1.7 0.8044 0.2122 0.8190 0.2702 0.8542 0.3330 0.8995 0.3443 0.9115 0.3378
Investment Tax Credit α∆0 α
∆
1 α
∆
2 α
∆
3
τinv = 0.02 -0.0009 0.8543 0.3314 0.0122
τinv = 0.02 -0.0013 0.8548 0.3306 0.0184
τinv = 0.02 -0.0018 0.8553 0.3297 0.0248
τinv = 0.02 -0.0022 0.8557 0.3289 0.0313
τinv = 0.02 -0.0027 0.8561 0.3283 0.0379
τinv = 0.02 -0.0033 0.8564 0.3275 0.0481
Markup-variations α∆1 α
∆
2
η = 1.25 0.8421 0.3791
η = 1.2 0.8322 0.4177
Variations in plant-uncertainty α∆1 α
∆
2
σ = 0.0345 0.8659 0.3020
σ = 0.023 0.8713 0.2922
Notes: This table reports the Krusell-Smith equilibrium laws of motion for differences in log-capital stocks between Home and Foreign for all model
specifications presented in the main chapter. In the experiments varying the investment tax credit, mark-ups and plant-level idiosyncratic uncertainty,
openness (ω) is fixed at its baseline value of 0.7.
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Table 1.9: Krusell-Smith-Rules for log(%H)
Variations in Openness
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6
α%0 α
%
1 α
%
2 α
%
3 α
%
0 α
%
1 α
%
2 α
%
3
Frictionless 1.0123 -0.2357 -0.2014 -0.0704 1.0144 -0.2576 -0.1805 -0.1271
ξ = 0.002 1.0190 -0.2356 -0.2022 -0.0713 1.0191 -0.2577 -0.1801 -0.1272
ξ = 0.008 1.0179 -0.2348 -0.2019 -0.0713 1.0175 -0.2561 -0.1804 -0.1283
ξ = 0.05 1.0135 -0.2323 -0.2011 -0.0727 1.0137 -0.2532 -0.1803 -0.1317
ξ = 0.2 1.0091 -0.2295 -0.2005 -0.0745 1.0093 -0.2494 -0.1808 -0.1365
ξ = 0.25 1.0078 -0.2288 -0.2003 -0.0748 1.0079 -0.2484 -0.1808 -0.1375
ξ = 0.4 1.0043 -0.2272 -0.1996 -0.0755 1.0045 -0.2461 -0.1808 -0.1398
ξ = 1.0 0.9944 -0.2232 -0.1974 -0.0768 0.9945 -0.2404 -0.1802 -0.1446
ξ = 1.7 0.9859 -0.2201 -0.1953 -0.0774 0.9860 -0.2364 -0.1790 -0.1474
ω = 0.7 ω = 0.85
α%0 α
%
1 α
%
2 α
%
3 α
%
0 α
%
1 α
%
2 α
%
3
Frictionless 1.0114 -0.3011 -0.1355 -0.2164 1.0102 -0.3679 -0.0680 -0.3237
ξ = 0.002 1.0181 -0.3016 -0.1357 -0.2167 1.0179 -0.3682 -0.0690 -0.3258
ξ = 0.008 1.0174 -0.3005 -0.1360 -0.2172 1.0189 -0.3686 -0.0687 -0.3280
ξ = 0.05 1.0143 -0.2976 -0.1362 -0.2228 1.0152 -0.3656 -0.0687 -0.3337
ξ = 0.2 1.0095 -0.2934 -0.1368 -0.2316 1.0098 -0.3613 -0.0691 -0.3433
ξ = 0.25 1.0082 -0.2923 -0.1371 -0.2336 1.0085 -0.3602 -0.0693 -0.3459
ξ = 0.4 1.0046 -0.2894 -0.1376 -0.2387 1.0049 -0.3575 -0.0696 -0.3526
ξ = 1.0 0.9947 -0.2819 -0.1388 -0.2519 0.9947 -0.3499 -0.0708 -0.3725
ξ = 1.7 0.9863 -0.2763 -0.1393 -0.2608 0.9864 -0.3438 -0.0718 -0.3884
ω = 0.9
α%0 α
%
1 α
%
2 α
%
3
Frictionless 1.0100 -0.3911 -0.0447 -0.3596
ξ = 0.002 1.0181 -0.3918 -0.0455 -0.3631
ξ = 0.008 1.0190 -0.3921 -0.0452 -0.3653
ξ = 0.05 1.0152 -0.3891 -0.0452 -0.3711
ξ = 0.2 1.0099 -0.3850 -0.0455 -0.3808
ξ = 0.25 1.0085 -0.3839 -0.0456 -0.3834
ξ = 0.4 1.0050 -0.3813 -0.0459 -0.3903
ξ = 1.0 0.9947 -0.3739 -0.0468 -0.4112
ξ = 1.7 0.9864 -0.3680 -0.0477 -0.4283
Notes: This table reports the Krusell-Smith equilibrium forecasting rules for %H for the variations in openness and fixed adjustment costs.
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Table 1.10: Krusell-Smith-Rules for log(%H) (cont.)
Investment Tax Credit α%0 α
%
1 α
%
2 α
%
3 α
%
4
τinv = 0.02 0.9923 -0.2778 -0.1413 -0.2613 0.0101
τinv = 0.03 0.9926 -0.2776 -0.1419 -0.2615 0.0154
τinv = 0.04 0.0031 -0.2773 -0.1426 -0.2618 0.0208
τinv = 0.05 0.9943 -0.2772 -0.1434 -0.2620 0.0265
τinv = 0.06 0.9960 -0.2775 -0.1442 -0.2621 -0.0324
τinv = 0.075 0.9996 -0.2783 -0.1455 -0.2621 -0.0416
Markup-variations α%0 α
%
1 α
%
2 α
%
3
η = 1.25 1.0381 -0.2910 -0.1415 -0.2540
η = 1.2 1.0685 -0.3011 -0.1427 -0.2481
Variations in plant-uncertainty α%0 α
%
1 α
%
2 α
%
3
σ = 0.0345 1.0119 -0.2727 -0.1409 -0.2675
σ = 0.023 1.0367 -0.2727 -0.1433 -0.2692
Notes: This table reports the Krusell-Smith equilibrium forecasting rules for %H for the experiments
varying the investment tax credit, mark-ups and plant-level idiosyncratic uncertainty.
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Table 1.11: Krusell-Smith-Rules for log(τ)
Variations in Opennes
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6 ω = 0.7 ω = 0.85 ω = 0.9
ατ1 α
τ
2 α
τ
1 α
τ
2 α
τ
1 α
τ
2 α
τ
1 α
τ
2 α
τ
1 α
τ
2
Frictionless 0.3433 1.4083 0.3855 1.2716 0.4140 1.0825 0.4284 0.9249 0.4330 0.8992
ξ = 0.002 0.3352 1.4266 0.3877 1.2726 0.4150 1.0841 0.4274 0.9309 0.4328 0.9078
ξ = 0.008 0.3291 1.4270 0.3786 1.2844 0.4114 1.0865 0.4285 0.9373 0.4336 0.9131
ξ = 0.05 0.3104 1.4575 0.3640 1.3185 0.4033 1.1147 0.4241 0.9537 0.4299 0.9279
ξ = 0.2 0.2879 1.4927 0.3425 1.3666 0.3914 1.1588 0.4174 0.9813 0.4244 0.9521
ξ = 0.25 0.2834 1.4990 0.3374 1.3765 0.3879 1.1688 0.4157 0.9886 0.4229 0.9586
ξ = 0.4 0.2738 1.5126 0.3255 1.3994 0.3793 1.1943 0.4112 1.0079 0.4193 0.9761
ξ = 1.0 0.2565 1.5374 0.3007 1.4478 0.3574 1.2604 0.3987 1.0648 0.4089 1.0282
ξ = 1.7 0.2481 1.5493 0.2870 1.4741 0.3424 1.3048 0.3887 1.1102 0.4004 1.0712
Investment Tax Credit ατ0 α
τ
1 α
τ
2 α
τ
3
τinv = 0.02 0.0010 0.3426 1.3060 -0.0135
τinv = 0.02 0.0015 0.3425 1.3061 -0.0205
τinv = 0.02 0.0020 0.3424 1.3064 -0.0276
τinv = 0.02 0.0025 0.3423 1.3065 -0.0349
τinv = 0.02 0.0030 0.3423 1.3066 -0.0423
τinv = 0.02 0.0038 0.3423 1.3065 -0.0538
Markup-variations ατ1 α
τ
2
η = 1.25 0.3734 1.2714
η = 1.2 0.3958 1.2422
Variations in plant-uncertainty ατ1 α
τ
2
σ = 0.0345 0.3297 1.3371
σ = 0.023 0.3247 1.3437
Notes: This table reports the Krusell-Smith equilibrium forecasting rules for the terms of trade τ for all model specifications presented in the main chapter.
In the experiments varying the investment tax credit, mark-ups and plant-level idiosyncratic uncertainty, openness (ω) is fixed at its baseline value of 0.7.
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Table 1.12: R2s
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6
αworldx α
∆
x α
%
x α
τ
x α
world
x α
∆
x α
%
x α
τ
x
ξ = 0.002 1.0000 0.9950 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 0.9978 1.0000 0.9998
ξ = 0.008 1.0000 0.9982 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 0.9990 1.0000 0.9998
ξ = 0.05 1.0000 0.9994 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9993 1.0000 0.9999
ξ = 0.2 1.0000 0.9998 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9996 1.0000 0.9999
ξ = 0.25 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9997 1.0000 0.9999
ξ = 0.4 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 1.0000 1.0000
ξ = 1.0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000
ξ = 1.7 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000
ω = 0.7 ω = 0.85
αworldx α
∆
x α
%
x α
τ
x α
world
x α
∆
x α
%
x α
τ
x
ξ = 0.002 1.0000 0.9995 0.9999 0.9997 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9998
ξ = 0.008 1.0000 0.9998 0.9999 0.9997 1.0000 0.9999 0.9998 0.9998
ξ = 0.05 1.0000 0.9998 0.9999 0.9997 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9997
ξ = 0.2 1.0000 0.9998 0.9999 0.9997 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9997
ξ = 0.25 1.0000 0.9998 0.9999 0.9997 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9997
ξ = 0.4 1.0000 0.9998 0.9999 0.9998 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9997
ξ = 1.0 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9997
ξ = 1.7 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9998
ω = 0.9
αworldx α
∆
x α
%
x α
τ
x
ξ = 0.002 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 0.9998
ξ = 0.008 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9998
ξ = 0.05 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9997
ξ = 0.2 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9997
ξ = 0.25 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9997
ξ = 0.4 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9997
ξ = 1.0 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9997
ξ = 1.7 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9997
Notes: This table reports the R2 of the regressions estimating the Krusell-Smith laws of motion for
capital and the price forecasting rules for the variations in openness and fixed adjustment costs.
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Table 1.13: R2s (cont.)
Investment Tax Credit α%0 α
%
1 α
%
2 α
%
3 α
%
4
τinv = 0.02 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999
τinv = 0.02 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999
τinv = 0.02 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999
τinv = 0.02 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999
τinv = 0.02 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999
τinv = 0.02 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999
Markup-variations α%0 α
%
1 α
%
2 α
%
3
η = 1.25 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999
η = 1.2 1.0000 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999
Variations in plant-uncertainty α%0 α
%
1 α
%
2 α
%
3
σ = 0.0345 1.0000 0.9999 1.0000 0.9999
σ = 0.023 1.0000 0.9999 0.9998 0.9999
Notes: This table reports the R2 of the regressions estimating the Krusell-Smith laws of mo-
tion for capital and the price forecasting rules for the experiments varying the investment tax
credit, mark-ups and plant-level idiosyncratic uncertainty.
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1.C. NUMERICAL SOLUTION METHOD
1.C.3 Business Cycle Statistics for ITC Model
Table 1.15 displays the business cycle statistics for the model with investment tax
credits of various sizes.
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Table 1.14: Long-run accuracy
Variations in Openness
ω = 0.55 ω = 0.6 ω = 0.7 ω = 0.85 ω = 0.9
ξ = 0.002 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.42 0.41
ξ = 0.008 0.39 0.44 0.39 0.33 0.32
ξ = 0.05 0.30 0.41 0.40 0.36 0.33
ξ = 0.2 0.27 0.39 0.44 0.37 0.36
ξ = 0.25 0.25 0.37 0.43 0.38 0.36
ξ = 0.4 0.21 0.32 0.40 0.37 0.36
ξ = 1.0 0.20 0.26 0.35 0.35 0.35
ξ = 1.7 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.33 0.34
Investment Tax Credit
τinv = 0.02 0.3486
τinv = 0.03 0.3796
τinv = 0.04 0.4276
τinv = 0.05 0.5136
τinv = 0.06 0.5980
τinv = 0.075 0.7473
Markup-variations
η = 1.25 0.3810
η = 1.2 0.4414
Variations in plant-uncertainty
σ = 0.0345 0.2596
σ = 0.023 0.2731
This table reports the 99th percentile of percentage deviations between market clearing
capital stocks and the ones implied by the aggregate laws of motion over a simulation
of 5000 periods using a draw for aggregate productivity different from the one that was
used in the Krusell-Smith solution algorithm.
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Table 1.15: Cyclical Properties with Investment Tax Credit (Matched φ)
τinv 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.075
Standard Deviations in %
Output 1.842 1.934 2.056 2.207 2.374 2.268
Standard Deviations relative to Output
Investment 6.00 7.326 8.586 9.840 11.269 14.297
Consumption 0.243 0.285 0.327 0.364 0.396 0.434
Employment 0.699 0.841 0.978 1.100 1.203 1.326
Exports 0.922 1.228 1.507 1.746 1.944 2.183
Imports 1.078 1.461 1.798 2.082 2.312 2.580
NX 0.708 0.928 1.122 1.284 1.412 1.555
ToTs 0.9666 0.963 0.958 0.953 0.948 0.941
Correlation with Output
Investment 0.778 0.752 0.745 0.741 0.727 0.674
Consumption 0.580 0.318 0.102 -0.069 -0.204 -0.356
Employment 0.878 0.842 0.832 0.836 0.845 0.862
Exports -0.018 -0.172 -0.292 -0.386 -0.460 -0.546
Imports 0.062 0.214 0.331 0.422 0.494 0.576
NX -0.538 -0.551 -0.584 -0.621 -0.655 -0.699
ToTs 0.858 0.725 0.577 0.429 0.293 0.116
Persistence
Output 0.693 0.687 0.679 0.671 0.664 0.653
Investment 0.577 0.559 0.545 0.529 0.507 0.455
Consumption 0.666 0.627 0.600 0.572 0.569 0.555
Employment 0.612 0.586 0.569 0.557 0.549 0.542
Exports 0.632 0.576 0.548 0.532 0.523 0.513
Imports 0.604 0.560 0.540 0.530 0.525 0.521
NX 0.562 0.538 0.527 0.520 0.517 0.515
ToTs 0.732 0.717 0.701 0.684 0.670 0.650
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Chapter2
Quantifying the Contribution of Search to
Wage Inequality
2.1 Introduction
Mincerian wage regressions explain only about a third of the observed inequality in
wage data. Search theoretic models of the labor market offer a compelling explana-
tion for this phenomenon. Their central assumption is that sampling job offers in
unemployment takes time and is subject to the opportunity cost of foregone wages.
Identical workers, therefore, accept a range of heterogeneous job offers.1 The liter-
ature has come to call this frictional wage dispersion. Understanding how much of
residual inequality results from search frictions opposed to unobserved worker het-
erogeneity is of first order importance for judging the efficiency of labor markets and
designing appropriate social insurance schemes.
Structural models that seek to answer this question conclude that more than 40
percent of wage inequality can be explained by the search friction (see Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002) and Carrillo-Tudela (2012)). Hornstein et al. (2012) (henceforth
referred to by HKV) show that on the job search is the key mechanism that generates
large frictional wage dispersion. A high offer arrival rate on the job implies that
workers are giving up less when moving out of unemployment. This makes them
willing to accept relatively poor job offers. Moreover, they quickly move up the job
ladder which means a larger share of workers with relatively high wages.
In this chapter, we provide evidence from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) that an important share of job to job transitions is not value
improving. Accounting for this, we calibrate a structural search model with worker
1See Mortensen (2003) and the references therein.
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and job heterogeneity that replicates observed overall and residual wage inequality.
It attributes less than 14 percent of overall wage inequality to the search friction.
This result comes in spite of our inclusion of a number of important channels that
enlarge the set of acceptable job offers to the worker: skill accumulation on the
job, skill loss in unemployment and search on the job. The crucial novelty is the
introduction of reallocation shocks that we calibrate to the share of wage losses after
a job to job transition. Without them, in a recalibrated model, the variance of the
wage offer distribution more than doubles and the contribution of the search friction
jumps to over 38 percent, in line with the findings in the previous literature.
The basic intuition for our main result can be summarized in three steps. First,
the share of residual inequality that the search friction can explain is an increasing
function of the variance of the job offer distribution. This is an unobservable object
that has to be identified from wage data. Here, we follow Low et al. (2010) and
estimate if from the excess variance of wage growth for job switchers relative to job
stayers.
Second, when all job to job transitions are value improving, workers quickly move
into the high ranked jobs from which they are unlikely to accept further offers.
Calibrated search efficiency therefore has to be high in order to replicate the size
of observed job to job flows. This, in turn, means that workers are concentrating
in the high ranked jobs even faster. Most observed wage changes between jobs are
then small improvements such that a high excess variance of wage growth for job
switchers can only be rationalized by a very disperse job offer distribution.
Third, as we demonstrate using a variation of the on the job search model studied
by HKV, this causal chain is broken by the introduction of what Jolivet et al. (2006)
label a reallocation shock : A fraction of the on the job offers leaves the worker only to
decide between accepting the outside offer or moving into unemployment. The lower
outside option decreases the inferred on the job offer arrival rate because workers are
more likely to accept an offer resulting from a reallocation shock. These setbacks also
mean that workers move into the high ranked jobs at a lower rate. This makes them
more likely to accept outside offers. All in all, negative wage growth observations
and a larger set of acceptable voluntary outside offers mean that the same excess
variance of wage growth can be rationalized with a much less disperse wage offer
distribution.
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2.2. FURTHER RELATED LITERATURE
Can we find evidence for reallocation shocks in the data? Fujita (2011) using data
from the UK Labour Force Survey shows that an important share of workers who
search on the job do so to avoid unemployment. We extend his analysis using the
SIPP employment data to show that reallocation shocks are an important driving
force behind observed flows. About a third of all job to job transitions yield lower
nominal wages for the worker and neither observable non-wage benefits nor higher
expected wage growth can account for workers accepting these lower wages. Instead,
workers who initially accept a wage cut are more likely to switch jobs again shortly
afterwards. Our quantitative model allows us to map the share of losses into the size
of reallocation shocks explicitly controlling for measurement error and stochastic
innovations to workers’ wages. We estimate reallocation shocks to be responsible for
60 percent of observed losses.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 gives an overview
of related literature. In Section 2 we lay out the simple analytical model that high-
lights the importance of reallocation shocks. Section 3 provides empirical evidence for
their presence in the data and highlights stylized facts of residual wage dispersion.
We present our full model in Section 4. Section 5 discusses its parameterization.
Section 6 presents and analyzes the results, and Section 7 concludes. Additional
information on the analytical derivations, the empirical part and the numerical al-
gorithm is relegated to the appendix.2
2.2 Further Related Literature
Burdett et al. (2011) and Ortego-Marti (2012) show that workers’ reservation wages
fall significantly in a job ladder model augmented by skill accumulation on the job
and skill depreciation in unemployment, respectively. These models match the mean
to minimum residual wage in the data, potentially rationalizing all residual inequality
as frictional.3 We incorporate these features into our model to give it a fair chance
of generating substantial frictional inequality. We show that the inferred job offer
distribution provides an upper bound for the share of residual inequality that can be
2All programs used for data analysis and model solution are available on the authors’ web pages.
3Other recent papers that study conditions under which frictional wage inequality can explain all
residual inequality are Papp (2012) and Michelacci et al. (2012). An earlier example is Bontemps
et al. (2000).
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thought of as frictional.
Another strand of related literature tries to decompose residual inequality from
reduced-form specifications. Abowd et al. (1999) and Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2010) find that search frictions explain between 7− 25 percent of the French inter-
industry differential and 6 percent of US wages, respectively. These models rely on
exogenous labor mobility and either a permanent component of worker heterogene-
ity (Abowd et al. (1999) ), or a stationary shock process (Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2010)). Our structural model allows us to explicitly model the selection of workers
into matches. Moreover, we confirm findings from previous studies that residual wage
inequality increases strongly over a worker’s life-cycle. This suggests a permanent
shock component in individual wage potential. Our model allows for such a non-
stationary shock process and our decomposition of workers’ wages over the life-cycle
shows that a substantial part of heterogeneity is the result of different employment
histories during working life.4 Finally, also using the SIPP, Low et al. (2010) use a
selection model to infer the wage offer distribution and the shock process of individ-
ual wage potential from US wage data. While we ask a different question and use
a different empirical strategy, our estimates yield a comparable magnitude for the
relative size of idiosyncratic and employment risk.
2.3 Intuition from a Simple Model
HKV show that the job offer arrival rate on the job is a key parameter determining
the wage distribution, and thus the amount of frictional wage inequality, in job ladder
models. The higher the on the job offer arrival rate is compared to in unemployment,
the smaller is the option value the worker gives up by remaining unemployed and
waiting for better offers. Consequently, the minimum wage accepted by workers
decreases. Additionally, a high offer arrival rate on the job implies that workers
quickly move up the job ladder. This leads to relatively many workers located at
high paying jobs. The fact that 1 in 40 employees in the US labor market switches
jobs every month seems to hint at high offer arrival rates on the job.
4Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010) assume transitory shocks to the worker component and attribute
6% of US wage dispersion to search frictions. Using their identification strategy on our non-
stationary shock process, search frictions explain almost none of the variance of log wages in
our simulated data.
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2.3. INTUITION FROM A SIMPLE MODEL
Using an extension to the model studied by HKV, we now demonstrate that one
can match high job to job transitions with substantially lower job offer arrival rates
when introducing what Jolivet et al. (2006) label a reallocation shock : A fraction of
all on the job offers do not allow the worker to stay with his current job, but only
leave him to choose between accepting other employment or becoming unemployed.
One may think of these shocks as both transitions within layoff notice period as
well as those originating out of non-pecuniary motives such as moving in with one’s
spouse or closer to one’s parents.5 We show that these shocks crucially affect the
wage distribution, both directly and indirectly by the lower inferred on the job offer
arrival rate.
Our exposition here is parsimonious and focuses on a few key equations. Appendix
2.A provides a full characterization of the solution. There is a unit mass of homoge-
neous workers receiving wage offers at Poisson rate λu when unemployed and with
rate λ when employed. Wage offers are random draws from a cumulative wage offer
distribution F (w) with upper support wmax that the worker can accept or reject.
Time is continuous and workers discount the future at rate r. It is easy to see that
the worker follows a reservation wage strategy where the minimum accepted wage is
denoted w∗. The asset value of being employed with current wage w is:
rW (w) = w + λ(1− λd)
ˆ wmax
w
[W (z)−W (w)]dF (z)
+ λλd
ˆ wmax
w∗
[W (z)−W (w)]dF (z)
− (ω + λλdF (w∗))(W (w)− U).
The worker receives a ”normal” on the job offer with probability λ(1 − λd), where
λd is the probability that an on the job offer is a reallocation shock. The second
line is the value of accepting an outside offer after a reallocation shock. Note that
now workers accept all wage offers above the reservation wage because they do not
have the option to stay with their old jobs. The third line states the value of moving
into unemployment which either happens with probability ω after exogenous job
destruction, or when the worker refuses an offer after a reallocation shock which
5This is in distinction from a transition where the benefit might have been non-monetary but
related to the new job like a more permanent work contract or employer provided health insur-
ance.
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occurs with probability λλdF (w
∗). When setting λd = 0, the model reduces to the
job ladder model studied by HKV. The asset value of unemployment reads:
rU = b+ λu
ˆ wmax
w∗
[W (z)− U ]dF (z).
An unemployed worker receives benefits b and samples job offers at rate λu.
We now establish that a larger share of reallocation shocks decreases the job offer
arrival rate inferred from employment transition data and reduces the share of work-
ers with relatively high wages. We then demonstrate that this lowers the amount of
wage dispersion implied by the model. The on the job offer arrival rate is typically
identified by matching a fixed job to job transition rate, which we label JTJ , and
which is given by:
JTJ = λ(1− λd)
ˆ wmax
w∗
[1− F (z)]dG(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ANO
+λλd [1− F (w∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ARO
,
where G(w) is the realized distribution of wages. We define ANO as the average
probability that a normal on the job offer is accepted and ARO as the probability
that an offer is accepted after a reallocation shock. Solving for the implied on the
job offer rate gives:
λ∗ =
JTJ
(1− λd)ANO + λdARO.
Increasing the share of reallocation shocks λd decreases the inferred on the job offer
rate λ∗ for two reasons. First, job offers after a reallocation shock are accepted with
probability ARO which is larger than the average probability of a normal on the job
offer being accepted (ANO). Second, it indirectly affects the latter by changing the
wage distribution G(w) which we derive in Appendix 2.A:
G(w) =
F (w)− F (w∗)
1− F (w∗)
=:D︷ ︸︸ ︷
ω + λ∗λd
ω + λ∗λd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:D
+λ∗(1− λd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:C
[1− F (w)] . (2.1)
Reallocation shocks have two effects on the wage distribution. First, like exogenous
destruction, they move workers into unemployment from which they subsequently
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accept any offer above their reservation wage (D). In addition, C shows that they
decrease the amount of regular job offers, and thus, the speed that workers climb
up the job ladder. Consequently, G(w) becomes steeper at low values, i.e., more
workers have relatively low wages implying that the probability of a normal offer
being accepted (ANO) rises.
In Section 2.6.2, we infer the wage offer distribution F (w) from wage data and
show that the mechanisms just outlined have large quantitative implications for the
inference. To fix ideas, we here study the effects of changes in λd on wage dispersion
for a given F (w). HKV propose the ratio of the mean to the minimum wage (Mm-
ratio: w¯/w∗) as summary statistic to compare wage dispersion across different classes
of search models.6 The measure has become a popular statistic in the literature, and
for comparability we use it as one summary statistic for wage dispersion later in the
chapter.
Table 2.1: Parameterization Simple Model
Parameter Value
b 0.4w
λu 0.3
F (w) lnN (0, 0.04)
JTJ 2.5 %
r 0.33 %
Unemployment benefits b are a fraction
of the mean wage w. JTJ designates
the job to job transition rate.
In Appendix 2.A, we show that the reservation wage is characterized by:
w∗ = b+ (λu − λ∗)
ˆ wmax
w∗
1− F (z)
r + ω + λ∗λdF (w∗) + λ∗λdF (z) + λ∗[1− F (z)]dz. (2.2)
It is the sum of the flow benefits in unemployment and the option value to keep
searching in unemployment. As in a pure job ladder model (λd = 0), the latter is
decreasing in the difference λu − λ, because workers are giving up less in terms of
search efficiency when moving out of unemployment. Similarly, r and ω decrease the
value of additional search because workers become more impatient and high wage
6In the models they study, this measure is independent of the wage offer distribution F (w). This
does not hold in the environment studies here (see Appendix 2.A for a proof).
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offers have a lower duration, respectively. Using comparative statics, we demonstrate
that changes in λd affect the minimum wage directly and indirectly via the implied
search efficiency on the job:
dw∗
dλd
=
∂w∗
∂λd︸︷︷︸
<0
+
∂w∗
∂λ∗
∂λ∗
∂λd︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
The direct effect of a reallocation shock can be directly read from (2.2): With prob-
ability F (w∗), like exogenous job destruction, it decreases the expected duration of
holding employment. Moreover, the further a worker moves up the job ladder, the
more likely he will move into a lower ranked job, which decreases the difference in
valuation between higher and lower ranked jobs. Both factors decrease the incentive
to wait for better offers when moving out of unemployment.7 However, the increase
in reallocation shocks decreases λ∗ which increases the reservation wage. Theoreti-
cally, the effect λd has on the minimum wage is therefore ambiguous and may change
depending on parameter values.
The mean wage, is given by:
w¯ =
ˆ wmax
w∗
wdG(z)
Provided our earlier discussion, it should be intuitive that it is a decreasing function
of λd. More reallocation shocks imply a steeper G(w) and hence a lower mean wage.
For the remainder of this section, to be able to supply graphical representations
to our argument, we impose parametric assumptions on the model. Table 2.1 lists
the parameter values. All of them are relatively common in the literature (HKV use
similar parameter values in their exposition).
Figure 2.2a demonstrates how the wage distribution becomes steeper as λd in-
creases. Figure 2.2b shows the drop in the inferred on the job offer arrival rate.
The model estimate reacts particularly sensitive to changes at small values of λd.
Regarding the reservation wage, Appendix 2.A shows that it rises up to λd = 0.35
and starts to decrease again slowly afterwards. The resulting Mm-ratio from varying
λd given our parameter values is reported in Figure 2.2c. Especially for low values
7It is this effect which has Hornstein et al. (2007) conclude that reallocation shocks should unam-
biguously increase the Mm-ratio.
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Figure 2.1: Parameterized Simple Model
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(c) Mm-Ratio
Figure 2.2a shows the implied distributions of wages paid G(w) for different reallocation shock probabilities λd using
the parameterization reported in Table 2.1. Figure 2.2b reports the implied search efficiency λ for the same exercise,
and Figure 2.2c reports the resulting Mm-ratio.
of λd, the Mm-ratio decreases quite sharply in the share of reallocation shocks.
2.4 Reallocation Shocks and Residual Wage Dispersion in
the Data
In this section, we introduce our data set, the Survey of Income and Program Partic-
ipation (SIPP), and discuss sample selection. We compile different pieces of evidence
to show that reallocation shocks are an important feature of the data and link them
to existing evidence in other studies. We also obtain the distribution of residual
wages from a Mincerian wage regression. Residual inequality is large and shows a
substantial increase with worker age.
2.4.1 Data Source and Sample Creation
Our analysis requires detailed longitudinal information on wages, worker and job
characteristics at a very high temporal resolution. The data set most adequate for
these requirements is the SIPP of which we employ the 1993 and 1996 panels.8 It is a
representative sample of the non-institutionalized civilian US population maintained
8Our data set is based on CEPR SIPP extracts available for download at
http://www.ceprdata.org/sipp/sipp data.php. We modify these abstracts to include fur-
ther information contained in the SIPP files but not in the original abstracts. Appendix 2.B
provides additional information on the differences between the two data sets and the steps we
take to merge them.
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by the US Census Bureau.9 The level of detail it provides in individual records allows
us to accurately identify an individual’s main job and hourly wages on that job.10
Our initial sample consists of 5,243,222 person/month observations.
Our data cover the years 1993-1995 (1993 sample) and 1996-1999 (1996 sample)
providing us with up to 48 months of observations per individual. We use obser-
vations from individuals aged 23-55, for whom we require complete information on
the individual’s employment status, age and employer id. We only consider an in-
dividual’s primary job11 and drop workers that are recalled by former employers
or have missing reporting months during a job spell.12 Moreover, we drop workers
reporting to be school enrolled, the self-employed, family-workers, members of the
armed forces, workers at non-profit companies and anyone whose wage information
was imputed by the SIPP.13 Finally, we truncate the wage distribution at the top
and bottom 1% to take care of outliers and top-coding.14 These restrictions leave us
with 2,039,345 person/month observations.
We identify job to job transitions as those transitions where the worker works in
two consecutive months without reporting unemployment in between,15 and either
the worker’s employer identification number or his two-digit occupational identifier
changes.16 Appendix 2.C provides a discussion for alternative measures of job to job
transitions and compares our estimate to those obtained from CPS data.
9The 1996 panel oversamples poor households. We use population weights provided by the SIPP
throughout our analysis.
10The survey reports at most two jobs for each 4-month recording period. In case an individual
holds more than two jobs, the two jobs with most hours worked are reported.
11As primary job we consider the position where the largest share of hours worked is spent.
12In case of recall, we choose to exclude those observations because recalled workers likely possess
a different search technology than what we include in our model specification.
13Since our investigation starts from the observation that wage predictions conditional on worker
observables explain only a relatively small part of wages, it would seem odd to include wage
observations which are mere predictions of these very models
14Earnings are topcoded at $33333 and $50000 for a four month period in the 1993 and 1996
sample, respectively.
15Theoretically, we could use the weekly employment status and count job to job transitions only,
when a worker is employed in two consecutive weeks. However, it seems reasonable to assume
that a few days in between jobs may be spent on a potential relocation or other pre-work
sensitivities. Hence, we only discard observations where the worker reports to actively seek a
job during non-employment.
16We think of job to job transitions as a change in the technology operated by the worker; therefore,
we include both, changes in job ids (as in Fallick and Fleischman (2004)) and occupation (as in
Moscarini and Thomsson (2007)).
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2.4.2 Reallocation Shocks and On the Job Search
This section provides empirical evidence from previous studies and our own data
that reallocation shocks are an important feature of employment transitions. While
we cannot infer their size directly from the data, Section 2.5 uses a moment from the
data together with an extended search model to quantify the share of these shocks.
The existing literature already highlights several shortcomings of a pure job ladder
model. Fallick and Fleischman (2004) find for the CPS that a worker who reports
to be actively searching on the job is more likely to be unemployed the next month.
Fujita (2011) uses a question in the UK labor force survey that asks employees to
state a reason for their engaging in on the job search. He finds that of those who
report to be actively searching, 12 percent do so for fear of loosing their current
job and another 27 percent because they are unsatisfied with their current job due
to non-pecuniary reasons. Na´gipal (2005) shows for a basic job ladder model that
the job offer arrival rate on the job has to be higher than during unemployment in
order to replicate observed flow rates. Jolivet et al. (2006) show that in the PSID
23.3 percent of job to job transitions are associated with nominal wage decreases.
Including reallocation shocks into a Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, they find
that these shocks account for a third of all job to job offers. Using the SIPP, Connolly
and Gottschalk (2008) find that 44.1 percent of all job to job transitions lead to lower
real wages. They stress that a higher future expected wage growth may explain initial
wage cuts and estimate that 64 percent of male and 81 percent of female wage cuts
are truly transitions to lower valued jobs.17
Regarding our own data, the SIPP asks workers who terminate a job for their
reason to do so. The answers further corroborate the evidence previously cited: Only
55 percent of those responding state that they quit to take another job. In contrast,
19 percent of jobs ended, because the previous job did not provide the possibility to
continue.18 Adding another 4 percent of cases which pertain to personal or family
related issues, this yields up to 23 percent of transitions where, for one reason or
another, staying with the old job may not have been an option. There are a number
of caveats to the informativeness of this variable: Some of the possible answers are not
17Vice versa, they find that 1.3 percent of females’ and 8.6 percent of males’ transitions with wage
improvements actually go into lower valued matches.
18This includes the answers on layoff, job was temporary and ended, discharged/fired, employer
bankrupt, employer sold business, and slack work or business conditions.
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Table 2.2: Wage Cuts after Job to Job Transitions
Sample Stratification Share loss Mean loss
Whole sample 0.344 -0.196
Job characteristics
- Non-Union to Union 0.346 -0.196
- Health insurance 0.352 -0.196
- Education 0.352 -0.196
Old wage
- Lowest 25% 0.232 -0.16
- 25-75% 0.352 -0.198
- Top 25% 0.457 -0.215
The Table shows the share of workers incurring a cut in nominal hourly wages after a job to job movement
for our sample population as a whole as well as for several subsets. Mean loss reports the mean wage loss
in log points conditional on suffering a wage cut upon movement. Under Job characteristics, the first line
excludes workers from the sample who transit from non-unionized to unionized jobs, the second and third
line additionally exclude workers who move from jobs without health insurance to an employer providing an
insurance policy and movements where the new employer subsidizes expenses on education. The panel Old
wage divides workers based on their wages on the old job.
mutually exclusive, or do not map directly into our interpretation of a reallocation
shock. Even more problematic, in less than 30 percent of the cases we identify as
job to job transitions, the worker provides an answer.19 20
Instead of trying to infer search efficiency from this rather noisy variable, we follow
a different strategy in combining employment flow data with accompanying wage
dynamics. As we report in Table 2.2, a pervasive phenomenon in the data are job to
job transitions resulting in nominal wage losses. In the whole population, roughly
one third of all transitions result in workers earning lower hourly wages in the month
after the transition compared to the last month on the previous job.21 Conditional
losses are substantial with workers on average receiving about 20 percent lower wages
than previously.22
19For a negligible share the question is not applicable, because only the main job changed, but
the worker stays with his old employer. See Appendix 2.C for a detailed discussion on how we
identify job to job transitions.
20Na´gipal (2008) discusses the same issue.
21As a robustness test, we also constructed three-month-averages of wages before and after a
movement to mitigate other sources of reporting error in the months surrounding the transition.
This did not affect our estimates.
22In Appendix 2.C, we report the same figures for real wage changes. In that case, the share of
loss-making transitions increases to roughly one half with average losses of about 15 percent. In
principle, the worker should only consider real wages. But in the presence of some wage rigidity
the worker expects a wage loss on his current job as well and compares nominal wages.
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More than one third of loss-making transitions may seem like a fairly large share
at first glance. One possible objection is that wages do not accurately capture the
full present value of the new job. As a robustness check, in the segment entitled Job
characteristics, we exclude transitions from non-unionized to unionized jobs since
the latter should have higher expected duration and therefore, potentially, higher
present value. This does not materially affect our result. Neither does controlling
for observable benefit payments such as moving from jobs without health insurance
to jobs that provide insurance or into jobs which subsidize education.23 Moreover,
losses from job to job transitions are a frequent phenomenon across all segments of
the wage distribution from top to bottom as can be seen in the segment Old wage.
They are twice as likely to occur in the upper quartile of the distribution than in the
bottom one, as might be expected given that higher wage earners also have more to
lose. Still, even in the bottom part, more than 23 percent of transitions end up in
lower paying jobs.
We perform a whole battery of further data stratifications to check whether a
particular subgroup or time period is driving the results. Their results are reported
in detail in Appendix 2.C. Share of losses and conditional changes do not materially
change whether we split the sample by year to control for business cycle effects, by
gender, age or tenure.24
In Appendix 2.C, we also give consideration to an alternative explanation put
forward by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). They lay out a framework in which
workers will accept wage cuts upon job to job transitions, if the option value of
working at the other firm is sufficiently high. Indeed, Papp (2012) shows that this
framework can rationalize a large amount of wage cuts and large frictional wage
dispersion. The key operating mechanism in this class of models is that workers who
experienced wage losses have on average steeper observed wage growth afterwards,
i.e. wages are backloaded. As we show, there is no indication of that occurring in
our data.25
23Given that e.g. Flinn and Mabli (2008) show, also using the SIPP, that wages and non-wage
benefits are positively correlated, this should perhaps not be surprising.
24One exception occurs when we limit our sample to those individuals who report being paid by
the hour. In that case, the share of losses drops to 23 percent and conditional losses to 7.8
percent. Still, this figure appears to understate the phenomenon for the population as a whole,
because this group is a highly selective subsample of the population with relatively low wages.
25This appears to contradicts the finding of Connolly and Gottschalk (2008) cited earlier. However,
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As further piece of evidence that wage losses are the result of transitions into lower
ranked jobs, we estimate a probit model conditioning the event of experiencing an-
other subsequent job to job transition on the initial wage change upon movement.
Workers who experience a loss making transition are significantly more likely to sub-
sequently transit again. For example, someone having suffered a loss of 20 percent
upon movement is 10.3 percent more likely to transit again then someone who ex-
perienced an increase of equivalent size and 5.6 percent more likely than someone
whose wage remained unchanged.
These different tests lead us to conclude that most of the occurrences of loss-
making transitions are not the result of some benefit not properly accounted for by
reported compensation. However, we also cannot not conclude that they all result
from reallocation shocks. Simple measurement error in wages is surely part of the
story. Shocks to workers’ idiosyncratic wage potential may be another contributing
factor. In Section 2.5, we explicitly include these factors in our model specification
in order to quantify the amount of reallocation shocks.
2.4.3 Residual Wage Dispersion in the SIPP
Table 2.3 summarizes measures of residual wage inequality from a regression of
log hourly wages26 on a constant, time dummies, a dummy for disabled workers,
a dummy for gender, a dummy for marital status, dummies for race (White, Black,
Hispanic, Other), dummies for education (Less than high school, High School, Some
college, College), 45 regional dummies, the number of kids, experience and experi-
ence square. The mean R2 of this regressions is 0.37 and the variance of log residual
wages is 0.21 leaving a significant share of wage variance unexplained.27
the authors classify wages into only two categories (low,high) and subsequent wage growth into
three categories (low,medium,high). In Appendix 2.C, we show using a continuous wage growth
measure that the data suggest no correlation.
26See Appendix 2.B for details on how hourly wages are computed.
27In an earlier version of this chapter, we also controlled for unobserved individual worker fixed
effect similar to Hornstein et al. (2007). The short observation period of 48 months means that
many workers do not experience any job to job transition while they are in the sample. As
a result, their individual effect captures the full firm effect in wages and the distribution of
residual wages has a large mass point at one. We thank an anonymous referee and Tama´s Papp
for pointing out this issue to us. Nevertheless, we can compare our model results to this statistic
when running the same regression on simulated data. Doing so does not change our conclusions
drawn in Section 2.7.
68
2.5. A QUANTITATIVE MODEL OF WAGE DISPERSION
Table 2.3: Residual Wage Inequality in the 1993/1996 SIPP
Mm-ratio Mm-ratio by Age Cohort Further measures
Pctl. Age 5th Percentile var. log wages Gini
1st 3.02 25 1.95
5th 2.14 36 2.12 0.21 0.29
10th 1.83 49 2.25
The table reports summary measures of residual wage inequality in the merged 1993/1996 SIPP: the mean
to minimum ratio, Gini-coefficient and variance of log wages after controlling for worker observables. Since
the lowest wage observation in the data is likely the result of measurement error, we report several low per-
centiles as candidates for the actual minimum wage. Columns 3 to 4 report the Mm-ratio for different age
cohorts using the 5th percentile as minimum wage.
The left part of Table 2.3 summarizes the Mm-ratio in the data. Since the lowest
wages are likely the result of measurement error, we report a number of low per-
centiles as candidate points. Independent of the precise measure, the Mm-ratio, the
variance of log wages or the Gini coefficient, residual wage dispersion is large and
comparable to previous studies.
While regressions like the one above provide a measure for wage inequality among
observationally equivalent workers, it is not clear that this should be interpreted
as frictional inequality. Such an interpretation would e.g. falsely assign measure-
ment error and unobserved stochastic innovations to individual wage potential to
the search friction. The second column highlights a fact extensively analyzed in
the incomplete markets literature, e.g. Storesletten et al. (2004), but not often ad-
dressed in the existing search literature on wage inequality: Cross-sectional residual
inequality increases substantially over the life-cycle. Models with a fixed worker wage
potential and no on the job search would imply that inequality does not change with
age. Models with on the job search would even predict a decrease in inequality,
because workers over time cluster at the higher paying jobs. Therefore, in our model
specification, we follow the incomplete markets literature and allow for persistent
stochastic innovations to workers’ wage potential.
2.5 A Quantitative Model of Wage Dispersion
In this section, we extend our simple model studied in Section 2.3 by adding worker
heterogeneity. We enrich the worker’s decision problem by a number of empirically
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relevant channels that imply larger frictional inequality.28 We also add stochastic
innovations to individual wage potential and measurement error in wages which
allows us to disentangle wage losses resulting from reallocation shocks from those
resulting from other sources.
The model is set in discrete time. Workers differ in their idiosyncratic log wage
potential At and draw job offers from heterogeneous jobs with log wage contribution
Γ.29 When a worker of type At and a job of type Γ meet, the wage is given by
wt = exp(At + Γ).
30 We assume that search is random, and unemployed workers
contact job offers at rate λu in which case Γ is drawn from a distribution with cdf
F (Γ) on support [Γm,ΓM ]. Employed workers continue to sample job offers from the
same distribution. Following our discussion in Section 2.3, we model some job to job
transitions as the result of a reallocation shocks. An employed worker receives a job
offer with probability λ and can in general decide to stay with his old match, or form
a new one. However, in λd of those cases, the outside option becomes unemployment.
Unemployed workers receive unemployment benefits bt and a value of leisure Zt
that both depend on the worker’s idiosyncratic state:
b(At) = min
{
bmax, rrb · E
[
wt(At,Γ)|At
]}
Z(At) = rrZ · E
[
wt(At,Γ)|At
]
.
where bmax are statutory maximum UI payments. Averages are taken over the range
of acceptable job offers, which themselves depend on At. In the case of unemployment
insurance, the dependence on the worker’s state capture the fact that benefits are a
28Our focus is on the decision problem of a worker, faces an exogenous job offer distribution. In an
earlier version of this chapter, Tjaden and Wellschmied (2012), we used a general equilibrium
approach with search and matching in the labor market and a Nash-Bargaining game played
by workers and firms. We show that the resulting non-linear log wage schedule can be almost
perfectly approximated by a linear one. For ease of presentation, we opt here for the partial
equilibrium representation.
29Γ is the only source of job effects in our model. These can arise from different job specific
productivities, match specific effects and, as Winfried Koeniger pointed out to us, differences
arising from bargaining over quasi rents from capital.
30Following the existing literature, we assume that wages monotonically increase in the job compo-
nent conditional on the worker component. Kircher and Eeckhout (2011) and Bagger and Lentz
(2012) show that when job effects are independent of match specific effects and the production
function has a non-zero cross-partial derivative, bargaining models imply a non-monotone wage
schedule, and a specific sorting of workers over firms is an equilibrium outcome. If this was an
important aspect of the data, our model would not control for it.
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function of prior contributions and workers with higher wage potential contributed
more before becoming unemployed. In the case of the value of leisure, we choose this
as the closest analogy to the homogeneous agent world.31
Workers die with probability φ and are replaced by an unemployed labor market
entrant whose idiosyncratic log wage potential is drawn from the distribution N ∼
N(µN , σ
2
N). Burdett et al. (2011) show that introducing experience gains into an on
the job search model increases the amount of frictional wage dispersion significantly.
To allow for this feature, we let the evolution of workers’ wage potential depend on
the agent’s employment status:
At+1 =
At + ν + t if employedAt − δ + t if unemployed.
δ represents skill depreciation while being unemployed and ν represents learning on
the job.  is a stochastic shock with  ∼ N(0, σ2 ). We think of shocks to wage
potential as demand shocks for specific skills or health shocks. The assumption of a
uni-root process in wage potential is in line with most of the labor literature.32 A
non-stationary stochastic specification for wages has also become a standard feature
of the incomplete markets literature.33 It has so far been less common in quantitative
search models.
We summarize the worker problem by the value of employment W and the value
of unemployment U . The value of employment depends on a worker’s wage potential
and a firm’s wage contribution, the value of unemployment on the workers’ wage
potential alone. The value of employment reads:
W (At,Γ) = wt(At,Γ) + β(1− φ)Et
{
(1− ω)[
(1− λ)H + λ[(1− λd)ΩE + λdΛ]
]
+ ωU(At+1)
}
Et is the expectation operator given all information in period t and ω is an exogenous
31Furthermore, one can think of this as an, admittedly very stylized, reduced form for capturing
wealth heterogeneity. High wage workers tend to have higher asset levels and unemployed
workers deplete their assets over time.
32See Abowd and Card (1989), Topel (1991), Topel and Ward (1992), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004)
and Low et al. (2010).
33See for example Krueger et al. (2010).
71
CHAPTER 2. SEARCH AND WAGE INEQUALITY
match destruction shock. For clarity of presentation, we defined the outcome of the
choice whether to quit after a bad shock to wage potential as H, the upper envelopes
for receiving a regular job offer on the job ΩE and the upper envelope for receiving
a reallocation shock Λ. Let Γ′ be the job component at an outside job offer:
H = max{W (At+1,Γ), U(At+1)}
ΩE =
ˆ ΓM
Γm
max{W (At+1,Γ), U(At+1),W (At+1,Γ′)}dF (Γ′)
Λ =
ˆ ΓM
Γm
max{W (At+1,Γ′), U(At+1)}dF (Γ′).
The value of unemployment solves:
U(At) = b(At) + Z(At) + β(1− φ)Et
{
(1− λu)U(At+1)
+ λu
ˆ ΓM
Γm
max{W (At+1,Γ), U(At+1)}dF (Γ)
}
.
2.6 Parameterization
This section proceeds as follows: We first discuss our calibration regarding non-
distributional parameters (preferences, institutions, flow rates) in Section 2.6.1. In
Section 2.6.2, we discuss our calibration of distributional parameters. Table 2.4
summarizes our calibration.
2.6.1 Non-Distributional Parameters
The model period is one month. When comparing monthly wages in the model to
hourly wages in the data, we assume an average of 160 work hours per month. The
length of a period is of importance, because it puts an upper bound on the job offer
probability λu and the minimum duration of an unemployment spell. A maximum
of one offer per month is well supported by the data,34 but the second constraint is
likely to be binding.35
34Holzer (1988) reports based on NLSY data that 34 percent of the unemployed received at least
one job offer and 12 percent received more than one offer per month.
35See Clark and Summers (1979). Our model cannot by construction match the high observed
outflow rates within the first month. However, time disaggregation below one month is rather
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We calculate the employment to unemployment and unemployment to employment
flow rates in our SIPP sample. The exogenous job destruction rate ω is set such that
the total job destruction rate, the sum of endogenous and exogenous movements
from employment to unemployment, is 0.65 percent per month. We attach to λu a
value that implies a monthly job finding rate of 12.3 percent.
Information on job to job movements and accompanying wage changes identify
λ and λd. We adjust λ to imply that 1.43 percent of workers switch employers
every period. Our identifying assumption for separating voluntary and involuntary
movements is that voluntary movements always result in expected wage increases.
Together with the losses due to stochastic idiosyncratic shocks to wage potential and
measurement error, both of which are calibrated below, setting λd to 0.1 allows us
to replicate that 34 percent of job to job movements result in nominal wage losses.36
The flow rates estimated from our sample are considerably lower than compara-
ble estimates commonly found in the CPS. In Appendix 2.B, we discuss that this
is largely explained by fact that our sample selection criteria lead us to focus on
individuals with relatively stable employment histories. Estimated flow rates from
our raw sample are considerably larger and comparable to those found in the CPS.37
Consistent with findings from Siegel (2002) for average bond and stock returns,
we set β to imply a yearly interest rate of 4 percent. Next, we consider the flow
value of unemployment. We set the replacement rate rrb to 25 percent. As argued
in Hall and Milgrom (2008) this provides a parsimonious description of the system.
The maximum UI benefit payment is set to 1168 $, which is the average across US
states. The parameter determining the value of leisure rrz is set to 15 percent which
yields a total replacement rate of 40 percent when entering into unemployment as in
costly, because our numerical algorithm uses value function iteration, which converges at a rate
of β.
36The share of realized job to job transitions that result from a reallocation shock is 28 percent,
which compares nicely with our survey evidence presented in Section 2.4.2. In total, 60 percent
of loss making transitions result from reallocation shocks. Our explicit modeling of measure-
ment error and shocks to individual wage potential decrease the estimate of reallocation shocks
considerably compared to the studies of Jolivet et al. (2006) and Connolly and Gottschalk
(2008).
37Moreover, equation (2.2) highlights that for a worker’s decision problem only the difference
between the on and off the job offer arrival rates matters. Both are significantly lower in our
study compared to the ones reported by e.g., Fallick and Fleischman (2004) based on CPS data,
but the difference has a comparable size.
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Shimer (2005).38
We choose an indirect inference approach in calibrating experience and deprecia-
tion.39 In the data, we regress log hourly wages at zero tenure on individual fixed
effects, time fixed effects and a quadratic polynomial in experience. The regression
yields an average increase in annual wages of 3 percent per year of experience over a
working life of 25 years.40 We then use our model solution to simulate 30000 worker
histories and draw a panel of the same length as the SIPP. We perform a similar
regression41 in our simulated data to control for selection and adjust ν to match this
statistic. For skill depreciation δ we run a regression of log hourly wages after an un-
employment to employment transition on the duration of the previous unemployment
spell and worker observables. The results imply that an extra month of unemploy-
ment reduces wages by 0.39 percent. We then again replicate this regression in our
data and adjust δ to match the regression statistic.
2.6.2 Distributional Parameters
We now describe the way we calibrate the variance of the wage offer distribution
σ2F , idiosyncratic shocks to wage potential σ
2
 , initial worker dispersion σ
2
N and the
measurement error process. None of the statistics is directly observable in the data
because agents endogenously select themselves into and out of employment and into
employment with jobs of specific wage offers in response to idiosyncratic productivity
developments. Instead, we identify them from within our model.
Measuring Job Heterogeneity
Similar to Low et al. (2010), our identification of the job offer distribution rests
on the excess variance of job switchers and job stayers in the data. Other than
specifying an additive specification for log wages and assuming the firm contribution
to be log normally distributed, this identification only relies on the assumption that
38The value of leisure is a much discussed object in the literature and Hall and Milgrom (2008)
suggest a total replacement rate of 0.71. In Appendix 2.E we show that using this higher rate
leaves our results virtually unaffected.
39We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach to us.
40Altonji and Williams (1998) report very similar results.
41Experience is imperfectly measured in the SIPP. Workers are asked how many years they worker
at least 6 full months since first entering the labor market. We construct the same measure for
yearly experience in our simulated data.
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Table 2.4: Calibration
Variable Target
β = 0.997 4 percent annual interest rate
rrb = 0.25
bmean
wmean
= 0.25
rrZ = 0.15
Zmean
wmean
= 0.15
bmax 1168$
ω = 6.5 ∗ 10−3 EU flow rate of 0.0065
λu = 0.124 UE flow rate of 0.123
λ = 0.043 JTJ flow rate of 0.0147
λd = 0.096 34 percent of wage cuts upon JTJ movements
ν = 2.5 ∗ 10−3 3 percent yearly experience coefficient
δ = 2.3 ∗ 10−3 0.39 percent monthly depreciation coefficient
φ = 0.04 33 years of working life
σF = 0.163, Γ ∼ N(0, σ2F ) Equation (2.4)=0.0397
σ = 0.016,  ∼ N(0, σ2 ) Life-cycle wage profile
σN = 0.293, N ∼ N(µN , σ2N) Life-cycle wage profile
σι = 0.119, ι ∼ N(0, σ2ι ) Estimation
µN = 5.618 Mean monthly wage 2139$
The left column states the calibrated variable with its value and the second states the relevant moment. EU
stands for employment to unemployment, UE for unemployment to employment, and JTJ for job to job.
measurement error for job switchers is the same as for job stayers. Appendix 2.D
provides evidence for this assumption.
In our SIPP data, we assume that wages are generated by:
ln(wi,t) = α0 + α1dt + α2Zi + β2Γi + ei,t (2.3)
where dt captures aggregate states, such as TFP and Zi is a vector of idiosyncratic
components. We split the unobservable ei,t into two parts:
ei,t = ri,t + Ai,t
Like in the model Ai,t is assumed to follow a random walk with drift and innovations
i,t, and ri,t captures measurement error. For our present purpose, we have to make
no further assumptions regarding the distributional properties of measurement error.
First-differencing eliminates the idiosyncratic wage components. As mentioned
above, we only observe a self-selected subset of the realizations of Γ and  as agents
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can quit into unemployment after negative idiosyncratic shocks and refuse wage
offers. The subsets of observed realizations Γobs and obs are themselves random vari-
ables which follow distributions of unknown functional forms. However, we can use
the workers’ decision rules, which determine for each (At,Γ) combination whether to
form or continue a match, to map these moments back into the structural parameters.
Define observed wage growth when a job to job transition takes place
∆ln(wbi,t) = ν + κt + [Γ
obs
i − Γobsi−1] + obsi,t + ∆ri,t
and when no such transition takes place
∆ln(wwi,t) = ν + κt + 
obs
i,t + ∆ri,t
where κt = α1(dt − dt−1). After regressing out a constant and time dummies, we
obtain the residual excess variance of job movers relative to job stayers:42
V ar
[
∆ln(wˆbi,t)
]− V ar [∆ln(wˆwi,t)]
= V ar
[
Γobsi − Γobsi,−1
]
+ Cov
[
obsi,t (Γ
obs
i − Γobsi,−1)
]
(2.4)
where we have invoked the assumption that measurement error is uncorrelated with
the event of job switching.
Equation (2.4) also holds in our model and we use it as a calibration target for σ2F .
The endogenous sorting that causes the observed distribution in the data to differ
from the true one is also present in our model.
Calibrating Idiosyncratic Wage Potential
Similar to Storesletten et al. (2004), we calibrate the variance of idiosyncratic wage
shocks to the life-cycle profile of cross sectional residual wage dispersion.43 While we
explicitly model initial worker heterogeneity and experience gains, the data possesses
42We delete the top and bottom 0.5% of the wage growth observations to get rid of reporting error.
43In principle, we could derive a moment condition similar to the one above to identify idiosyncratic
wage uncertainty (see Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) for more details). Whereas the identification
of the job component only required two consecutive wage observations, the maximum spell length
of 48 months in the SIPP now becomes more of on an issue which is why we opt for a different
approach.
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well-known idiosyncratic wage components absent from our model that we regress
out (gender, race, marriage, number of children, disability and time dummies).44 We
then choose σ2N to match the initial variance of residual log wage inequality and σ
2

to match its increase over the life cycle.
Lastly, wage fluctuations may result from measurement error. To accurately iden-
tify the share of reallocation shocks and to properly calibrate the innovations to
individual wage potential, we require an explicit treatment for this source of wage
fluctuations. At this point, we need to make further assumptions regarding its statis-
tical properties. Appendix 2.D shows that the autocovariance function of within job
wage growth goes to zero at longer lags. We therefore follow Meghir and Pistaferri
(2004) and postulate an MA(q) process (i.e. ri,t = Θ(q)ιi,t = ιi,t−
∑q
j=1 θjιi,t−j). The
autocovariance function is close to zero after 12 lags,such that we fix q at 12. Assum-
ing E(obsi,t obsi,t−j) = 0 ∀j 6= 0, we obtain the parameters Θ(12) and σι using Maximum
Likelihood estimation and Kalman filtering.45 Appendix 2.D supplies further detail
on the procedure and shows that θ12 is indeed estimated close to zero.
2.7 Results
We now present the main results of this chapter. In Section 2.7.1 we demonstrate
that our model generates residual wage dispersion of the size estimated in the data
and that it matches its life-cycle profile. Moreover, the model provides a close fit to
the shape of the overall wage distribution. Section 2.7.2 discusses the structurally
inferred parameters of the wage offer distribution and of idiosyncratic wage uncer-
tainty. We then go on to determine the relative contributions of job dispersion,
development in workers’ wage potential and the distribution of workers over jobs
to overall wage dispersion. Our results attribute 13.7 percent of wage inequality to
the presence of the search friction. Using an alternative model without reallocation
shocks, the estimate jumps up to the size previously estimated in the data.
44We purify our data of these effects, which are well-known drivers of wages, because we think
them inadequately represented by our model set-up. Gender and race biases are likely the
result of discrimination. Marriage stands in for a joint labor supply decision absent from our
model. Disability and the number of children likely do represent productivity, but not in a way
adequately captured by our model.
45We thank Johannes Pfeifer for providing the Kalman filtering routine to us.
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2.7.1 Empirical Fit
We simulate a cohort of 30000 workers over their life-cycle. From the resulting
individual paths we sample 48 month observation spells to generate a data set of the
same length as the SIPP. We then run a regression of log wages on a constant and
experience to calculate the model counterpart to our measure of residual wages in
the data. Table 2.5 summarizes our results.
Table 2.5: Residual Wage Dispersion
Mean-Min Ratio Gini V ar(log(w˜it))
Model Data Model Data Model Data
1st 3.01 3.02
Pctl. 5th 2.21 2.14 0.24 0.29 0.18 0.21
10th 1.89 1.83
The table compares the size of the residual wage dispersion generated by our baseline
specification to the one found in the 1993/1996 SIPP. The first two columns report
the Mm-ratio in the model and the data using the 1st, 5th, and 10th percentile as
possible minimum wages. As further summary statistics, we compare the Gini coef-
ficient and the variance of log wages.
The mean residual wage paid is 3.01 times the smallest observation evaluated at
the first percentile. When looking at higher percentiles, model and data line up
closely as well. Other summary statistics of inequality also indicate a good fit: the
Gini coefficient and the variance of residual log wages are slightly smaller, but close
to those found in our data set.
In Section 2.4.3, we discussed that a characteristic feature of residual inequality
is its increase over the life-cycle and used the fact to motivate our stochastic wage
potential process. Figure 2.3a compares the model to the data along that dimension.
We closely match the magnitude of the increase over the life-cycle, while missing the
concave shape at the end.
In our subsequent analysis, we use our model to compute the contribution of search
induced wage inequality to overall wage inequality in the population cross-section.
We therefore need to verify that our model fits the data along that dimension. As
discussed previously, there are a few well-known wage determinants in the data that
our model is not designed to include. Therefore, in what follows, we first regress
log wages in our data on a constant and dummies for disability, gender, marriage
status, the number of kids, time and race. These factors account for 13.3 percent
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Figure 2.2: Model Fit
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(b) Wage Distributions
Figure 2.3a plots the Mm-ratio by age in the model against the data. Figure 2.3b compares demeaned density
functions of wages after applying a kernel smoother.
of log wage variation. We compare the wage distribution from our model to the
resulting distribution. Figure 2.3b plots the kernel estimator of the density function
of wages after transforming the data back to levels against its model counterpart.
The two graphs match up almost perfectly well. There is substantial inequality and
the distribution features the characteristic right skew.
2.7.2 Underlying Sources of Inequality
Confident that our model features the main determinants of wage inequality, we use
it to infer the relative importance of differing initial abilities (σN , in our model), un-
certainty of idiosyncratic wage potential (σ), the search friction (σF ) and a sorting
term to be introduced below in explaining overall wage inequality. Our calibrated
parameters are displayed in the first line of Table 2.6. The value for σ implies
an annual standard deviation for the permanent component of wages of 0.06. To
put our results into perspective, Low et al. (2010), using the 1993 SIPP, estimate a
standard deviation for the job offer distribution of 0.23 and of 0.103 for annual id-
iosyncratic innovations. Both our standard deviations are smaller, which can largely
be explained by different sample selection criteria.46 Their relative sizes, however,
46Most importantly, our exclussion of individuals with imputed wages reduces our estimates com-
pared to theirs. The total amount of wage inequality is also lower in our data. Hourly wages
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Table 2.6: Wage Offer Distribution and Idiosyncratic Risk
Specification σF σ σN λ
Baseline 0.163 0.016 0.293 0.043
job ladder model (λd = 0) 0.296 0.017 0.117 0.1
The table displays the standard deviations of the wage offer distribution and of
the idiosyncratic wage shock. The first line refers to the baseline specification
and the second one to a calibration of a ”pure” job ladder model.
are surprisingly similar given the very different identification strategies.
Our model implies a direct link between observed wage outcomes and these deep
parameters. In order to map it out, we use our simulated data and consider the
following variance decomposition, which we separately estimate for each age group
in our simulated data
V ar(ln(wi)) = V ar(Ai) + V ar(Γi) + 2Cov(Ai,Γi) + V ar(ri).
The left panel of Figure 2.3 illustrates the results. For young workers, job hetero-
geneity explains about 24 percent of overall log wage variance but that number drops
as workers’ employment histories become more diverse. Our model identifies worker
heterogeneity as the dominant factor in explaining variations in wages and this effect
is increasing in age. Measurement error is responsible for about 2.4 percent of vari-
ation. Sorting of workers over job types has a mild positive effect. In a population
weighted average, frictional wage dispersion accounts for 15.5 percent of wage in-
equality within our model. Given that we eliminated 13.3 percent of wage variation
through our fixed effect regression, this implies frictional inequality to account for
13.7 percent of overall wage inequality present in our data.
2.7.3 On the Job Search and Structural Inference
Previous estimates from structural search models that try to disentangle the contri-
butions of worker and job effects to wage variation imply a much lager role for the
latter than we do (Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) suggest numbers up to 50% and
Carrillo-Tudela (2012) finds numbers around 40%.). In this section, we investigate
whether the introduction of the reallocation shock alone can explain the large quan-
based on a yearly measure have a standard deviation of 7.66 in their data. In our case, this
drops to 7.03.
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Figure 2.3: Contribution of Search Frictions to Overall Wage Dispersion Baseline v.
job ladder Model
The graphs display the cumulative contribution of sorting (black area), firm effects (dark grey area) measure-
ment error(medium grey area) and worker heterogeneity (light area) to the variance of log wages, conditional
on age. The left panel is from our baseline specification, the right panel results from a job ladder model
with idiosyncratic productivity risk.
titative discrepancy. We also highlight how the mechanisms outlined in Section 2.3
interact when we identify the variance of the job offer distribution.
We re-calibrate our baseline model to a more common job ladder model setting,
λd = 0, and neglect wage losses upon transition as calibration target. With a Mm-
ratio of 3.45 at the first percentile, the model yields a residual inequality of similar size
as our baseline specification. To demonstrate that measurement error and stochastic
wages alone cannot account for the stylized facts outlined in Section 2.4.2, we com-
pare moments of wage dynamics upon job to job movement in the data to our our
baseline specification and the job ladder-model. Table 2.7 displays the results.
In the data, job to job movements on average result in wage gains of 3.3 percent.
Conditional on suffering a wage loss upon movement, workers lose 19.6 percent of
Table 2.7: Wage changes from job to job movements
Specification Avg. gain Avg. loss
Data 0.033 -0.196
Baseline 0.071 -0.186
job ladder model (λd = 0) 0.227 -0.09
The table compares the model baseline specification with a pure on the
job search version in their implications for job to job transitions. Statis-
tics are the resulting average wage gain upon job movement and the av-
erage wage loss, conditional on observing a loss. Data refers to compu-
tation from the SIPP for nominal wages.
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their previous wages. Our baseline specification fares quite well in reproducing these
statistics. Wage gains are too high, but the order of magnitude is comparable. The
model does well in reproducing the large conditional wage losses. In Appendix 2.E,
we show that our baseline specification is also in line with the large initial wage gains
at job to job transitions reported by Topel and Ward (1992) and the convex decrease
of these gains over experience. In the pure job ladder model, average wage gains
at job to job transitions of 23 percent are much too large compared to the data.
Since workers in this model only transit to higher ranked jobs, the wage losses are
only observed as result of a negative shock to individual wage potential or due to
measurement error. A conditional 9 percent average wage loss clearly fails in this
respect. We come back to this fact below.
We now investigate what these differences imply for the inferred importance of
difference sources of wage inequality. The right panel of Figure 2.3 shows that this
model paints a much changed picture of the different sources of wage inequality,
when compared to our baseline specification. The cross-sectional average for the
contribution of frictional wage dispersion more than doubles to about 44 percent
(38.8% percent of wage variation in the data) with values as high as 78 percent for
the youngest workers. Closely related is an almost doubling in the inferred standard
deviation of the wage offer distribution as can be seen in the second row of Table
2.6.
The reason for these results can be traced back to the role of reallocation shocks.
Section 2.3 demonstrated that in the absence of reallocation shocks, the inferred job
offer arrival rate on the job is higher and more workers are in the right tail of the job
offer distribution. Table 2.6 shows that our recallibrated model implies an on the job
offer arrival rate more than twice as large as our baseline calibration. Consequently,
workers quickly move into very high ranked matches, accept further outside offers
only infrequently and wage improvements are relatively small. Since they also do not
experience large losses when moving, the implied wage offer distribution has to spread
out substantially to reproduce the observed excess variance for job switchers. On
the flip side, most initial dispersion is explained by job effects and the inferred initial
worker heterogeneity drops by more than half in terms of its standard deviation. The
two model versions tell rather different stories about the sources of life-time wage
inequality. As a robustness analysis, we decrease the share of reallocation shocks
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exogenously by a half in Appendix 2.E. The variance decomposition leads to results
close to our baseline case, showing that already some reallocation shocks overturn
the strong implications from the pure job ladder model.
2.8 Conclusion
We solve a rich structural model of job and worker heterogeneity to quantify the
importance of the search friction in generating wage inequality. Our model features
several major channels that expand the range of acceptable offers to the workers
creating larger frictional inequality: skill accumulation on the job, skill loss in un-
employment and search on the job. The baseline calibration reproduces both overall
and residual wage inequality. Nonetheless, the search friction accounts for only 13.7
percent of total inequality.
The large quantitative difference to previous estimates stems from our introduction
of reallocation shocks upon job to job transitions. These shocks allow our model to
match a large job to job transition rate in the data with a relatively low on the job
offer arrival rate. As a consequence, the endogenous wage distribution features few
workers at high ranked jobs. The calibrated variance of the job offer distribution is
relatively small and only a small share of wage variation can be explained by job
differences.
Empirically, we provide various pieces of evidence to show that reallocation shocks
provide a fitting description for about a quarter of observed job to job transitions.
Most importantly, about one third of all job to job transitions end up with lower
nominal wages than on the previous job. This finding is robust to both controlling
for observed benefit payments as well as all kinds of data stratification.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
2.A Solving the Simple Model
This section derives implicit solutions for the minimum wage, the mean wage, the
wage distribution and the relationship between job to job transitions and the job
offer rate for the model presented in Section 2.3.
Recall the worker problem:
rW (w) = w + λ(1− λd)
ˆ wmax
w
[W (z)−W (w)]dF (z)
+ λλd
ˆ wmax
w∗
[W (z)−W (w)]dF (z)
− (ω + λλdF (w∗))(W (w)− U)
rU = b+ λu
ˆ wmax
w∗
[W (z)− U ]dF (z),
where F (w) is the cdf of the wage offer distribution with upper support wmax, λ
is the job offer arrival rate on the job, λd is the share of reallocation shocks, ω
is the job destruction rate and λu the job offer arrival rate during unemployment.
Evaluating the asset value of employment at w∗ and setting it equal to the asset
value of unemployment yields:
w∗ = b+ (λu − λ)
ˆ wmax
w∗
W ′(z)[1− F (z)]dz.
Differentiating the asset value of employment with respect to w yields
W ′(w) =
1
ω + λλdF (w∗) + r + λλd + λ(1− λd)[1− F (w)]
We therefore obtain an implicit solution for the reservation wage reported in Section
2.3:
w∗ = b+ (λu − λ)
ˆ wmax
w∗
1− F (z)
r + ω + λλdF (w∗) + λλdF (z) + λ[1− F (z)]dz. (2.5)
Figure 2.5a highlights the non-monotone relationship between λd and w
∗ discussed
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Figure 2.4: Parameterized Simple Model (2)
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The figure displays the relationship between the share of reallocation shocks, λd, the minimum wage and the mean
wage for the calibration performed in Section 2.3.
in Section 2.3.
We now derive an implicit solution for the wage distribution G(w). A stationary
distribution of employment over wages implies:
(1− u)G(w)[ω + λλdF (w∗) + λ[1− F (w)]] =
uλu[F (w)− F (w∗)] + (1− u)λλd[1−G(w)][F (w)− F (w∗)] (2.6)
Rearranging yields
G(w) =
uλu + (1− u)λλd
1− u
F (w)− F (w∗)
ω + λ[1− F (w)] + λλdF (w) .
Evaluating (2.6) at wmax yields
u
1− u =
ω + λλdF (w
∗)
λu[1− F (w∗)] .
Substituting into (2.6) gives the solution for G(w):
G(w) =
F (w)− F (w∗)
1− F (w∗)
ω + λλd
ω + λλdF (w) + λ[1− F (w)] . (2.7)
We now derive an implicit solution for the relationship between λ and the job to
job transition rate that we omit in the main chapter for parsimony. Total job to job
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flows are given by:
JTJ = λλd[1− F (w∗)] + λ(1− λd)
ˆ wmax
w∗
[1− F (z)]dG(z).
Integrating the equation by parts yields
JTJ = λλd[1− F (w∗)] + λ(1− λd)
ˆ wmax
w∗
G(z)dF (z)
Substituting in G(w) gives
JTJ = λλd[1− F (w∗)]
+ λ(1− λd) ω + λλd
1− F (w∗)
ˆ wmax
w∗
F (z)− F (w∗)
ω + λλd + λ(1− λd)[1− F (z)]dF (z).
Replace z = F (z) to obtain
JTJ = λλd[1− F (w∗)]
+ λ(1− λd) ω + λλd
1− F (w∗)
ˆ 1
F (w∗)
z − F (w∗)
ω + λλd + λ(1− λd)[1− z]dz. (2.8)
Solving the integral yields:
ˆ 1
F (w∗)
z − F (w∗)
ω + λλd + λ(1− λd)[1− z]dz =∣∣∣− λ(1− λd)z + [ω + λ]log(ω + λλd + λ(1− λd)[1− z])
[λ(1− λd)]2
+
F (w∗)log(ω + λλd + λ(1− λd)[1− z])
λ(1− λd)
∣∣∣1
F (w∗)
.
Finally, we can derive a solution for the mean wage:
w¯ =
ˆ wmax
w∗
wdG(z).
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Integration by parts yields
w¯ =wmax −
ˆ wmax
w∗
G(z)dz
=[wmax − w∗] + w∗ −
ˆ wmax
w∗
G(z)dz
=w∗ +
ˆ wmax
w∗
[1−G(z)]dz
=w∗ +
ω + λ− λ(1− λd)F (w∗)
1− F (w∗)
ˆ wmax
w∗
1− F (z)
ω + λλd + λ(1− λd)[1− F (z)]dz,
which is an implicit solution for w¯. Figure 2.5b shows the resulting downward sloping
relationship between λd and λ. Upon inspection to the mean and minimum wage,
it becomes apparent that their ratio is not a moment independent of F (w) in our
model with reallocation shocks.
2.B Creating the Data Set
2.B.1 Aligning the 1993 and 1996 SIPP
Our two samples from the SIPP differ regarding data collection and sample size.
Unlike the 1993 sample, the 1996 SIPP uses computer-assisted interviewing tech-
niques to increase data quality. The computer assures that employer identification
numbers stay constant across interviewing waves. Moreover, the 1996 SIPP uses de-
pendent interviewing across waves with respect to employer IDs asking: ”Last time
we recorded that you worked for [Employer name]. Do you still work for [Employer
name]?”. Both features likely reduce misreporting in employer changes. In the 1993
sample, interviewers assign employer IDs manually for each wave and use no depen-
dent interviewing across waves. To address the issue in the 1993 sample, we use
employers IDs constructed by Stinson (2003) which combine the survey data with
administrative records to accurately identify these changes.
The 1996 sample also has a considerably larger initial sample size, providing in-
formation on 95,402 sample members compared with 56,800 in the 1993 SIPP.47
47The 1993 SIPP was the last sample that published a Full Panel Longitudinal Research File.
The imputation methods in the Core files do not use longitudinal information for imputation
purposes and include records for individuals that did not respond in a given wave. We circumvent
these problems by using only records that appear in the Full Panel Longitudinal Research File
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Some information we use from both panels is grouped differently in the 1993 and
1996 SIPP. First, the grouping for the state of residence provides somewhat more
detailed information for smaller states in the 1996 panel. Second, the 1993 panel
contains monthly information on membership in the armed forces. This information
is only available on a 4 months basis in the 1996 panel. We therefore have to drop
entire individual waves from the 1996 SIPP when the individual reports to have been
member of the armed forces during that time. For those readers interested in more
of the details of sample creation and sample selection than are provided here and in
the next section, STATA and Matlab codes for all our empirical work is available for
download on the author’s web pages.
2.B.2 Calculating Hourly Wages and Sample Selection
The SIPP asks respondents whether they are paid by the hour and their correspond-
ing hourly pay rate in each month. We use this hourly pay rate whenever it applies.
The SIPP also reports total monthly earnings per job, whether the job lasted the
entire month and the number of hours worked per week. When computing monthly
earnings of those workers that are not paid by the hour, we assume that workers do
not alter their earnings response based on the length of a month and use smooth
4.3 weeks per months.48 SIPP records starting date and end date of each job that
does not last the entire month. We use this information to calculate hourly wages
for those months.
As we also report in the main text, we select our sample from the original merged
1993 and 1996 SIPP by using only observations from individuals aged 23-55 (prime
working age), for whom we require complete information on the individual’s employ-
ment status, age and employer id. We only consider an individual’s primary job
and drop workers that are recalled by former employers49 or have missing reporting
months during a job spell. Moreover, we drop workers reporting to be school en-
rolled, the self-employed, family-workers, members of the armed forces, workers at
non-profit companies and anyone whose wage information was imputed by the SIPP.
as suggested by the CENSUS Bureau.
48Neither the reported wage, nor earnings or hours worked are reported by dependent interviewing
across waves in either of the two samples.
49We chose to exclude those observations because recalled workers likely possess a different search
technology than what is represented in our model specification.
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Table 2.8: Comparing Sample data to Original Data
Mean wage EE rate V ar(ln(wit)− ln(wit−1)))
SIPP 13.71 2.18% 0.1223
Sample 13.43 1.43% 0.0548
The table compares our sample data to the original SIPP data. The first column
reports the nominal mean wage, the second the rate of job to job transitions and the
third column the variance of log-wage growth.
Finally, we truncate the wage distribution at the top and bottom 1% to take care of
outliers and top-coding.50 These restrictions leave us with 2,039,345 person/month
observations.
In particular our choices of excluding individuals who are recalled by former em-
ployers and those with imputed wages introduce changes to the data set which have
bearing on some of our key calibration targets. Table 2.8 compares our final data set
to the original, non-stratified SIPP samples. Mean hourly wages are almost identi-
cal. The aforementioned exclusions limit our data to a sub-sample of the population
that has relatively stable work profiles. Job to job transition rates are considerably
lower in the stratified data and lower than rates usually reported from CPS data.
Moreover, the variance of log wages at job to job transitions is considerably lower in
our final sample. Here, the exclusion of imputed wages along with the truncation of
the wage distribution at the bottom are largely responsible for the more than fifty
percent reduction.
2.C More on the Empirics of On the Job Search
2.C.1 Measuring Job to Job Flows
In order to calibrate the job offer arrival rate on the job, it is crucial to accurately
identify job to job transitions in the data. One of the biggest advantages in working
with SIPP data is that workers are asked to report an employment status for each
week of the reporting period separately. This allows us to identify any unemployment
spell lasting longer than one workweek.
In a given month we count as employed someone who reports holding a job for
50Earnings are topcoded at $33333 and $50000 for a four month period in the 1993 and 1996
sample, respectively.
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the entire month. This definition includes paid as well as unpaid absences as result
of vacations, illnesses or labor disputes. It does exclude, however, those who report
having been on layoff for at least a week. There is no standard definition for job
to job movements in empirical work. We therefore experiment with several different
definitions. Our first measure is analogous to the definition in Fallick and Fleischman
(2004) and equates job to job transitions with firm changes. We use a monthly
employer identifier based on company names. We refer to this definition by JTJ1.
Given that a firm is a match in our model and given that employees may transit
between jobs within a given firm, we find it useful to somewhat broaden the concept
beyond employer id changes. For JTJ2 we therefore follow Moscarini and Thomsson
(2007) in identifying job to job movements by changes in the three digit occupational
code. Moreover, we define JTJ3 = JTJ1 ∪ JTJ2 as the union set from the two
definitions.
Table 2.9: Different Definitions of JTJ Flow Rates
(a) Full 1993/1996 Merged SIPP Data Set
JTJ1 JTJ2 JTJ3 CPS
JTJ 1.75 1.27 2.18 2.29
Share loss 36.2 37.2 35.3
Ave. loss 23.8 23.6 22.6
(b) Sample for Baseline Calibration
JTJ1 JTJ2 JTJ3
JTJ 1.03 0.73 1.43
Share loss 36.4 34.4 34.4
Ave. loss 20.1 19 19.6
The Table shows percentage probabilities for job to job transitions based
on SIPP data from 1993 to 1999. For reference we also cite monthly av-
erages from Fallick and Fleischman (2004) using CPS data for the years
1994–2003 for workers between 25 and 54. The different flow definitions
can be found in the text. Panel (a) reports figures for the whole merged
1993/1996 SIPP data set before applying any sample selection criterion.
Panel (b) refers to the sample underlying our baseline calibration from
which most other numbers in this chapter are computed. Share loss re-
ports the percentage of EE transitions which result in lower hourly wages
under the given flow definition. Ave. loss reports the corresponding con-
ditional average wage loss.
Table 2.9 reports job to job flow rates based on the different definitions. For
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comparison, we also report averages from monthly estimates for the years 1994-2003
taken from Fallick and Fleischman (2004), who use CPS data for individuals ages
24 to 54. As we noted in Appendix 2.B.2, our choice of excluding individuals with
imputed wages and those who are recalled by former employers is equivalent to re-
stricting the sample to people with relatively stable employment profiles, which lets
EE-rates drop under any definition. For better comparability with the numbers
based on the CPS, in Panel (a) we therefore first report estimates of flow sizes from
our raw sample. Identifying job to job movements by either employer changes or
changes in the occupational code alone yields roughly comparable flow sizes. How-
ever, only our broadest definition of job to job employment transitions comes close
to the magnitude found in the CPS. Reassuringly, the share of transitions yielding
lower hourly wages and their conditional average loss are very similar regardless of
the definition used. This still holds true when repeating the estimation on our final
sample in Panel (b). Our calibration is based on the 1.43 percent probability found
when applying JTJ3 on our baseline sample. It is the only definition which, using the
raw sample, yields estimates of comparable size to those from the CPS which many
other studies use. Regarding the decrease after applying sample selection criteria,
we are confident that this figure is more representative for the kinds of transitions
included in our model environment.
2.C.2 Wages and On the Job Search
We argue in the main chapter that the magnitude of job to job flows in itself is
insufficient to identify the on the job offer arrival rate. Instead, the question is how
many of these job changes actually yield higher wages for the worker. In the main
text, in Section 2.4.2, we established as stylized fact from our data that about one
third of all job to job transitions yield lower nominal wages for the worker than his
previous job. In this section, we establish the robustness of this result by considering
a number of different data stratifications to demonstrate that those wage cuts are
not driven by any subsample of the population but instead extend across workers of
all kinds. All results are summarized in Table 2.13.
91
CHAPTER 2. SEARCH AND WAGE INEQUALITY
Wage Gains from Employment Changes
First, we use CPI data to deflate monthly wages. The share of losses in wage changes
increases to 47 percent while the mean loss reduces to 14.6 percent. Evidently,
many transitions result in unchanged nominal wages between jobs. Of course, the
worker should only care about real wages in making his decision. Meanwhile, an
argument can be made that in the presence of some wage rigidity, the worker expects
a real wage loss on his current job as well and therefore compares nominal wages.
Results are unaltered when trying to control for benefit payments at the new job.
We subsequently exclude from the sample transitions from non-Union to unionized
jobs, transitions into jobs that provide health insurance, and transitions into jobs
that provide educational subsidies. None of these modifications significantly changes
the moments of interest.
Next, we consider potential business cycle effects by splitting our sample into
different years. The willingness of workers to accept a wage reduction upon transition
might depend on the aggregate state of the economy. Between, 1993 and 1999, the
time of our sample, the US economy experienced the longest uninterrupted expansion
in post-WWII history which was to last until March 2001. Yet, we again observe no
significant variation in the share of losses or the size of losses between years.
Women are known to have less stable work relationships than men and might
therefore be responsible for an overproportional share of loss making job to job tran-
sitions. Nonetheless, in the data both sexes have an equal probability of experiencing
a wage cut after moving. The same holds for stratifications by age groups. Young
workers have a looser attachment to the labor market and may initially experiment
with different career paths or search for jobs with higher non-monetary benefits. But
none of these phenomena cause the youngest age group to experience markedly more
job to job transitions with wage losses.
We also stratify our sample by earnings and tenure. We split the main sample
into its lowest and highest quartile and the observations in-between. Again, we do
not expect the outcome to be random, because high wage earners are more likely to
incur a loss when they are forced to look for alternative employment. Nonetheless,
low wage earners are far from insulated to wage losses when switching jobs and
even in the lowest quartile, 23 percent of all job to job transitions result in nominal
wage losses. Considering tenure is informative in two ways. For one, one might
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hypothesize that a subsample of the population with a loser labor market attachment
who never accumulate longer periods of tenure are disproportionately responsible for
the observed job losses. Still, wage losses upon transition are a pervasive phenomenon
across all of the tenure distribution. Alternatively, one might be assume that the
observed losses are the result of losses in match-specific capital for high-tenured
workers. In his case, they should be increasing in tenure on the previous job. This
hypothesis, also, is not borne out in the data.51
Lastly, we restrict our sample to workers who report being paid by the hour. This
might help to rule out potential measurement error resulting from hour calculations
of hourly wages for people where only earnings are reported. In that case, the share
of losses drops to twenty percent and conditional losses to seven. Still, this figure
appears to understate the phenomenon for the population as a whole. First, the
group of workers paid by the hour is a highly selective subsample of the population
with relatively low wages. Mean hourly wages in the SIPP are $13.5, but drop to
$11.1 within that group. Second, we are interested in total worker compensation.
When workers are asked about their hourly pay rate, the question reads: ”What
was your regular hourly pay rate at the end of month X”. Hence, respondents are
unlikely to include any bonuses or performance payments. Contrary, when asking
about total monthly earnings, the question explicitly states: ”Be sure to include any
tips, bonuses, overtime pay, or commissions”.
Alternative Explanations
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) propose an alternative explanation for those wage
losses. They lay out a model where wages can only be renegotiated by mutual
agreement and the firm has all the bargaining power. Wage raises on the job occur
as a result of counter-offers to bids by other firms. They demonstrate that in such
a framework workers will accept wage cuts upon job to job transitions, if the option
value of working at the other firm is sufficiently high. Workers only move to higher
ranked firms than their current employer and very productive firms offer the potential
51Unfortunately, the tenure measure is of low quality in the SIPP. Of those being employed in
the first month of the interview, more than 8 percent of workers report not having been em-
ployed with their current employer previously implying unrealistically high worker turnover
rates. Moreover, the tenure variable is employer specific in the SIPP and not linked to a job as
in our model.
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of large future wage gains.
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Figure 2.5: Initial Wages Change and Subsequent Wage Growth
The left panel plots cumulative wage growth in the two months after a job to job movement against the
initial wage change, excluding the latter from the calculation. The figure was generated using all observed
job to job transitions. In the right panel, we only include job to job transitions where the worker was
subsequently observed for at least 24 months. The cumulation of wage growth now includes the initial
change upon transition.
A testable implication of these types of models is that expected future wage growth
with the new employer should be an increasing function of the wage cut accepted.
The left panel of Figure 2.5 plots cumulative wage growth with the new job against
the initial wage change for our population of job to job transitions. There is no
relationship between the initial wage change and consecutive wage growth. In the
right panel, 2.5 we restrict the sample to agents whom we observe for at least two
years with their new job (This time, the initial wage cut is included in the sum). We
again find no evidence, that agents that accepted an initial wage cut are compensated
by steeper wage profiles on the new job.52 Hagedorn and Manovskii (2010) provide
further evidence against the mechanism. They show that wage growth of job stayers
in the US is uncorrelated to local labor market tightness whereas the model by
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) would predict it to be an increasing function of the
probability to receive a job offer.53
52It is of course possible that the higher expected wage increases lie further in the future than the
two years we observe. Given that Dustmann and Meghir (2005) find wage-tenure profiles to be
basically flat after two years, however, we find this not to be very likely.
53The same holds true for models that stress the importance of learning about match quality over
time.
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2.D Estimating the Measurement Error Process
For the identification of the amount of reallocation shocks, the identification of the
wage offer distribution, the identification of innovations to individual wage potential
and the amount of frictional wage dispersion, we need to identify the process of
measurement error. Table 2.10 reports the results of regressing within job change in
log wages (after taking out year dummies) on its lags. The regression indicates that
the autocovariance of wage growth is falling at higher lags and close to zero after
eleven months. Therefore, we follow Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and postulate an
MA(q) process for measurement error (i.e. ri,t = Θ(q)ιi,t = ιi,t−
∑q
j=1 θjιi,t−j) fixing
q at 12.
Table 2.10: Autocovariance Structure of Wage Growth
Lag Coef.
1 -0.433
2 -0.232
3 -0.180
4 -0.362
5 -0.248
6 -0.147
7 -0.143
8 -0.171
9 -0.122
10 -0.143
11 -0.075
12 0.023
13 -0.070
14 -0.048
The table reports
the coefficients from
regressing within job
wage growth (after
controlling for time
fixed effects) on its
own lags.
In Section 2.6.2, we use the assumption that the measurement error process does
not change upon a reported job to job transition to identify the size of job hetero-
geneity. One can think of two alternative assumptions, one leading to an over- and
one leading to an underestimation of job heterogeneity. First consider the case where
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measurement error is constant within job spells and upon each job to job movement
the worker draws a new measurement error shock. In this case, the variance of mea-
surement error and job dispersion are not separately identified. However, given the
high autocovariance of within job wage growth displayed in Table 2.10, we find the
assumption of constant measurement error to be at odds with the data.
Alternatively, one may assume that measurement error follow a MA process within
job spells, but the process begins anew upon a job to job transition. In this case, the
variance of wage growth of job stayers would be inflated relatively to job switchers
and we would underestimate the variance of job heterogeneity. This theory would
imply that the variance of within job wage growth is larger at later stages of the job
than in the period directly after the job to job transition (when the MA process is
still building up). To assess this implication more formally, we compare the variance
of within job wage growth in the first ten months after a job to job transition and
the later months. The respective numbers are 0.0111 and 0.0115, so virtually the
same.
Finally, to simulate our model, we require estimates of Θ(12) and σι. We obtain
these by maximizing the sum of individual likelihoods of within job wage growth
in the data. More specifically, we treat ιi,t as unobserved state and obtain the
individual likelihood for wage growth of individual i from the following state space
representation:
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git =

1
θ1 − 1
θ2 − θ1
θ3 − θ2
θ4 − θ3
θ5 − θ4
θ6 − θ5
θ7 − θ6
θ8 − θ7
θ9 − θ8
θ10 − θ9
θ11 − θ10
θ12 − θ11
−θ12

′
ρit + β1it
ρit+1 =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

ρit +

ιit+1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Our calibration imposes the following moment restriction: σ = 0.016. Table 2.11
reports our estimation results.
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Table 2.11: Estimates for Measurement Error
Parameter Estimate
σι 0.119
θ1 0.538
θ2 0.468
θ3 0.376
θ4 0.093
θ5 0.109
θ6 0.115
θ7 0.070
θ8 0.058
θ9 0.056
θ10 -0.008
θ11 0.021
θ12 0.093
The table shows the estimation
results for the measurement error
process.
2.E Robustness Exercises
This section performs three robustness exercises for our quantitative model. We show
that our results are almost unaffected by calibrating to a higher replacement rate.
Second, we show that our main conclusions are unchanged when reducing the share
of reallocation shocks by half. Third, we show that our modeling of reallocation
shocks is not in contrast to the large average wage gains of young workers reported
by Topel and Ward (1992).
HKV show that the amount of frictional wage dispersion in the standard job ladder
model depends crucially on the replacement rate in unemployment. Indeed, equation
(2.2) shows that the minimum wage is an increasing function in this parameter. In
our calibration, we follow Shimer (2005) and choose a total replacement rate of 0.4.
However, the literature has not settled on an appropriate value yet, and substantially
higher values have been suggested. Therefore, we follow Hall and Milgrom (2008)
and adjust the value of leisure upwards to imply a replacement rate of 0.71. Neither
the identified deep parameters, nor the sources of wage inequality over the life-cycle
change economically significant as a result from this experiment.54 The reason for
54The Mm-ratio changes by less than 10−3 at each wage quintile.
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the robustness is that the ability to search on the job, the process of individual
wage potential and the option value generated by stochastic innovations to wage
potential make workers accept almost all wage offers in our baseline calibration. Put
differently, rejected offers have a very low probability of realization. In consequence,
shifting the threshold somewhat to the right of the distribution still leads to very
low probabilities of jobs being declined. Therefore, the equilibrium distributions are
almost unaffected and the inferred parameters are almost unchanged. In fact, we
observe substantial changes only with replacement rates close to one.
Given its crucial quantitative importance, we also perform a robustness exercise
for the reallocation shocks. We drop the share of loss making job to job transitions
as calibration target and reduce the share of reallocation shocks from 10 to only 5
percent. As expected, this calibration performs worse in matching moments of wage
growth reported in Table 2.7. Yet, our main conclusions are quite robust to this
exercise. The share of model implied wage inequality attributed to the search friction
rises by 14 percentage points, and the share explained by initial worker heterogeneity
drops by 3 percentage points. Also, the variance of the job offer distribution and
innovations to individual wage potential are almost unchanged. The finding reflects
our result from Section 2.3 that these types of models are mostly affected at the
margin of introducing reallocation shocks.
Table 2.12: Comparing Wage Growth in the Model to Topel and Ward (1992)
Market Experience (years) Average wage gain at Average wage gain at
job transition (model) job transition (TW)
0− 2.5 0.132 0.145
2.5− 5 0.099 0.099
5− 7.5 0.079 0.064
7.5− 10 0.068 0.046
0− 10 0.102 0.094
The table compares for different ranges of labor market experience the average change in log wages at a
job to job transition in our model to those reported in Topel and Ward (1992) (TW).
Topel and Ward (1992) find that early in their careers, workers experience large
wage gains resulting from job to job movements. One may conjecture that this
finding is in contrast to our modeling of reallocation shocks. However, our model
lines up closely with their data regarding the profile of wage gains at job to job
transitions as a function of experience. Table 2.12 shows that we match both the
99
CHAPTER 2. SEARCH AND WAGE INEQUALITY
average wage increase during the first ten years of labor market experience as well as
its decreasing profile with labor market experience.55 To understand this fact, one
should keep in mind that in our model inexperienced workers are located at rather
low paying jobs, implying that reallocation shocks are more likely to yield wage gains
than for older workers at better jobs.
2.F Numerical Algorithm
The numerical algorithm consists of two nested loops followed by simulations. Codes
are available on the authors’ webpages.
– We start the algorithm by guessing functions for b(At) and Z(At).
– Next, we discretize the workers’ log wage potential by 1500 grid points. We
find 15 to be a non-binding upper bound. The distribution of the log job
component is discretized into 100 equi-likely grid points.
– Given the initial guesses, we can start the inner loop, which calculates the value
functions using value function iteration. Expectations regarding next period’s
idiosyncratic wage potential are calculated using Gaussian quadrature with 10
nodes for evaluating the innovations and linear interpolation56 between grid
points.
– The value functions of the workers allow us to to obtain policy rules for match
formation. Using these, we compute the stationary distribution of the economy
by distribution function iteration. For the distribution function we use a finer
grid for workers’ wage potential of 5000 grid points. We then update policy
functions.
– Next, we update b(At) and Z(At) and iterate until convergence.
55The model also does a good job in matching potential labor market experience into actual labor
market experience. The model performs less well in matching the large amount of job holdings
after the first five years. One should keep in mind that both their data set and sample selection
is different from ours, and their sample includes workers that are still in education.
56We opt for linear interpolation at this step, as it considerably decreases the computational bur-
den and does not appear to alter the results compared to spline interpolation. Also, spline
extrapolation is known to be unreliable.
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– The last step are the simulations, that employ the policy functions and equi-
librium job offer rates. We use linear inter and extrapolation on the worker
and job grid.
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Table 2.13: Wage Cuts after Job to Job Transitions
Stratification Share loss Mean loss
Whole sample
Nominal 0.344 -0.196
Real 0.471 -0.146
Job characteristics
Union 0.345 -0.196
+ Health insurance 0.352 -0.196
+ Education 0.351 -0.196
Year
1993 0.346 -0.196
1994 0.36 -0.216
1995 0.364 -0.211
1996 0.33 -0.192
1997 0.343 -0.187
1998 0.324 -0.196
1999 0.345 -0.178
Gender
Male 0.352 -0.202
Female 0.334 -0.189
Age
23-34 0.348 -0.198
35-43 0.336 -0.196
44-55 0.345 -0.192
Income
Lowest 25% 0.233 -0.16
25-75% 0.353 -0.198
Top 25% 0.454 -0.214
Tenure
Less than 6 months 0.357 -0.209
6-12 months 0.309 -0.185
1-3 years 0.344 -0.182
3-10 years 0.35 -0.173
10 and more years 0.343 -0.161
Paid by the hour 0.232 -0.078
The Table shows the share of workers incurring a cut in hourly wages after a job to job movement for the
whole population and different subsamples in the 1993/1996 SIPP. Mean loss reports the mean wage loss in
log points conditional on suffering a wage cut upon movement. All figures refer to nominal wages, except in
the row labeled Real.
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Chapter3
Foreign Customer Accumulation and
Export Dynamics
3.1 Introduction
New plants, after setting up production and entering a market, typically lag behind
their industry competitors in terms of sales for a number of years. This holds true
even for highly commoditized products where entrants and incumbents produce very
similar products. An intuitive explanation for this phenomenon is that new producers
are simply less efficient than their experienced competition and take a long time to
catch up in terms of process and organizational know-how. A recent line of literature
questions this supply side explanation and presents evidence that hints at demand
side forces as determinants of the fate of young plants. Foster et al. (2012) use
price information from the Census of Manufactures to show that new plants actually
possess a small advantage in physical productivity compared to incumbent plants.
Instead, their lower sales volumes seem to be the result of an insufficient number of
customers to sell to.
If indeed new customers are so hard to come by, this micro friction has potentially
important macroeconomic implications. Entrants are by no means the only plants
facing the problem of finding new customers to sell to. Any plant, after a positive pro-
ductivity shock would have to invest time and resources into building marketing and
distribution capacities to exploit productive potential. In international economics,
the presence of such market expansion friction might provide an explanation for
what has been termed the elasticity puzzle - the discrepancy between high estimated
elasticities of substitution between goods produced in different countries from trade
liberalization episodes and the low elasticities needed to reproduce the co-movement
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of exports and real exchange rate at business cycle frequency. Persistent tariff reduc-
tions should induce exporters to larger investments into their export demand leading
to larger trade reactions than transitory exchange rate variations.
This chapter explores the macroeconomic implications of slow and active demand
accumulation within the context of a dynamic model of plant exporting behavior.
It introduces the notion of “customer capital” into a set-up in which plants differ
in terms of revenue productivity and exporting is subject to sunk entry and fixed
costs that has become the workhorse for empirical studies of export participation. I
structurally estimate the model on a new panel data set of German manufacturing
firms between 1995 and 2008. The substantial expansion in exporting that German
manufacturing experienced during this time serves as an important case study on
which to test the model’s empirical predictions. The estimated model implies that
during the observed time period the average plant spends between 26 and 38 percent
of export revenue on building and maintaining a customer stock in export markets.
The estimated demand elasticity in the export market of 1.42 is well within the range
typically calibrated in international business cycle models. The model predicts a low
elasticity of aggregate exports with respect to real exchange rate movements. The
predicted much larger trade gains after a tariff elimination are in the same order of
magnitude as those predicted by a more standard fixed costs model.
The model setup builds on the large literature of estimated dynamic models of
export participation. The paper most closely related is Das et al. (2007). To their
model I introduce the notion of a consumer base in export: Firms have to accu-
mulate consumer-capital in order to sell in the foreign market. I assume that there
are DRS in generating demand from investing in a consumer base. This technology
may be broadly interpreted as follows: tt encompasses advertising expenditure on
building brand reputation as well as the establishment of a network of local buyers
and distribution channels. The unifying feature of these activities is that they take
time and money to complete and additional benefits become increasingly more ex-
pensive. Customer capital, like physical capital, depreciates over time and is subject
to adjustment costs. Exports are subject to an ad valorem tariff which may vary
over time and exporters have to form expectations over aggregate export demand
and the real exchange rate which vary stochastically.
The paper uses the AFiD Panel of Industrial Establishments, a plant level panel
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maintained by the German national statistical agency to estimate the model pa-
rameters. With more than 50,000 plant observations per year, it provides extensive
coverage of the German manufacturing sector and spans the years 1995 to 2008. Dur-
ing the observed time period, the sector experiences a strong expansion in export
activity. Export participation by plants in the sample rises from 54 to 65 percent
and total export revenue doubles in real terms. This expansion was the result of a
drop in worldwide tariffs after the conclusion of the Uruguay round in 1995, a strong
expansion in demand especially in transition economies, and favorable exchange rate
movements in the initial years of the sample.
I use the data to structurally estimate the model parameters using a simulated
method of moments (SMM) estimator. After solving the plant problem by value
function iteration, I simulate the export behavior of plants to obtain a panel data
set of the same size as the underlying data set. During the simulation, I feed in the
observed time series for aggregate tariffs, export demand and real exchange rate. I
obtain estimates by minimizing a quadratic form criterion function in a vector of
data moments.
This chapter is the first to obtain an estimate from plant level data of the marketing
costs plants incur to maintain and increase their customer stock in export markets.
The estimated costs are large and account by far for the largest share of export
costs. In 1995, the beginning of the sample for example, the average exporter spent
2.4 million euros on maintaining customer capital and a further 0.96 million on
expanding it. Estimated entry costs into exporting of 33,467 1995 euros are relatively
small when compared to other estimates in the literature.
The estimation procedure succeeds in matching the chosen target moments well, in
particular when comparing growth rates and survival probabilities for new exporters.
Its predictions on export participation are well in line with the data up to 2006 after
which it misses a further surge in export participation. It closely matches the shape of
the growth in total export revenue while overpredicting its absolute size. Importantly,
when compared to an estimated restricted model version in which plants face fixed
costs of exporting only, the baseline correctly predicts a further surge in exporting
revenue after 2003 while the fixed cost model predicts exports to slightly decline.
I use three different scenarios to compare the dynamic implications of the baseline
model to a more standard sunk/fixed cost model of exporting: a real exchange rate
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depreciation, an increase in worldwide demand and an elimination of all export
tariffs. Aggregate exports in the fixed cost model react almost twice as strong to a
real exchange rate depreciation compared to the in baseline model with estimated
elasticities of 3.4 compared to 1.9. Meanwhile, both models predict gains of total
exports of 10 to 11 percent when moving to free trade. In case of the baseline model,
however, these take almost ten years to fully realize. So, unlike the fixed cost model,
the estimated baseline model can reconcile large predictions of trade gains after a
tariff reduction with a subdued reaction of aggregate exports to a real exchange
rate depreciation. Slow and active demand accumulation therefore quantitatively
manages to provide an answer to the elasticity puzzle.
This chapter builds on a long line of literature in empirical trade that estimates
structural and reduced form discrete choice models of export participation on plant
or firm level data. Some of the most prominent examples are Roberts and Tybout
(1997), Bernard and Wagner (2001), Bernard and Jensen (2004) and the aforemen-
tioned study by Das et al. (2007). Willis and Ruhl (2009) and Arkolakis (2010) point
out that the predictions of these models are at odds with the observed increasing
survival rates for new exporters and the above average export growth rates among
small exporters following trade liberalizations.
A number of recent contributions has therefore started to extend this framework
by broadening the focus beyond mere participation. Fitzgerald and Haller (2012)
use plant level information on export destinations and sales by six digit tariff line
from Irish manufacturing firms to show that lagged export sales are an important
predictor of future trade participation. They also interpret this as evidence of some
market specific demand factor that plants have to accumulate over time. This chapter
differs in its use of a structural estimation approach which allows me to quantify the
costs associated with foreign customer accumulation and to conduct counterfactual
experiments. Eaton et al. (2010) combine Columbian plant level data with U.S.
Customs data to establish patterns in individual sales relationships between the
Columbian plants and their U.S. buyers. They then propose a continuous time search
model with heterogeneous buyers. The evidence they provide is mostly consistent
with the model and data of this chapter. One may think of the search friction as micro
foundation for the demand technology I assume. Arkolakis (2010) also proposes a
static model of costly costumer accumulation to reconcile theory and data.
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The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model. In Section
3.3, I introduce my data set, discuss sample selection, and establish some stylized
facts which indicate a slow process of demand accumulation for new exporters. I
also report how I calculate series for aggregate tariffs, export demand and the real
exchange rate. Section 3.5 presents parameter estimates, evaluates model fit and
discusses what implications they have for the cost of exporting. Section 3.6 contrasts
the dynamic behavior of the model to that of a more standard fixed cost model.
Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 A model of export participation and intensity choice
The section presents a dynamic model of plant export participation and costly cus-
tomer accumulation. Like in much of previous literature, exporting is subject to
sunk entry and fixed participation costs. I extend the framework by the notion of
customer capital in the export market. After entering into exporting, plants first
have to spend resources on acquiring a stock of customers to sell to. This includes
advertising expenditures on building brand reputation as well as the establishment
of a network of local buyers and distribution channels. In the model, this concept
takes the form of a capital good that the firm has to spend resources on in acquiring
and which generates demand through a decreasing returns to scale technology1. Like
physical capital, it depreciates geometrically and is subject to convex adjustment
costs in the size of gross investment. The latter imply that plants take several years
after entering the market to reach their desired market size. They also induce a
decreasing exit hazard over time as plants have more customers to sell to. When a
firm chooses not to export in any year, it starts its next exporting episode having
to build up its entire customer base anew. The sunk component in exporting costs
therefore increases as firms grow bigger.
In the part of the export market that a plant has acquired access to, it behaves as
monopolistic competitor which rules out strategic considerations in pricing. Other
than on its price, a plant’s profits from exporting depend on idiosyncratic shocks to
export demand and production costs and aggregate movements in real exchange rate,
tariffs, and total income in export markets. Idiosyncratic profitability, real exchange
1Given my assumption of linear costs in accumulating customers, decreasing returns imply an
interior solution for the target market size.
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rate and aggregate demand follow known Markov processes over which the plant has
to form expectations. The model focuses on the export market to keep the already
highly dimensional model tractable and focused. The abstraction from the home
market implies that home and foreign market are independent in terms of consumer
base.
3.2.1 Export Revenues and Profits
When plant i chooses to export in a given period t, it faces the following demand
schedule in its export market
qDit = itp
∗−η
it D
α
itD
W
t . (3.1)
it is a shock that shifts the idiosyncratic demand schedule. p
∗
it is the price in foreign
currency terms that the plant sets for its product . Dit is the size of the customer base
that the firm has accumulated in foreign markets. I will discuss the details of how a
firm accumulates market share below. The assumption that 0 < α < 1 implies that
customer capital is subject to decreasing returns to scale. DWt represents aggregate
demand in export markets. It, too, evolves stochastically2.
Export sales are subject to an ad valorem tariff τt, which may evolve over time.
The real exchange rate in period t is denoted by RERt. The foreign demand schedule
therefore implies the following revenue function dependent on goods sold qit:
R (qit) =
RERt
1 + τt
q
η−1
η
it 
1
η
it
(
DαitD
W
t
) 1
η .
Plants face variable costs of production cit such that gross profits from exporting are
given by:
piit = R (qit)− citqit.
Profit maximization implies that plants choose prices as a fixed mark-up over variable
production costs: p∗it =
η
η−1
1+τ
RERt
cit. In my data I observe a plant’s export revenue
denoted in terms of domestic currency but no information on production costs and
2Equation (3.1) would follow naturally from the assumption of a CES consumption aggregator in
the export markets. In that case, DWt would be total consumption and D
α
it would measure the
intensity, with which plant i has penetrated the market, i.e. the amount of customers it can
reach.
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therefore no direct measure of gross profits from exporting. However, given the
previously made assumptions, optimal pricing implies that profits are a fixed fraction
of revenues: piit =
1
η
Rit. Per period gross profits from exporting evaluated using
optimal prices are therefore given by:
piit =
1
η
(
η − 1
η
)η−1
itc
1−η
it D
α
itD
W
t
(
RERt
1 + τt
)η
.
I normalize constants to one and define zit = itc
1−η
it as a composite state for id-
iosyncratic export profitability. For the estimations, this allows me to work with the
following relatively simple equation for potential export profits:
piit = zitD
α
itD
W
t
(
RERt
1 + τt
)η
. (3.2)
It is also zit for which I make distributional assumptions and over which the firm
forms expectations. More specifically, I assume idiosyncratic export profitability to
be the sum of a fixed component χi and a persistent component φit:
zit = φit + χi.
The permanent component χi is a realization of a log-normal distribution lnN
(
0, σ2χ
)
.
The logarithm of φit follows an AR(1) process with innovations ε
φ
it drawn from a nor-
mal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2φ:
ln (φit) = ρφ ln (φit−1) + ε
φ
it.
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3.2.2 Costs of Exporting
A firm that wants to export in any given period faces two types of costs: a stochastic
fixed overhead and costs of maintaining or increasing its foreign customer stock.
The fixed cost is on average higher, when the firm has not been an exporter in the
previous period and therefore has a sunk component. It represents administrative
costs and costs of complying with foreign regulations and customs procedures. Those
are unlikely related to the amount of exporting a firm does. In addition, penetrating
the export market means having to acquire customers via marketing and potentially
building up a network for distribution and sales3. I treat foreign demand potential
Dit as a capital good like in Arkolakis (2010), Drozd and Nosal (2012), and Fitzgerald
and Haller (2012). It depreciates over time and its accumulation is costly and subject
to convex adjustment costs. Convex adjustment costs mean that a firm, after entering
into exporting, will take a number of years to build up its desired stock of foreign
customers.
Costs of accumulating a customer base
A plant that did not export previously enters the year without any customers in
foreign markets. A plant that served Dit−1 customers last year, retains a fraction of
(1− δ). Other supply relations dissolve, because partners in foreign markets go out
of business, and built up reputation from previous marketing campaigns becomes
less valuable. Before determining its export volume for the current year, the plant
has the opportunity of investing into its customer stock. Accumulating additional
units of Iit = Dit− (1− δ)Dit−1 costs clinIit in terms of current profits. Additionally,
it has to pay quadratic adjustment costs c
conv
2
(
Iit
Dit
)2
Dit on its investment. The total
costs of investing c (Dit, Dit−1) are:
c (Dit, Dit−1) = clin (Dit − (1− δ)Dit−1) + c
conv
2
(
Iit
Dit
)2
Dit.
3Alternatively, the firm can outsource marketing and distribution to local subcontractors. In this
case, it probably has to find different subcontractors for different regions such that the costs of
distribution network are still increasing in its size.
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Fixed Costs of Exporting
A firm that did not export in the previous year needs to pay a sunk entry cost γE−ξEit
where ξEit ∼ N (0, σ2E). If it has exporting experience from the last year, it pays a
fixed cost of γF − ξFit , where γF < γE and ξFit ∼ N (0, σ2F ). Letting yit ∈ {0, 1} denote
the export state of plant i in period t, per period net profits from exporting can be
summarized by:
u
(
φit, χi,Dit, Dit−1, RERt, DWt , τt
)
=

piit − γF + ξFit − c(Dit, Dit−1) yt = 1 ∧ yt−1 = 1
piit − γE + ξEit − c(Dit, 0) yt = 1 ∧ yt−1 = 0
0 yt = 0
3.2.3 Bellman Equations
In any given year t, a plant observes the current realizations of ξXit ,φit,RERt, D
W
t . It
then decides whether to participate in the exporting business this period. If it does,
it also decides how much to invest into its customer stock and sets prices thereafter.
Prior to 1995, plants expect the current tariff level to persist forever. In 1995, they
learn the whole tariff sequence up to 2008. They assume that from 2008 on, tariffs
will stay at that level forever. Dropping time subscripts for all variables except τ
and denoting future values of a variable x by x′, I summarize the dynamic problem
for the firm using two Bellman equations:
– For plants that exported in the previous period
V 1(ξF , φ,D−1, RER,DW , τt) = max
[
max
{
D
pi − γF + ξF − c(D,D−1)
+βE
[
V 1
(
ξF ′, φ′, (1− δ)D,RER′, DW ′, τt+1
)]}
,
βE
[
V 0
({ξE′, φ′, RER′, DW ′, τt+1)]]
(3.3)
– For plants that did not export in the previous period
V 0(ξE , φ,RER,DW , τt) = max
[
max
{
D
pi − γE + ξE − c(D, 0)
+βE
[
V 1
(
ξF ′, φ′, (1− δ)D,RER′, DW ′, τt+1
)]}
βE
[
V 0
(
ξE′, φ′, RER′, DW ′, τt+1
)]]
(3.4)
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3.3 Data
This section introduces the data set, the AFiD Panel of Industrial Establishments
maintained by the German Federal Statistical Office. It contains on average more
than 50,000 establishments per year and covers the years 1995 to 2008. During
the observed time period, German manufacturing experienced an exporting boom.
Export participation in the sample rose from 54 to 65 percent and the (unweighted)
average revenue share of exporting increased from 22 to 28 percent. As a result,
aggregate real export revenue doubled.
After briefly describing sample selection, in Section 3.3.3 I provide further evi-
dence from the data set that plants after entering the export market face important
demand side frictions. In the first four years of an exporting spell, entrants have
on average higher growth rates than incumbents. While the year of entry is asso-
ciated with a healthy increase in domestic revenues, pointing to an initial increase
in productivity, it is not sustained in the following years. This is evidence against
upgrading in physical productivity as result of exporting. Also, survival probabilities
are an increasing function of exporting tenure.
In Section 3.3.4 I discuss how I calculate tariffs. The year 1995, the beginning of
the data set, saw the conclusion of the Uruguay round of trade negotiations which
resulted in the creation of the WTO and a commitment to substantial tariff reduc-
tions for the trade in manufacturing goods from joining nations. Those were to be
gradually phased in until 2000 for developed and until 2004 for developing coun-
tries. Also, in 2004 ten mostly Eastern European countries joined the EU which
meant that German firms could now access those neighboring markets tariff free. As
a result, the trade weighted average value added tariff for German manufacturing
exports dropped from about 3.3 percent in 1995 to about 2.1 percent in 2008.
Simultaneously, real per capita income in many emerging economies started grow-
ing strongly. Market size in those countries relative to the German home market
increased by more than thirty percent. Section 3.3.5 discusses how I calculate a
time series for real aggregate export demand. Finally, in Section 3.3.6 I present the
real exchange rate series. Germany’s effective real exchange rate in 1995 had just
strongly appreciated after the calamities in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
that forced out Britain and caused Italy to depreciate against the German Mark. In
the years up to 2000, Germany devaluated by more than 20 percent against its trade
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partners. Until the end of the sample, it appreciated again by about 10 percent.
3.3.1 AFiD - Administrative Firm Data for Germany
My data set is the AFiD Panel of Industrial Establishments. It is an annual, admin-
istrative plant-level panel maintained by the German Federal Statistical Office. It
samples from the universe of German manufacturing establishments with 20 or more
employees. In sectors with predominantly smaller firms, this cut-off can be substan-
tially lowered. Participation for the sampled plants is mandated by law. A plant
is counted as an individual unit if it is locally separated from other establishments
belonging to the same firm. Ownership is recorded, but does not influence sampling.
Establishments owned by German firms in other countries are not included.
The sample covers the years 1995 to 2008. Variables collected include total revenue,
total export revenue, employment, hours worked and investment. One of the appeals
of the data set is its coverage. It comprises an average of about 50,000 plants per
year. The panel is unbalanced but plants tend to stay in the sample quite long
such that an uninterrupted series of 14 observations exists for 26,522 plants and
about 10,000 more have at least 10 years worth of observations. Sectorial classifiers
allow to group plants into NACE rev. 1.1 sectors.4 All NACE sectors related to
manufacturing and the extractive industries are covered (NACE 10-36). While there
are clear sectoral differences with regards to export participation and intensity, they
share a common upwards trend which is why I opt not to do estimations separately
by sector.5
3.3.2 Sample selection and summary statistics
I first delete every observation from the data set that has missing information on
employment, total revenue and export revenue. In order to eliminate plant-year ob-
servations which are potentially the result of misreporting, I also delete for every
year separately observations which are in the top and bottom percentile for employ-
4For further information on the methodology behind the NACE classification and its relation to
other systems of industry classification, you may consult Eurostat.
5The interested reader finds more information on the data set in Appendix 3.A. Tables 3.6 - 3.7
reports sample splits by sectoral classification, firm type and employment size categories. All of
them use the year 1999 as an example.
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Figure 3.1: The extensive and the intensive margin of exporting in AFiD
(1995-2008)
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(b) Growth in aggregate export revenue
Note: The figure illustrates trends in the exporting behavior of the plants in the data set during the observed time
period. Panel (a) shows the percentage of plants with positive export revenues. Panel (b) reports the growth in real
aggregate export revenue.
ment or total revenue growth6. The resulting sample contains 667,601 plant-year
observations from 81,913 different establishments.
Historically always export oriented, the German manufacturing sector grew even
substantially more so during the time of our sample. As Figure 3.2a shows, the
percentage of firms in the sample engaged in some form of exporting activity grew
by more than 10 percentage points from about 54 percent 1995 to about 65 percent
in 2008. Conditional on being an exporter, export revenue grew also more important
as a share of total revenue. The average export revenue share rose from less than
22 percent in 1995 to more than 28 percent in 2008. Figure 3.2b shows that as
a consequence of this expansion on the extensive and intensive margin, real total
exports doubled between 1995 and 2007.
As illustrated in Figure 3.7 in the appendix, the expansion in export participation
was the result of high entry rates and a steady decline in exit rates from exporting.
Nonetheless, even though export participation as a whole increased substantially
during the sample period, turnover between exporting and non-exporting remained
high. Even in the boom year of 2006, more than two percent of plants with positive
6This criterion is not applicable for export revenue growth. Because of the way I measure growth
rates, the top and bottom percentile of export revenue growth rates would largely contain
episodes of exit and entry
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export revenue in 2005 did not report any exporting in 2006.
3.3.3 Evidence for slow demand accumulation
In a recent contribution, Foster et al. (2012), using data from the US Census of
Manufacturers, show that entrants into the US domestic market are much smaller
than their established industry competitors, and that they may take over a decade
to close the gap in sales. Using price data, they can show that these size differences
are not the result of lower productivity but rather of a lack customers to sell their
products to. Established firms entering into exporting should face a similar problem.
They, too, first have to establish distribution channels, explore and penetrate markets
and build a reputation with customers. These are both time- and resource consuming
activities that imply that it takes young exporters a number of years to reach their
desired export volumes. These entry episode therefore serve as another good test case
on which to evaluate the hypothesis of demand side impediments to plant growth.
Table 3.1: Sales growth rates for new exporters
Year after entry
Sales growth
Export Domestic
0 2.000 0.093
1 0.288 -0.011
2 0.060 -0.017
3 0.059 -0.016
4 0.040 -0.015
Note: The table displays growth rates for plants who enter into
exporting for export revenue (column 1) and domestic revenue
(column 2) conditional on surviving as exporter. I count the year
when the plant enters into exporting as year zero. Growth rates
are calculated as
xt−xt−1
.5(xt+xt−1)
. This statistic is bounded between
-2 (exit) and 2 (entry).
As documented in the previous subsection, due to high turnover and a substantial
net expansion in export participation, entrance into exporting is a very frequent
occurrence in my data set. In total, there are 14,814 observations where a plant
shows a switch from non-exporter to exporter. I exploit this fact to test hypothesis
on sales behavior during the years after entry. Table 3.1 reports mean sales growth
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rates for entrants into exporting in foreign and domestic markets. Throughout the
chapter, I calculate growth rates as (xt − xt−1)/(.5(xt + xt−1)). This measure, first
introduced by Davis et al. (1998), has the advantage of being bounded between -2
and +2, which allows to include market entry and exit.
There are two observations one can make from the table. For one, conditional on
surviving as an exporter, in the first four years after entering into exporting, new ex-
porters show on average higher export sales growth rates than incumbent exporters.
The average export sales growth rate over all plants and years is 0.051. Second,
while entering into exporting is also associated with a healthy increase in domestic
sales which points to a positive productivity innovation, this cannot be said for the
subsequent years which all display negative growth rates (which are consistent with
mean reversion in productivity). In combination, these two observations suggest that
while entering into exporting is associated with a productivity increase, subsequent
growth in export sales is not the result of further improvements in productivity.
Instead, improved demand conditions seem to be responsible for the strong export
sales growth in the year following entry.
Table 3.2: Survival probabilities for new exporters
Year after entry Probability of survival
0 67.9
1 82.6
2 87.3
3 89.7
4 92.0
5 91.7
6 93.1
7 94.4
8 95.5
Note: The table displays survival probabilities as exporter in the years
after entering into exporting. For example, the first line shows that for
firms who report export revenue after having had not exported in the
first year, the chance of again exporting in the next year is 67.9 percent.
Table 3.2 illustrates another fact that hints at the accumulation of some export
market specific factor: the probability of surviving as an exporter is an increasing
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function in the number of years already spent exporting. While sunk fixed costs in
entering exporting would explain hysteresis in the exporter status, their combina-
tion with mean reversion in revenue productivities still implies a decreasing survival
probability as more plants revert below the continuation threshold.
3.3.4 Tariff data
The AFiD data set does not record plant level information regarding export des-
tination country. The only variable recorded is total export revenue. In order to
empirically identify the effect of variations in tariff duties on export participation
and sales, I construct a yearly average measure of tariff duties that German man-
ufacturing exports were subject to between 1995 and 2008. Export data by sector
are available from the Eurostat Comext data base7 and recorded according to the
Harmonized System (HS) classification as is the norm with trade data. I manually
construct matches between NACE (rev 1.1) sectors and HS(2) chapters and obtain
dissaggregate export data for the relevant sectors. In order to construct a stable
world market aggregate for the time period, I then rank export destinations by trade
value for every year. The union set of the top twenty partners in every year con-
stitutes the world market. The set stably accounts for about 80 percent of total
German manufacturing exports. Please consult Appendix 3.D for more details on
this procedure and for a list of the export destinations included.
I then obtain six digit tariff line data from the WTO8 and match them with
the export data from Comext to calculate an average trade-weighted measure for ad
valorem export duties during the sample period. The resulting time series is displayed
in Figure 3.3a. With an average of only 3.3 percent, tariff duties on German exports
were already low at the beginning of the sample period. The trade liberalizations
described in the introduction to this section are well visible in the series. Between
1995 and 2000, the tariffs drop by a full percentage point to 2.2 percent as a result
of the implementation of the Urugay tariff reductions and abolitions. In 2004, the
accession of ten mostly Eastern European countries to the European Union means
exports to those destinations are now tariff-free which has aggregate tariffs drop by
another .3 percentage points.
7For more details see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/
8http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tariffs_e/tariff_data_e.htm
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3.3.5 Aggregate export demand
In my model, there are four reasons why export revenue for a plant grows. The
plant may expand its penetration of world markets by investing into its stock of cus-
tomers. It may experience an increase in revenue productivity. The value of exports
in domestic currency terms may shift because of favorable exchange rate movements.
Tariff reductions increase the share of sales revenue the plant retains. Finally, ag-
gregate import demand in the part of the world that the plant has penetrated grows
with aggregate income.
I use the same set of countries from the calculation of the tariff series to obtain a
world demand series. Total demand in country i at time t in real terms is given by
Di,t = GDPi,t + IMi,t − EXi,t
where GDPi,t is real GDP and IMi,t are EXi,t are real aggregate imports and exports.
The time series for these variables are taken from the World Bank Development
Report9 and the IMF Global Economic Outlook10 . The resulting aggregate demand
series by country are then averaged and weighted by total German manufacturing
exports. Finally, I make the assumption that the costs of exporting (production costs
and other) are growing at the same rate as domestic demand. The relevant series for
evaluating export profitability is therefore
DWt
Dt
, world demand relative to domestic
demand. Normalizing relative aggregate export demand in 1995 to 1.0, the resulting
time series is displayed in Figure 3.3b. Between 1995 and 2005, total export demand
relative to domestic demand grows by 27 percent, a level at which it stays more or
less constant until the end of the observed time period.
3.3.6 Real exchange rate
The real exchange rate data are from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
Ideally, one would want to calculate the real exchange rate for the same set of coun-
tries used for calculating tariffs and aggregate demand series. Meanwhile, especially
for the emerging market economies which are are part of the world aggregate, con-
9Available at http://databank.worldbank.org/Data/Home.aspx
10Available at http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=k3s92bru78li6_&hl=en&dl=
en
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Figure 3.2: Aggregate series
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Note: Panel (a) displays the trade-weighted average tariff series for German manufacturing exports between 1995
and 2008. To calculate the series, I match average across HS(6) tariff lines for manufacturing exports and weight
them by trade volume for export destination and tariff line. Panel (b) displays world demand in the export market
for German manufacturing relative to home market demand. The series is normalized to 1 in 1995. The export
market is an aggregate of Germany’s 23 most important trade partners weighted by trade volume.
sistent inflation data for this time period is hard to obtain. I therefore use the BIS
data as the closest approximation. The BIS time series is based on a trade basket
of 51 partner countries going back to 1994. There also exists a longer time series
going back to 1964 based on 22 trade partners. My estimations of the real exchange
rate process below are based on a series where I splice the series based on the more
narrow basket until 1993 to the series based on the broader basket. In the case of
Germany, until about 1997, these two series almost coincide so there should be no
problem of continuity.
The real exchange rate is calculated as the geometric weighted average of bilateral
nominal exchange rates adjusted with the corresponding relative consumer prices.
The trade based weighting methodology has its theoretical underpinnings in Arm-
ington (1969). The weights capture both direct bilateral trade and third market
competition by double-weighting.11 Please consult Appendix 3.D for a display of
Germany’s real exchange rate during the sample period.
11For more details on the methodology, please consult Klau and Fung (2006).
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3.4 Estimation
This section describes how I estimate the model presented in Section 3.2 on the plant
level data from the previous section. In a first stage, I make assumptions on the pro-
cesses for the real exchange rate (RERt) and world demand (D
W
t ) whose parameters I
estimate independently. This leaves Ω =
{
β, η, α, δ, ρφ, σφ, σχ, c
lin, cconv, γE, σE, γF , σF
}
,
a set of 13 parameters to be determined. I set β to an annual interest rate of 5 percent
and estimate the other parameters using a Simulated Method of Moments (SMM)
approach as developed by McFadden (1989), Lee and Ingram (1991), and Duffie and
Singleton (1993). The twelve estimated parameters are collected in the parameter
vector θ. Further information on how I solve for the establishment policy functions
used in the simulation and on SMM itself can be found in Appendix 3.E.
3.4.1 Parameters estimated outside of the Model
I obtain parameter estimates for the real exchange rate process and aggregate export
demand prior to estimating the remaining model parameters. Table 3.3 summarizes
the estimated parameters and gives standard errors.
World demand process parameters
In my model simulation below, I assume DWt to follow a bounded random walk of
the form
log
(
DWt
)
= max
[
min
{
log
(
DWt−1
)
+ σDW 
DW
t , log(D
W
max)
}
, log
(
DWmin
)]
.
Section 3.3.5 explained how I calculate a times series for aggregate export demand
for German manufacturing products between 1995 and 2008. I estimate σDW from
the standard deviation of the growth rate of that series assuming that the random
walk is not at its bounds. The boundedness assumption helps in assuring stationarity
of the dynamic programming problem. After normalizing DW to 1.0 in 1995, I pick
DWmin = 0.75 and D
W
max = 1.5 as lower and upper bounds. These turned out large
enough to ensure that further expanding them did not affect estimation results12.
12It should be noted that discounting by the plants and the fact that I am simulating the model
over a finite number of periods mean that my results are unlikely to differ much from a model
where DW follows an unbounded random walk.
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Real exchange rate parameters
I assume the annual real exchange rate to follow an AR(1) process in logs:
log(RERt) = ρRER log(RERt−1) + σRERRERt , 
RER
t ∼ N(0, 1)
The p-value of an Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for non-stationarity on the real
exchange rate series from 1973 (the end of Bretton Woods) to 2008 is 0.0139, so
non-stationarity is rejected at the 5, but not the 1 percent confidence level. The
point estimate of ρRER is 0.9073 with a standard deviation of 0.0968. In order to
make my analysis comparable to that in previous studies, I stick to the assumption
of a stationary exchange rate.13 Table 3.3 summarizes the estimates for the processes
for aggregate demand and real exchange rate. I obtain the standard errors for the
innovation variances from bootstraps with 2,000 repetitions.
Table 3.3: Estimated parameters for the aggregate stochastic processes
Parameter σDW ρRER σRER
Estimate
0.0149 0.9073 0.0366
(0.0025) (0.0968) (0.004)
Note: The table reports the estimated standard deviation of
innovations to aggregate export demand (σDW ), the persis-
tence of the real exchange rate (ρRER) and the standard de-
viation of real exchange rate innovations (σRER). Standard
errors are in parenthesis.
3.4.2 A Simulated Method of Moments Approach
A direct evaluation of the model’s likelihood function in the parameter vector θ is
infeasible. I therefore use a Simulated Method of Moments procedure. Its underlying
idea is that, under the null hypothesis of a parameter estimate θˆ being the true
parameter vector θ0, simulated panels of the same number of units N and of the same
length T will on average yield the moments µ(θˆ) observed in data set. Variations
around the mean are the result of simulation uncertainty for the simulated data and
sampling uncertainty for the observed moments. Simulations are therefore repeated S
13As also discussed in Das et al. (2007), studies of real exchange rates dynamics fail to reject a
random walk because of limited test power, while studies that exploit long time series or pool
countries like Frankel and Rose (1995) are often able to do so.
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times over a fixed set of different stochastic draws and µ(θˆ) is estimated by averaging
over these draws. The challenge then is to identify a vector of moments µ(θ0) which
is informative about the underyling parameters in the sense that E0
aµ
aθ  0 for as
many entries as possible, i.e. the moments are responsive to changes in underlying
parameters.
I obtain parameter estimates by minimizing the quadratic form criterion function[
µ(θ0)− 1
S
S∑
s=1
µ(θˆ)s
]
W ∗−1
[
µ(θ0)− 1
S
S∑
s=1
µ(θˆ)s
]
(3.5)
where W ∗ is the optimal weighting matrix V ar
(
µ(θ0)− 1S
∑S
s=1 µ(θ)s
)
. As shown
by Lee and Ingram (1991), under the null V ar
(
1
S
∑S
s=1 µ(θ)s
)
is equal to 1
S
V ar (µ(θ0)).
Independence of simulated and data moments then implies
V ar(θˆ) =
(
1 +
1
S
)[
E0
∂µ′
∂θ
W ∗−1E0
∂µ
∂θ
]−1
. (3.6)
I obtain V ar (µ(θ0)) from (block-)bootstrapping the data 1,000 times with replace-
ment. Setting S = 20 means that the standard error of θˆ is increased by 5 % as
result of simulation uncertainty.
Given a guess for the parameter vector θˆ, I solve the firm problem using value
function iteration. I then simulate a panel of N = 50, 000 plants S times over a
fixed set of random draws feeding in the empirically observed time series for tariffs,
aggregate demand and real exchange rate. During an initial period, I first let the
economy settle into its stochastic steady state in which aggregate demand and tariffs
are fixed at their 1995 values. The real exchange rate varies randomly during the
initial periods following the AR(1) process estimated in the previous subsection. In
the 31 years leading up to the estimation window, I then fix the exchange rate to
follow its observed path.14 I also assume that, during the initial periods, the plants
are unaware of the tariff changes that start taking place in 1995, the first year of
the simulation window. In 1995, they learn the tariff transition path that leads
to the new, low-tariff stochastic steady state. Real exchange rate and aggregate
14I have real exchange rate data for the years 1964 to 2008 such that I can use the observations for
the years 1964 to 1994 during the initialization period.
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export demand follow their observed paths and plants form expectations according
to the estimated processes. For more details on the numerical solution method for
solving the plant problem and the global optimization algorithm used in finding the
minimum of the objective function you may also consult Appendix 3.E.
Table 3.4: Data moments used in estimation
Export revenue growth rate Growth rates entrants Survival rates entrants
Moment Data Model Period Data Model Period Data Model
Mean 0.051 0.056 1 0.276 0.281 0 0.667 0.643
Std 0.730 0.634 2 0.062 0.127 1 0.826 0.760
Skewness 0.002 0.061 3 0.063 0.065 2 0.877 0.847
Kurtosis 5.326 6.682 4 0.041 0.028 3 0.902 0.903
Autocorr(1) -.1958 -.151 4 0.923 0.935
Autocorr(2) -0.040 -0.086 5 0.922 0.950
6 0.936 0.960
7 0.949 0.968
8 0.960 0.967
Export revenue distribution Export participation
Quintile Data Model Moment Data Model
2 0.006 0.002 Corr(Expt, Expt−2) 0.881 0.878
3 0.019 0.008 Corr(Expt, Expt−4) 0.826 0.832
4 0.060 0.043 NE − E 0.056 0.052
5 0.915 0.946 E −NE 0.030 0.029
1995 Exporters 0.544 0.560
Note: The table reports the data moments that identify the model parameters via a Simulated Method of Moments
estimation. They can be classified into five subcategories: 1) Statistics of the export revenue growth rate 2) Export
revenue growth rates for entrants into exporting in the years after entry 3) Survival rates for entrants in the years af-
ter entry 4) Quintiles of the export revenue distribution 5) Moments on export participation, and transitions. Growth
rates are calculated as (xt − xt−1)/(.5(xt + xt−1)). This statistic is bounded between -2 (exit) and 2 (entry). Expt is
an indicator variable that equals one if a plant has positive export revenue in period t and zero otherwise. Data refers
to data moments. Model are simulated counterparts from the model’s baseline specification.
I use a total of 28 moments from the AFiD data to estimate the model. See Table
3.4 for a summary. They can be devided into five broad categories. The first category
contains moments of the export revenue growth distribution, the first four centered
moments and one and two year autocorrelation. Revenue growth is again defined
by Revt−Revt−1
.5(Revt+Revt−1)
for it to include entry and exit. Export revenue growth rates for
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entrants in the first four years after entry constitute the second subcategory.15 The
third set of moments is made up of the survival rates for entrants into exporting after
the initial year and the eight subsequent years. The fourth subcategory describes the
export revenue distribution and contains the shares in total export revenue (averaged
over the sample period) for the second to fifth quintile.16 Finally, the last set of
moments concerns the extensive margin of exporting: persistence in exporting status
over two and four years, average entry (NE −E) and exit (E −NE) rates into and
from exporting as well as total export participation at the beginning of the sample.
3.5 Results
This section presents my estimation results. Table 3.5 reports the parameter esti-
mates for the baseline model and for a version in which all accumulation of export
specific demand has been shut down. Overall, the baseline model performs well in
matching the target moments and in accounting for the behavior of entrants into
exporting in the year after entry. The model predicts an even larger growth in total
exports than what is observed, even though the estimated price elasticity of demand
in the export market of 1.42 is well within the low range commonly calibrated in
open economy business cycle models. While both the baseline version and the re-
stricted fixed costs version somewhat underpredict the growth in export participation
towards the end of the sample, the baseline model clearly does a better job in repli-
cating the data. Most importantly, while the fixed cost model predicts aggregate
exports basically flat after 2002 in the absence of favorable macroeconomic shocks,
the baseline model reproduces well the 50 percent surge between 2002 and 2008 as
plants are still building up their foreign demand after the favorable shocks which
occurred during the first half of the sample. Estimated entry costs of exporting are
low compared with other estimates in the literature. It turns out, however, that by
far the largest cost of exporting is spent on building up and maintaining a foreign
demand base which constitutes a large sunk investment as well.
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Table 3.5: Parameter estimates
Baseline No customer capital
Parameter Estimate 95% Conf. Int. Estimate 95% Conf. Int.
Demand elasticity
η 1.432 [1.248, 1.615] 3.472 [3.238, 3.706]
Foreign demand technology
α 0.526 [0.508, 0.543] – –
δ 0.207 [0.191, 0.222] – –
Revenue productivity distribution
ρφ 0.871 [0.862, 0.881] 0.992 [0.992, 0.992]
σφ 0.307 [0.303, 0.311] 0.369 [0.364, 0.373]
σχ 1.776 [1.704, 1.849] 3.346 [3.258, 3.343]
Costs of foreign demand accumulation
clin 1.166 [0.994, 1.339] – –
cconv 2.851 [2.448, 3.254] – –
Fixed costs of exporting
γE 1.040 [0.990, 1.339] 1.679 [1.513, 1.844]
σE 0.347 [0.316, 0.379] 0.767 [0.679, 0.853]
γF 0.625 [0.582, 0.667] 0.610 [0.585, 0.634]
σF 1.241 [1.163, 1.319] 0.355 [0.310, 0.399]
Note: The table displays the estimated components of the parameter vector θˆ along with the respective 95
percent confidence intervals. Columns two and three report results for the model baseline specification. The
two rightmost columns reports results for a restricted model version in which I set α to zero such that firms
do not accumulate export market specific demand. In consequence, the parameters δ, clin, cconv are not part
of the estimation either.
3.5.1 Parameter estimates
The second and third column of Table 3.5 report the estimated parameter vector θˆ
along with its 95 percent confidence interval for the model baseline specification. I
also estimate a restricted model version with α set to zero which reduces the set-
up to a pure fixed cost model like the one estimated in Das et al. (2007). This
allows me to investigate in how far they differ in terms of predictive power and
dynamic implications. Most parameters are fairly tightly estimated. I estimate a
15The growth rate in the year of entry is 2 by construction.
16The first quintile is linearly dependent on the other four quintiles and its inclusion into the
estimation would add no further information.
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price elasticity of demand of 1.432.17 With confidence bounds at 1.248 and 1.615,
this estimate is unfortunately not very precise. Still, the estimation procedure puts it
well in the low range of about 0.9 to 2.0 typically calibrated in open economy macro
models. At the same time it manages to account for the strong growth in average
export revenue as result of the favorable shocks to the aggregate export environment.
3.5.2 Identification
Table 3.10 in the appendix reports a stylized Jacobi matrix evaluated at the baseline
estimate of the parameter vector. As one can see there, many of the above moments
are affected by a large subset of the parameter vector such that the estimate of any
parameter cannot be attributed to one moment alone. Here, I want to give some
more intuition for what subset of moments identifies which parameter.
– Parameters of the foreign demand technology (α, δ)
The curvature of the foreign demand technology has very strong positive effects
on the autocorrelation of foreign revenue growth as well as on the growth rates
for plants that newly enter into exporting. The higher α, the higher the target
level of foreign demand and the longer the plant will show positive revenue
growth after entry or after a positive productivity shock. This also means that
the distribution of foreign revenue is more spread out and a larger share of total
revenue is generated in the top quintile. Finally, α decreases transitions into
and out of exporting by increasing persistence in exporting. In that sense, the
accumulation of a demand base acts much like a sunk entry cost spread out over
time. Depreciation δ in many ways has an opposing effect. Larger attrition
rates for foreign sales relationships mean less of an incentive to invest into them
and lower growth rates after entry. This also implies a more compressed sales
distribution. δ also decreases persistence in the export status and and increases
transitions.
17An estimate of 1.432 for η implies a mark-up over marginal costs of 231 percent and a gross profit
share in revenues of over 81 percent. One should keep in mind however, that an important part of
German manufacturing exports constitute medium to high tech products and investment goods
such that fixed operating and development costs make up an important part of overall costs.
Also, these profits have to pay for entry and fixed costs of exporting and costs of accumulating
and maintaining distribution channels which, as reported below, make up between 20 to 40
percent of revenues alone.
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– Demand elasticity (η)
As mentioned above, the foreign demand elasticity is not estimated with a very
strong precision. This also shows in the Jacobi matrix. η affects mean growth
rate overall as well as for entrants.
– Costs of foreign demand accumulation (clin, ccon)
A higher proportional profit loss in building a foreign customer stock decreases
growth rates for entrants and means a more compressed revenue distribution
overall. Higher convex investment costs have plants spread out their investment
over more years after entry or a positive productivity shock. They do, however,
also decrease the value of investment overall which, evaluated at the baseline
estimate, actually means lower growth rates in the years three and four after
entry. Experimentation showed this effect to be non-monotonic throughout the
larger parameter space.
– Revenue productivity distribution (ρφ, σφ, σχ)
Both ρφ and σφ have effects on the centered moments of the overall growth rates
and they both induce positive autocorrelation as productivity innovations be-
come larger and more persistent. More persistent innovations in particular also
mean higher growth rates for entrants as they can expect to stay productive for
a longer time and accumulate more demand. Increases in all three parameters
spread out the sales distribution. In some sense σχ picks up residual disper-
sion after α and the parameters of the revenue productivity process have been
identified.
– Fixed costs of exporting (γE, σE, γF , σF )
Sunk entry and continuation costs have an impact on almost all aspects of
the model. They increase the higher moments and autocorrelation of export
revenue growth by introducing stronger selection on productivity in entering
exports. They make exit more likely for entrants which reduces initial revenue
growth. The more compressed revenue distribution is also a consequence of
stronger selection and less export participation. Finally, a higher sunk com-
ponent in fixed costs introduces more persistence in exporting, a fact that has
been exploited in previous estimations of sunk cost models18.
18See for instance Roberts and Tybout (1997).
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Figure 3.3: Export participation and total export revenue
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Note: Panels (a) and (b) display export participation and the cumulative growth in total export revenues in the
data sample used for estimating the model (dash-dotted line) and compares it to the respective series in the baseline
model (solid line) and the restricted model version (dashed line) where α is restricted to zero. Panel (c) displays a
summary measure for aggregate export profitability, Qt ≡ DWt
(
RERt
1+τt
)η
, for the two model specifications.
Higher variability in sunk and fixed costs in many ways has the opposite ef-
fect off a higher mean. It makes export participation more volatile thereby
increasing exit and (re-)entry and decreasing persistence in exporting. Higher
variance in entry costs means more firms are going to enter who are unlikely
to survive long. More variable fixed costs increase exit probability for all firms
and in consequence also for entrants. This introduces selection which means
higher average growth rates for those entrants that survive.
3.5.3 Model fit
Coming back to Table 3.4, the columns entitled µ(θˆ) report the model generated
moment vector evaluated at the baseline estimate θˆ next to the target vector µ(θ0).
Overall, the model provides a close fit to the data. Regarding the export revenue
growth rate, the model reproduces the centered moments well and gets right the in-
crease in one and two year autocorrelation, even though the increase is steeper in the
data. Like in the data, entrants into exporting grow strongly in the years after entry
and their survival probabilities are increasing in exporting tenure, though the data
feature a step increase after the initial year, where the model produces a smoother
profile in survival rates. The export revenue distribution in the model is more dis-
perse than in the data and the model overestimates initial export participation.
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3.5.4 Model comparison
I now want to turn to the question in how far the baseline model’s implications
differ from those of a model with stochastic sunk and fixed cost as only costs of
exporting like the one estimated in Das et al. (2007). I therefore re-estimate the
model setting α to zero and have δ, clin, cconv take some arbitrary positive values. The
parameter estimates of this restricted specification are reported in the two rightmost
columns of Table 3.5. I then simulate the two estimated model versions for the
duration of my estimation sample feeding in the observed series for aggregate tariffs,
aggregate export demand and the real exchange rate and record the resulting series
for aggregate export participation and cumulative growth in aggregate exports which
were not specifically targeted in the estimation. The first two panels of Figure 3.3
compare the results to the data.
It follows from equation (3.2) that aggregate export revenue at time t in the model
is given by
1
η
N∑
i=1
zitD
α
itD
W
t
(
RERt
1 + τt
)η
.
Let me now define Qt ≡ DWt
(
RERt
1+τt
)η
as summary measure of aggregate export
profitability which moves the incentive to enter/stay in exporting and to increase
foreign market presence. Again normalizing the sample beginning in 1995 to zero, I
plot the cumulative growth in aggregate export profitability for both model versions
in the rightmost panel (c) of Figure 3.3. While both series use the same aggregate
price and demand series in their calculation, they differ due to the much higher
elasticity of substitution η of 3.47 compared to only 1.43 in the baseline version.
Both series experience a strong increase up to 2000 as tariffs drop and the German
real exchange rate experiences a 20 percent depreciation vis-a`-vis its trading partners.
Afterwards the increase is much more subdued in case of the baseline model and even
reversed to a degree as rising overall demand is counteracted by a rise in the real
exchange rate of about 10 percent.
The much higher estimate for the demand elasticity η in the fixed cost model
implies that aggregate exports are quite responsive to movements in the real exchange
rate. This constitutes a version of what has previously been called the elasticity
puzzle in international economics. In order to reconcile the high observed mean
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growth rate in plant export revenue in response to the favorable changes in the
aggregate export environment at the time, export demand has to be relatively elastic.
The two model versions differ markedly in their implications for both export par-
ticipation and total export growth. They both underpredict the rise in export par-
ticipation at the end of the sample because they do not catch the growth spurt after
2005. Neither do they catch the slight initial drop after 1996. Importantly, whereas
the baseline model has export participation increase slowly after 1996, the fixed
cost version predicts a steep increase which actually peaks in 2002 to then level off
again. This is a consequence of the discussed strong sensitivity of aggregate export
profitability to real exchange rate movements and clearly counterfactual to what is
observed in the data.
Turning to the growth in aggregate exports, there is an important difference be-
tween the model versions. The baseline model predicts stronger growth, especially
in the first six years, than is observed. Setting η a bit lower to a value still within
confidence bounds moves the series closer to the data. It is however, a deficiency that
it shares with the alternative specification. More importantly, the fixed cost model
has aggregate exports pretty much flat after 2002 and even sees a decline which
closely tracks the behavior of aggregate export profitability Qt. Meanwhile, in the
model with costly demand accumulation, export participation increases and firms
slowly continue increasing their customer stock in reaction to the previous shocks.
In consequence, aggregate exports rise by an additional 40 percent after 2003 which
accords well with what we see in the data. As can one can also see in Figure 3.7,
the baseline model matches the data well in another dimension by predicting the
export expansion to be accompanied by a steady decline in exit rates whereas the
fixed cost model predicts a rise in exit rates after 2002. The two models make similar
predictions regarding entry.
3.5.5 Estimated Costs of Exporting
My structural approach allows me to quantify the size of sunk entry and continuation
costs that plants face and the amount of resources they spend on maintaining and
expanding their sales network. An estimate of 1.04 for γE implies that entry costs are
on average .33 percent of the average plants export revenue in 1995 which translates
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into 33,467 1995 euros. Analogously, mean continuation costs are 20,108 1995 euros19.
Compared with an entry cost estimate of between $344,000 and $412,000 in terms
of 1986 dollars for a sample of Columbian manufacturing plants in Das et al. (2007),
these estimates seem surprisingly low. It turns out that by far the largest share
of sunk expenditures in exporting arises from costly investment into the customer
network. As one may also see in Figure 3.8, during the time of the sample, the
average exporter spends about 19 percent of export revenues on maintaining its
customer base and between 8 and 19 percent on further expanding it. In 1995, the
beginning of the sample, this translates into an average expenditure of 2.4 million
euros on maintaining customer capital and a further 0.96 million on expanding it.
The low entry and fixed cost estimates are also well in line with the findings in
Willis and Ruhl (2009) who, using the same data set as Das et al. (2007) to estimate
a two-country heterogeneous firm model with endogenous export participation, find
entry costs of $104,242 in terms of 1986 dollars. This estimate drops by a factor of 8
when exogenously imposing the slow export revenue growth for new exporters. Their
fixed costs estimate of $11,316 puts their results for the extended model version in the
same ballpark as mine. There are as yet not many figures in the literature to which
to compare the substantial estimates for money spent on marketing and maintaining
and building a sales network. One exception is Arkolakis (2010) who reports that,
depending on the definition used, American firms spend up to 7.7 percent of GDP on
marketing activities. Taken together with the estimates presented here, this shows
expenditures on building up demand, in the domestic or the foreign market, to be
substantial and an important factor behind the slow revenue growth of plants after
entering a market.
3.6 Macroeconomic Implications
This section investigates the macroeconomic implications of introducing costly de-
mand accumulation into a model of endogenous export participation. I trace out
the effects of three kinds of shocks for the behavior of aggregate exports, export
participation and entry and exit. First, I look at a persistent real exchange rate
19The stochastic nature of entry and continuation costs implies that average costs paid are lower.
On average, plants pay about 15.923 1995 euros to enter into exporting and 19.077 euros to
continue.
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depreciation. Second, I introduce a permanent stochastic innovation to aggregate
export demand. Finally, I consider the dynamic effects of moving the economy into
a free-trade environment by removing all tariffs.
3.6.1 Real exchange rate depreciation
Figure 3.4 displays the dynamic response of aggregate exports, export participation
and export entry and exit to a one standard deviation real exchange rate depreciation.
A first observation is that exports in the fixed cost model are much more responsive
to the positive real exchange rate innovation than they are in the baseline version.
The more than 12 percent increase in aggregate exports translates into an elasticity
of 3.4. That is more than 70 percent higher than the elasticity of 1.93 implied by
the baseline estimate. Also, whereas exports in the fixed cost model follow the real
exchange rate in monotonically reverting to their long-run mean, exports take until
the second year after the shock to reach their maximum response when firms take
time to react to the favorable conditions by investing into new sales relationships.
Export participation reacts stronger in the fixed cost model as well. This is the
result of both a more pronounced increase in entry and a much steeper initial decline
in exit from exporting. Nonetheless, the participation response in the baseline model
turns out to be more persistent, because exit stays below average for much longer.
As the exchange rate returns to its mean plants stop investing into the export market
and let their additional sales relations slowly dissolve. Since that takes time, they
remain less likely to exit for many years after the shock. This does not, however,
make aggregate exports more persistent than in the fixed cost model since the effect
is mostly on smaller firms.
3.6.2 Positive innovation to export demand
Next, I look at the response to a positive innovation to aggregate export demand in
Figure 3.5. In period zero, demand increases by 1.49 percent (one standard deviation)
and stays at that level throughout the simulation. The real exchange rate remains
fixed at its long-run average and tariffs are at the level of 1995. Again, the two
models differ markedly in their behavior. Already the initial reaction of exports
is much stronger in the baseline than it is in the restricted model, because firms
immediately start building more market share. In the subsequent years, exports rise
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Figure 3.4: Dynamic response to a real exchange rate depreciation
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Note: This figure displays the dynamic response of aggregate exports, export participation and export entry and
exit after a one standard deviation real exchange rate depreciation. The shock hits the economy in period zero and
the graphs show the mean response in that year and the twenty years afterwards. The solid lines represent responses
in the baseline model and the dashed lines represent the model with fixed entry and continuation costs only. The
responses of real exchange rate and aggregate exports (Panel a and b) are in percentage deviations from steady state.
The unit for participation, entry and exit (Panel c-e) is percentage point differences from steady state. Aggregate
export demand is fixed at one. Tariffs are at the level of 1995.
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Figure 3.5: Dynamic response to persistent increase in export demand
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Note: This figure displays the dynamic response of aggregate exports, export participation and export entry and
exit after a one standard deviation innovation to aggregate export demand. The shock hits the economy in period
zero and the graphs show the mean response in that year and the twenty years afterwards. The solid lines represent
responses in the baseline model and the dashed lines represent the model with fixed entry and continuation costs only.
The response of aggregate exports (Panel a) is in percentage deviations from steady state. The unit for participation,
entry and exit (Panel b-d) is percentage point differences from steady state. The real exchange rate is fixed at one.
Tariffs are at their level of 1995.
by another percentage point and it takes about five years for them to get there.
While initially, participation in both cases increases by only .1 percent, this gain
increases fourfold in the 10 years following the shock for the baseline case, but there
is no comparable development in the fixed cost model.
The possibility to subsequently accumulate more demand increases the value of
exporting more in the baseline model than it does in the fixed cost version as can be
seen by an initial reaction in entry which is about twice as high. The explanation for
the much larger increase in participation is similar to that for the more persistent
reaction to the real exchange rate shock. Exit rates in the fixed cost model return
to their mean two years after the positive innovation. They stay permanently lower
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in the baseline model. Larger idiosyncratic customer capital again implies a larger
sunk investment in exporting and in consequence lower exit probabilities.
3.6.3 Moving to free trade
Figure 3.6: Dynamic response to trade liberalization
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Note: This figure displays the dynamic response of aggregate exports, export participation and export entry and
exit after moving from the level of 1995 level of tariffs to free trade in period zero. The tariff reduction hits the
plants unexpectedly in period zero. The solid lines represent responses in the baseline model and the dashed lines
represent the model with fixed entry and continuation costs only. The response of aggregate exports (Panel a) is in
percentage deviations from steady state. The unit for participation, entry and exit (Panel b-d) is percentage point
differences from steady state. The real exchange rate and aggregate export demand are fixed at one.
Finally, I consider moving the economy from its 1995 tariff level to free trade in
Figure 3.6. This implies a 10 percent long-run gain in aggregate exports in the case
of the baseline model and an 11.5 percent gain for the alternative version. Export
participation rises by 1.13 and 1.00 percent in the long run respectively. While these
numbers may seem rather small, one should keep in mind that with a trade-weighted
average of 3.3 percent, tariffs were already quite low in 1995. The larger expansion
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in export participation in the baseline case again comes from a permanent drop in
exit rates.
There are two important observations to make. First, as consequence of the de-
mand friction that plants face when expanding export sales after the tariff drop the
full realization of trade gains takes almost ten years. This is an important con-
sideration to take into account when making welfare predictions about the reform.
Second, both models predict long-run gains of similar size. Only the baseline model,
however, is able to reconcile its prediction with a relatively low elasticity of exports
to a real exchange rate depreciation as observed empirically. It therefore provides a
solution to the elasticity puzzle in international economics by predicting both modest
export reactions to real exchange rate movements and much larger gains after trade
liberalizations.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I introduce a capital theoretic concept of the customer stock into
a dynamic structural model of export participation. I thereby contribute to a re-
cent literature in the areas of macroeconomics and international trade which investi-
gates the implications of slow demand accumulation for the propagation of aggregate
shocks and the distribution of export participation and intensity across international
destinations. The model builds on the framework introduced in Das et al. (2007)
and extends it by the introduction of a decreasing returns to scale technology which
converts an export market specific factor into export demand. Plants have to spend
resources on acquiring this factor which I call customer capital. A plant starts every
new exporting spell without any customer capital. In consequence, investments into
export demand constitute a type of sunk cost which causes firms to be more reluctant
to exit the market when faced with bad shocks. Adjustments to the customer capital
stock are subject to convex adjustment costs such that entrants spread investments
over several years until they reach their desired level. Just like physical capital, ex-
port demand depreciates in the absence of new investment as trade partners go out
of business and brands lose salience with consumers. Maintaining and expanding the
customer stock therefore imposes steady costs on exporters.
I structurally estimate the model on a panel data set of German manufacturing
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plants using a Simulated Method of Moments procedure. The data set spans the
years 1995 to 2008, a time period that saw a strong increase in exporting activity
among the plants in the sample. Export participation rose from 58 percent in the year
1995 to 66 percent in 2008 and total exports doubled in real terms. As consequence of
the richness of the data set, I observe more than 14,000 export entry episodes in the
sample. In the first four years of an export spell, plants display above average revenue
growth rates and exit hazard rates are strongly declining with export tenure. These
observations are consistent with a steady accumulation of export specific demand.
While the entry into exporting is associated with strong growth in domestic revenues
which hints at a positive productivity innovation, strong export revenue growth rates
do not coincide with equally strong growth in the domestic market in the following
years. This is an important indication that continued productivity growth is not
responsible for the high export growth rate, at least insofar as productivity is not
market specific.
I provide a first estimate of the costs related to export market demand accumula-
tion. Estimated costs are substantial with plants on average having to spend between
26 and 38 percent of export revenues on maintaining and expanding their customer
stock. On the other hand, estimated entry costs into exporting of 33,467 1995 euros
are small compared to other estimates in the literature. The model fits the data well.
Unlike a pure fixed cost model of export participation, it correctly predicts a strong
growth in aggregate exports in the years after 2003 even though aggregate export
profitability was flat in those years.
Regarding dynamic behavior, the model predicts total exports to keep expanding
up to ten years after the hypothetical elimination of all tariffs for manufacturing
exports. The total predicted rise in trade after eliminating an average of 3.3 percent
ad valorem tariffs is 10 percent. This number is comparable in magnitude to the 11.5
percent a restricted alternative model without customer capital would predict. Unlike
the fixed cost version, however, it is able to reconcile this prediction with a relatively
subdued reaction of aggregate exports to real exchange rate movements. It therefore
offers a possible answer to what has previously been called the elasticity puzzle in
international economics - the discrepancy between high estimates for elasticities of
substitution between goods from different countries from trade liberalization episodes
and low estimates at business cycle frequency.
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Appendix to Chapter3
3.A More information on the data set
Table 3.6: Summary statistics by sector
Sector (NACE rev. 1.1) % of obs
Employment Export
Mean Total Part. (%) % in Rev.
Mining (10-14) 2.9 86 129,093 15.2 25.8
Food, Bev., Tobacco (15-16) 12.7 90 571,013 24.3 16.8
Textile, App. Leath (17-19) 4.7 96 226,591 71.7 23.2
Wood products (20) 4.1 57 115,840 39.4 17.1
Paper, Printing (21-22) 7.9 104 411,524 52.8 14.8
Chemicals (24) 3.5 268 480,703 81.1 34.4
Rubber, Plastics (25) 6.3 113 356,709 71.5 21.4
Non-metallic min. (26) 7.7 65 251,323 29.4 20.8
Metal, Metal prod. (27-28) 17 102 863,567 54.7 20.1
Machinery (29) 14 141 992,867 73.9 33.5
Electr. machinery (30-33) 11.4 152 871,488 60.1 30.4
Transport equip. (34-35) 3.1 569 908,038 66.3 26.0
Other manufacturing (36) 4.4 103 228,067 68.3 20.5
Note: The table displays summary statistics by sector for AFiD the sample of German
manufacturing firms in 1999. Sectors are defined by broad NACE sectoral classifications.
Statistics are the percentage of plant observations in the sector, average firm employment,
total sectoral employment in the underlying population, export participation in percent
and average share of exports in revenue for exporters. The 1999 sample contains a total of
50,154 plant observations.
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Table 3.7: Employment size distribution
Size class % share
Employment Revenue
Revenue share (%)
Total Share (%) (Billion 1999 e)
1 to 49 52.82 723,667 11.2 84.6 7.1
50 to 99 21.56 757,004 11.7 101.8 8.5
100 to 249 15.83 1,232,709 19.1 191.8 16.0
250 to 499 5.76 992,980 15.4 169.5 14.1
500 to 999 2.58 871,948 13.5 195.7 16.3
Over 1000 1.45 1,857,817 28.9 452.9 37.9
Total 100 6,436,127 100 1,196 100
Note: The table displays the distribution of plants in the sample over 6 employment size classes for the year 1999.
Columns (3) to (6) additionally report total employment, share in total employment, total revenue and share in total
revenue for each size class.
3.B Export entry and exit
Figure 3.7: Export transitions in the data and the two model specifications
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Note: Panels (a) and (b) display export entry and exit rates in the data sample (dashed lines) used for estimating
the model and compares it to the respective series in the baseline model (solid lines) and the restricted model version
(dash-dotted lines) where α is restricted to zero.
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3.C Costs of customer capital accumulation
Figure 3.8: Average costs of demand base accumulation in terms of revenue
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Note: The figure displays the average share of total export revenue that plants spent on maintaining and expanding
their foreign customer base in a simulated version of the baseline model for the time of the sample (1995 to 2008)
given the observed series for real exchange rates, export demand and tariffs.
3.D Aggregate variables
3.D.1 Tariffs
This section describes how I calculate the average tariff series used in simulating
and estimating the model. The procedure consists of three steps. First, I calculate
German manufacturing exports by year and by country using export data from the
Eurostat Comext data base. I use those to identify the most important export
destinations and to construct a stable aggregate “rest of the world” export market.
Finally, I obtain disaggregated tariff data applicable to imports coming from the
European Union for countries that are part of the aggregate. Weighting them by
export volume (across destinations and within destinations across product lines)
yields an average tariff measure.
The first challenge consists in identifying which export flows recorded in the trade
data correspond to the sectors in my plant data base. The trade data are organized
by the Harmonized System (HS) classification whereas sectors in the plant data are
assigned based on the NACE rev. 1.1 classification. I match those sectoral classi-
fications manually which requires some judgment based on the precise description
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of the sectoral definitions. I choose to construct matches between two digit NACE
sectors and HS(2) chapters. Fortunately, in most cases identifying correspondences
is relatively straightforward. Table 3.8 provides some examples.
Table 3.8: NACE to HS matches - examples
NACE rev. 1.1 sector Matched HS(2) chapter
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 24 Tobacco Manuf. Tobacco substitutes
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper, 47 Pulp of wood, waste & scrap of paper
and paper products 48 Paper & paperboard,
articles of paper pulp
29 Manufacture of machinery 84 Nuclear reactors, boilers,
and equipment n.e.c. machinery & mechanical appliances,
30 Manufacture of office computers
machinery and computers
Note: The table reports three three matches between the NACE (rev 1.1) sectoral classifi-
cation and Harmonized System chapters that serve to construct an average tariff measure
for German manufacturing exports between 1995 and 2008.
For the HS chapters identified as being manufacturing related, I then aggregate
up exports and rank export destinations by export value for every year separately.
The union set of the top twenty export destinations constitutes the world market
for German manufacturing exports between 1995 and 2008. Table 3.9 lists the coun-
tries included and their share in total exports. Throughout the sample period, the
aggregate stably accounts for 80 percent of total export volume.
For each member country I obtain six digit add valorem tariff data from the WTO.
Exports to EU countries and to Switzerland are tariff free. I first compute tariff
measures by country (value-weighted and unweighted) and then weight them again
by export volume by year to obtain an aggregate series of for applicable tariff duties.
Figure 3.9 displays the resulting series. The left panel displays the series used in
the estimations, where value-weights are used in computing the tariff measures by
country. The right panel is based on unweighted averages.
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Figure 3.9: Tariff series
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Note: The figure displays the average tariff series applicable to German manufacturing exports between 1995 and
2008. In the left panel, individual tariff lines have been value-weighted by their share in exports to some destination
before weighting these averages by export value to destination. The right panel is based only on a value weighted
average across countries. Individual tariff lines at some destination are not further weighted.
3.D.2 Real exchange rate
Figure 3.10: Real exchange rate series for Germany (1995-2008)
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Note: The figure displays the trade-weighted real exchange rate for Germany between 1995 and 2008.
3.E Numerical Solution Method
This section of the appendix provides more details on the numerical solution algo-
rithm. Source code for replication of the results will be available for download from
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the author’s web page at http://www.uni-bonn.de/~s6votjad/. I carry out the
calculations of the time series for aggregate tariffs and aggregate demand in Stata.
The code for estimating the processes and generating the graphs in the main chap-
ter are written in the MATLAB® language. Finally, the estimation algorithm is
written in FORTRAN 90. The program makes use of the NAG Numerical Library
for numerical integration and some statistical calculations. To greatly speed up the
solution of the value function iteration, some of the main work is carried out on an
NVIDIA Tesla GPU using the CUDA Fortran set of extensions to the FORTRAN
language from PGI. For an exposition to the benefits of using graphics processors to
solve dynamic program problems see Aldrich et al. (2011). For an introduction to
programing in CUDA Fortran you should consult Ruetsch and Fatica (2011). For
readers who wish to replicate the results without access to an NVIDIA card, there
is a non-GPU version of the program available from the author upon request.
3.E.1 Simulated Method of Moments Procedure
In order to obtain parameter estimates, the problem consists of minimizing the
quadratic form given by equation (3.5) in the parameter vector θˆ. θˆ has twelve
elements, many of them without reasonable prior guesses to start from. Equation
(3.5) has no known derivatives and is not guaranteed to be continuous. It there-
fore employ a Particle Swarm global optimization algorithm. This method tries to
improve on a set of candidate solutions, called particles, by randomly moving them
around the search-space where the size of changes depends on the particle’s position
and velocity. Movements are also guided by the global and local memory of the best
solutions visited so far21. Upon convergence to the global minimum, the variance-
covariance matrix of the estimate is given by equation (3.6), where E0
∂µ
∂θ
is again
calculated using numerical differentiation.
3.E.2 Value Function Iteration
During the estimation procedure, for any given set of parameters θ, firm policies for
export participation and customer capital investment solve the dynamic program-
ming problem described by equations (3.3) and (3.4). I approximate the continuous
21For an introduction to the method see Poli (2008). For a description of the algorithm I employ, you
may also consult http://www.nag.co.uk/numeric/fl/nagdoc_fl23/xhtml/E05/e05saf.xml.
143
CHAPTER 3. CUSTOMER CAPITAL AND EXPORT DYNAMICS
variables D,φ, χ,RER and DWusing discrete sets of grid points. I then iterate on
equations (3.3) and (3.4) until convergence.
The customer capital grid is equi-spaced in log (D) with an upper bound of ωDmaxstat ,
where Dmaxstat =
(
α
(
RERmax/τ low
)η
DWmaxφmaxχmaxδ−1
) 1
1−α is the optimal customer
stock choice in the absence of uncertainty and convex adjustment costs evaluated at
the largest grid points of the aggregate and idiosyncratic state variables and ω is a
fixed fraction. Experimentation yielded ω = 0.6 as a suitable choice for Dmaxstat never to
be a binding constraint on plant choices. In discretizing the AR(1)-processes for the
persistent component of idiosyncratic revenue productivity φ and the real exchange
rate RER, I use Tauchen (1986). The grid points for the permanent component
of idiosyncratic productivity log (χ) are the mean values of a set of equi-likely bins
of the normal distribution N (0, σχ). Finally, in discretizing the bounded random
walk for log(DW ), I use an equi-distant set of grid points and obtain transition
probabilities from a mixture of linear interpolation and Gaussian quadrature. During
the estimation procedure I use 160 grid points for D , 10 grid points for φ and χ
each, 7 grid points for RER and 5 grid points for Dw.
Export participation policies take the form of threshold realizations ξˆE and ξˆFand
are therefore straightforward to calculate. The large dispersion in export revenues
across plants in the data implies that customer capital policies span a large interval
in R+0 . The challenge then consists of finding an accurate solution using only a
relatively small number of grid points. Instead of optimizing over the discrete set of
grid points, I use a golden section search optimization algorithm coupled with cubic
spline interpolation of the value function22.
The solution of the plant problem itself is subdivided into three steps. First, I
solve for plant policies for the stochastic steady state that persists after 2008 in
which tariffs are at a permanently low level. I then iterate backwards from 2008
to 1995 using the tariff series calculated in Section 3.3.4. Plants perfectly forecast
the tariff series and they form expectations over DWt+1and RERt+1 given their esti-
mated stochastic processes. Finally, I calculate policies that persist during the initial
stochastic steady state ante 1995 in which plants are ignorant of the tariff changes
22For an introduction to the calculation and use of splines in numerical analysis you may consult
de Boor (1978). In calculating spline coefficients, I also make use of two routines that come
as open source code with that book. They are available for download at http://orion.math.
iastate.edu/burkardt/f_src/f_src.html.
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that will start taking place in that year.
3.E.3 Transition Simulation
The policy functions that solve the plant’s dynamic problem serve as input into
S = 20 Monte Carlo Simulations with N = 50, 000 plants each. During the iterations
over different parameter guesses, the random draws are fixed to assure convergence
of the global minimization algorithm. The simulation consists of 150 initial periods
during which global demand is fixed and tariffs are at their high initial level and of the
transition period lasting 14 years between 1995 and 2008. I do not limit plant choices
regarding D to be on-grid and evaluate them using spline interpolation. Policy
functions for export entry and continuation policy I interpolate linearly. During the
transition period, when I feed in observed realizations for export demand DW and the
real exchange rate RER , I first linearly interpolate policies in these two dimensions.
The estimated parameter vector µ (θ) is the average over the S simulations
3.E.4 Stylized Jacobi matrix
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Table 3.9: Countries in world market aggregate
Country
Share in total exports (%)
1995 2008
Austria 5.49 5.51
Belgium20 6.49 5.10
Brazil 0.99 0.90
China 1.48 3.56
Czech Republic 1.63 2.84
Denmark 1.85 1.56
Finland 0.92 0.99
France 11.65 9.62
Hungary .95 1.79
Italy 7.49 6.30
Japan 2.60 1.32
Netherlands 7.33 6.28
Poland 1.72 4.11
Portugal 0.87 0.84
Romania 0.35 0.91
Russia 1.38 3.28
South Korea 1.18 0.90
Spain 3.43 4.42
Sweden 2.45 2.06
Switzerland 5.41 3.88
Taiwan 1.01 0.50
Turkey 1.11 1.58
United States 7.60 7.42
United Kingdom 8.27 6.61
Total 80.56 79.15
Note: The table reports the set of countries I use to calculate aggre-
gate series for tariffs and export demand. I select them by ranking
German manufacturing export destinations for every year between
1995 and 2008 by value. The set of countries is the union set of
the top twenty destinations in every year.
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Table 3.10: Stylized Jacobi matrix at baseline estimate
η α δ ρφ σφ σχ c
lin cconv γE σE γF σF
Mean
(
∆Rt
Rt
)
+ + o – - o o o o o o o
Std
(
∆Rt
Rt
)
o - + o + o o o – + - +
Skew
(
∆Rt
Rt
)
o ++ + – - + + + ++ – ++ –
Kurtosis
(
∆Rt
Rt
)
o o - - – o o o ++ - + -
Autocorr(1) o ++ o ++ ++ o o o ++ – ++ –
Autocorr(2) o ++ - ++ ++ - - - ++ – + –
GRE(1) o ++ o ++ o o o o - + o +
GRE(2) o ++ - ++ - o - + – + – +
GRE(3) + ++ - ++ ++ - - - – ++ – ++
GRE(4) - - – ++ – – – - – + – ++
SR(0) o o o o o o o o ++ - o -
SR(1) o o o o o o o o + - + -
SR(2) + o o o o o o o + - + -
SR(3) o o o + o o o o + - + -
SR(4) o o o + o o o o o o o -
SR(5) o o o o o o o o o o o o
SR(6) o o o o o o o o o o o o
SR(7) o o o o o o o o o o o o
SR(8) o o o o o o o o o o o o
Q2 o – + – – – + + + - + -
Q3 o – + – - – + o + - + -
Q4 o – + – - – o o + - + -
Q5 o + o o o o o o o o o o
NE − E o – + - o - o o – ++ – ++
E −NE o – + o o - + o – ++ – ++
Corr(Expt, Expt−2) o o o o o o o o + - o -
Corr(Expt, Expt−4) o + o o o o o o + - + -
Exp95 o o - + o o o o - o - o
Note: The table displays a stylized version of the Jacoby matrix evaluated at the baseline estimate of the model. The
Jacoby matrix provides a good guide as to what elements of the moment vector µ are strongly affected by any given
parameter and in turn, help identifying this parameter. – signifies an estimated elasticity of below -1 (strong negative
effect), - means an estimated elasticity between -1 and -.2 (negative effect). o marks no important effect (though entries
are scarcely zero). + represents an estimated elasticity of between .2 and 1 (positive effect). All elastiticies larger than
1 are marked by ++.
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